


Dennis Day, Annette Grindsted, Brigitte Piquard
and David Zammit (eds.)

Cities and Crises



HumanitarianNet

Thematic Network on Humanitarian
Development Studies

Cities and Crises

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2009
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Bilbao

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P.O. box 1 - 48080 Bilbao

I.S.B.N.: 978-84-9830-988-1

Acknowledgements

We wish to express our gratitude to Brigitte Piquard, Oxford Brookes University and University of Paris, who got the idea to organize a conference on urban crises and invited experts to give a series of brilliant papers, and to Julia Gonzalez, Co-ordinator of HumanitarianNet, who made it possible to organize a conference on responses to urban crises during HumanitarianNet's Annual Forum in Odense in 2008. We also wish to acknowledge Chamutal Eitam for editing the overall structure of the book.

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Introduction

Cities and Crises

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Sudden crises in urban spaces are a major global concern. Crises may be caused by various phenomena, such as natural disasters, conflicts arising from social and economic discontent, bad governance, and acts of terror. Whatever the causes and whichever form crises take, populations suffer serious damages – physically, spatially, socially, psychologically or symbolically. The present volume is concerned with what happens when local populations and the international community respond to those crises while faced with the dynamics of emerging modes of resistance and coping mechanisms among the suffering populations.

With the rampant urbanization, new forms of vulnerabilities have appeared. People are increasingly forced to settle in unstable, dangerous, extreme, or fragile environments, and many contemporary crises happen in cities such as Kabul, Mogadishu, Beirut, Gaza City, or Sarajevo. Therefore, the international community needs a better understanding of urban crisis contexts, and focussing on urban spaces becomes increasingly important for the efficiency of humanitarian actions. This presents a new challenge as humanitarian and development traditions usually focus on “open spaces” and rural environments. One question that arises, then, is how it is possible to corroborate with traditional humanitarian principles when working in contexts where the division between the civilian and non-civilian populations is blurred, where the population density may bring about more and more constraints and negative impacts, where the security of humanitarian workers and aid recipients cannot be guaranteed when the presence of humanitarian agencies creates a divided city and disrupts the economy. Clearly, agencies and research

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institutions today are not yet fully equipped, theoretically or practically, to respond to those crises, and often they fail to take into account the coping mechanisms and modes of resistance of urban populations, particularly those linking the need of social sense, the search for recognition of identities and roots on which social fabrics can be grounded.

Crises particularly have an impact on the way people produce, understand, and inhabit spaces and places. During a conflict, or in the case of imposed displacement (flight being one of the major coping mechanisms during a conflict), forced migrants, fighters, or the civilian population are forced to rebuild socialised spaces either in areas void of any a priori social significance such as camps, or areas from which they feel excluded. They are forced to take into account a new organising scheme, their territory potentially being broken into new fragments: a security zone, a military zone, a land mine-polluted area, a quiet zone (a conflict is not affecting a territory with the same intensity all over), humanitarian sanctuaries, accessible sites, forbidden areas... Places can change social functions, too: the Mosque becomes a guesthouse or a dispensary, a school becomes a barracks or a prison, and the sports ground becomes a heliport. Populations will expect to be able to re-inscribe all the social places with known social meanings. Rebuilding some social links and re-inscribing solidarities in meaningful spaces will become one of the key elements in making collective life possible.

In February 2008, scholars and aid practitioners met in Odense, Denmark for the HumanitarianNet annual congress, in order to discuss those issues and identify some new research lines along which further actions could be taken. This volume is based on some of the conclusions and cases studies presented then. Some transversal ideas and concepts recur in most of the chapters and serve as corner stones in terms of the structure of the book.

Understanding Vulnerabilities, Spaces, and the Culture of Violence

The notion of vulnerability, and its new specific stakes and forms in urban contexts, has been developed widely by most of the authors, linking therefore sudden crises in cities with poverty and development issues. Itzok Prezelj, discussing contemporary issues of crisis management in Slovenia, argues that the importance of human-centric crisis management is greater in urban spaces than in non-urban spaces due to the extent of physical damages caused by crises. One of the reasons is the complexity of urban crises which requires complex crisis management. A complex crisis normally refers to many simultaneous threatening events

with broad consequences. In any case, the risks involved are much higher in urban spaces with a high population density and in which infrastructure is of vital importance for citizens' everyday life. The idea of vulnerability is stressed also by Kvetoslava Princova who questions if a city in crises can still be considered as a refuge. Throughout history the city has been perceived as a place that offers security and protection. But history has also shown that cities are places of vulnerability. Kveta Princova addresses the question of how migrants and newcomers contribute to the vulnerability of cities and may become more vulnerable in urban settings, as the city very often fails to ensure adequate protection.

Vulnerabilities can also arise for specific groups such as minorities, migrants, or women. Two articles discuss gendered characteristics of violence in relation to urban violence in Rio de Janeiro and San Salvador. Tatiana Moura, Silvia Roque, and Rita Santos discuss whether women are invisible and silent. This is done within the context of 'newest wars' that are both local, because they take place in urban micro-territories, and global, because they appear all over the world and are caused by the same global phenomena. The authors argue that armed violence is sometimes used as a men's response to social and economic exclusion. This male use of violence relates to the construction of a kind of masculinity in terms of power and domination, which, in turn, is perceived as generating respect and social status. This masculinity requires a femininity to serve as its antithesis, and according to the authors, femininity is often to be seen as silenced, invisible, and vulnerable.

Notions of space and territory and their links to crises are also investigated. It is clear to all that space shapes a group and its identity but also that societies and communities shape spaces, their meanings, and the ways they are used. Iztok Prezelj defines the role of space in contemporary crisis management by distinguishing between traditional and non-traditional crises. In a globalized world non-traditional crises do not respect national borders. A local crisis can escalate into a transnational crisis within a short period of time. Therefore, space cannot be limited to its material and physical dimensions. In this respect, writes Prezelj, cyberspace has added yet another dimension to crisis and crisis management. The spatial dimension is of importance in all phases of crisis management, and specific issues are to be addressed in each stage. The scope of damage will generally determine the level of crisis management although political preferences may affect the level of crisis response. Transnational spaces can develop into virtual ones, and this new dimension has to be addressed when focussing on the links between crises and spaces; a point on which Annette Grindsted, Astrid Jensen, and Dennis Day agree in their study of virtual space and web-based data in relation to trust building.

Issues pertaining to spaces and territories can also be addressed through the notion of organisation and, particularly, urban planning. Shipra Narang-Suri and Sultan Barakat stress that the role of urban planning in contemporary post-war reconstruction has been examined in very limited terms, if indeed at all. They argue that while urban destruction was once seen as an opportunity for urban planners to correct the mistakes of the past and develop new visions for the future, this is no longer the case, and today's reconstruction processes seem to offer only an illusion of the possibilities of real change. Brigitte Piquard stresses the political use of planning and the fact that organisation of borders, closures, fences, and walls segregate populations, express symbolic violence, and create conflicts and crisis.

The third transversal concept is the notion of culture of violence and war heritage. This crucial element for understanding conflict creates a link between crisis and everyday life. The notion of culture of violence, a culture at the centre of the conflict, is quite relevant to that point. Social and cultural realities make every conflict singular, and the cultural inheritance makes the path leading to violence and the way to cope with it quite different from place to place. It is important to keep in mind all the dimensions of the cultural construction of violence in terms of perceptions, identification, and values. All a range of different behaviours and perceptions may be witnessed in a war context. This is how most tensions (even the very domestic ones) are dealt with by violent means. Economical behaviours are based on short-term investment or overnight benefits. Rules of society are evaluated according to one's own judgement of risk taking. Tatiana Moura and Silvia Roque, in their comparative studies of Rio de Janeiro and San Salvador, highlight the importance of the culture of war and, particularly, violence as a phenomenon that pervades everyday life. The gender dimensions of conflict, especially the roles attributed to women involved in armed violence and described in terms of direct victims, perpetrators of armed violence, and survivors are at the centre of their analysis.

Brigitte Piquard portrays the Separation wall between Israel and the West Bank as the architectural embodiment of the culture of war. Indeed, the separation Wall impacts all aspects of life from the conception of space, time, and mobility to the social, economic, and political aspects of life.

Responses and Coping Mechanisms

Different forms of coping mechanisms and responses to crises can be witnessed either from the local affected populations or from external

communities. Coping mechanisms have been mostly represented as uncontrolled fruits of hazard, involuntary changes, or reflex actions. One of the strengths of the anthropological overview has been to examine coping mechanisms as a mix between deliberate strategies, resulting from collective or individual decision-making processes, and "implicit consensus" based on tacit accept of change. Those two points could be understood as opposite ends on a continuum. Flight, organisation of black markets and of resistance could be considered as strategies. Changes of values and changes in the identification process could be seen as "implicit consensus". This would include, for example, feelings of victimisation or legitimization of some acts of violence.

Decision making in conflict and strategies for coping is based not only on the obvious calculations of cost/benefit analyses, consideration of danger and effectiveness, but these decisions are also influenced by feelings, emotions, memories of past conflicts or displacements, identities, and social networks. If a successful adaptation to conflict requires new skills, new knowledge, and new leaders, it can create new tensions, new cleavages, and new disparities among people of the same communities, given that some people adapt more easily or more quickly than others (Piquard, 2004, 73).

Resistance and coping mechanisms are based also on creativity and inventions of new social behaviours, new social links, and new structures, values, and beliefs, or on collective memories of past experiences. Coping with conflict may need a full re-creation, a re-adaptation to a new context. This understanding of coping mechanisms breaks with the classical "tropical caricature" (Rufin, 1991) of the "helpless victims" and the idea of passiveness of a civilian population during a conflict. During a war populations are often dispossessed of their own historical process, and hence they start re-organising their lives according to their own social framework and adopting coping mechanisms to make life more liveable. Many aspects of this re-creation, this innovation process, will be grounded in the links between space, time, and identity.

Kveta Princova follows those points and stresses the importance of social meanings and social links in the way communities adapt and react to change. She holds the view that homogeneous, poor communities are better at managing crises than heterogeneous, multi-ethnic districts. This is so because the degree of social control and solidarity in homogeneous neighbourhoods is greater, and consequently the degree of vulnerability is reduced. One dimension that is explored is migrants' social bonding patterns. Another one is urban expansion dynamics, including the ability of city governments, public authorities, and NGOs to cope

with migration and urban planning and management issues, such as medical care, social care, education, and transportation. Initiatives can therefore be taken by specific groups and communities in order to cope or react. Tatiana Moura and Rita Santos develop the example of “militant motherhood” which is a form of activism led by mothers who are survivors of violence, paying particular attention to those emerging in a specific scenario of armed violence, this is Rio de Janeiro. Despite not being at war, the city has one of the highest homicide rates caused by firearms in the world. And, as in many contexts of declared war, the city constitutes a focus of vulnerability for women, who are rendered invisible not only in the analysis of the impacts of armed violence in their lives, but also in the analysis of the strategies and initiatives they undertake to fight violence. This is so even though, as highlighted in many cases of conflict, women play key roles in grass root initiatives in peace processes and violence reduction or prevention. Some of the initiatives taken by local peace NGOs or educationalists when drawings murals, graffiti's on the Separation Wall are following the same purposes: reoccupying confiscated spaces and bringing back social meanings and modes of communication in places when forms of inscription of the communities have been denied.

According to Shipra Narang-Suri and Sultan Barakat, the sheer complexity of post-conflict situations, combined with the short-termist approaches adopted by many international actors, undermines any attempts to apply planning for achieving equitable and sustainable development, or reconciliation between communities divided by a conflict. Based on examples of reconstruction after the Second World War as well as more recent conflicts, the authors suggest that planning has a critical role to play in the process of cities recovering from conflict. The neglect of urban planning in recent years, particularly by international administrations, could be a significant factor in the failure of the international community to realize their ambitious goals of sustainability, reconciliation, and a durable peace. Jon Leonardo, Maria Luisa Setien, Trinidad L. Vicente, Concepción Maiztegui, and Rosa Santibáñez stress that urban research faces a number of challenges that need to be addressed. One is to identify mobility strategies of the different social groups within the metropolitan geography. Another one is to gain knowledge of and analyze employment realities. A third one is to verify the influence of housing opportunities on immigrants' geographical location. A fourth one is to identify processes of inclusion-segregation in public spaces. A fifth one is to investigate educational integration. A sixth one is to understand immigrants' accessibility to, among others, social, educational, and health-related resources.

Two other notions are important in the understanding of responses and coping mechanisms in urban contexts, namely trust and communication. Communication is essential to crisis management and, particularly, to the notion of trust. Space and the built environment is a vector of rhetoric and ideology. Therefore all types of work related to space and the built environment will be linked to meaning, expression, and communication.

In crisis management, according to Iztok Prezelj, the role of communication with the public – both with the narrow and the broad public – is essential. The management of multidimensional crises involves many different actors from different levels of governance. The response is in fact often more complex than the problem. According to Kveta Princova, communication is of crucial importance to the development of effective rescue systems. Weaknesses in urban communication lead to further isolation and cultural differences, social bonding patterns in and between minority groups and the majority society, lack of education, and poverty. Strengths, on the other hand, include the solidarity within minority groups in crisis management, the strategies applied by NGOs to achieve the active participation of local citizens in developing plans, and women's survival strategies.

This brings us to the notion of trust essential to post-crisis management. Annette Grindsted and Astrid Jensen analyze to what extent mass media's treatment of a crisis event affects trust dynamics in society, with a particular focus on the relationship between ethnic minority groups and the host society. Firstly, the authors claim that the importance of emotions, particularly trust dynamics, should not be underestimated in urban planning and development. Secondly, the authors focus on trust in relation to mediated crises, and within this context, crises can be seen as socially constructed phenomena. It is hypothesized that whereas general trust in society as such may not suffer from mainstream media's urban crisis discourse, the relationship between ethnic minority groups and the host society might be negatively affected. The study is based on a two-step analytical framework, applied to the analysis of media representation and public communication within the blogosphere during the Mohammad Crisis II in Denmark. The first step includes a crisis model based on the discursive identities that can be related to the crisis event. This enables us to analyze how different stakeholder groups are related to these identities in mainstream media and the blogosphere. The second step addresses the issue of how trust can be analyzed as a discursive phenomenon. Dennis Day shares the same conceptual framework in his discussion of the role of interactive public communication as a variety of public communications – particularly communication of

trust – in times of urban crises. The case study involved is a web forum devoted to crime and missing persons, particularly in Richmond, Virginia in 2006. The paper rests on the assumption that a precondition for communicative activity is trust, and that trust can be seen as an empirical phenomenon subject to analysis. It is shown how forum participants not only trust discussion forum activities, but also conventional mass media, although it is emphasized that participants' decision to trust mass media should not be seen as a general phenomenon, but as tied only to specific events. Dennis Day's analysis of communication of trust shows how ordinary citizens manage an 'urban crisis' by joining an on-line discussion forum. Crisis management is constructed as a cooperative, situated, social activity which for its participants is an everyday affair. It is concluded that more long-term concerns of crisis management are better understood in the light of how those affected deal with crises on their own terms.

Towards Further Investigations

Though coming from different disciplines, research interests, and experiences, the authors of the different articles collected in this volume call for further investigations as a consequence both of the globalization process and of climatic changes, but also because systematic data collection has not been carried out. Different dimensions can be highlighted: the importance of the gender dimension and the 'emergence of new 'femininities' (Moura & Roque) or the importance of web-based functionalities in urban trust restoration processes (Grindsted & Jensen).

The legal dimension is also very important. Are attacks against spaces, towns, symbolic buildings (urbicide, spaciocide) crimes against humanity or forms of ethnocide? How to guarantee protection to non-fighters in an urban space? Are safe spaces, peace zones or places increasing vulnerability of populations such as in Srebrenica or in Cana?

Cities are linked to migration due to their cosmopolitanism and their diversities. Cities may become refuges during sudden crises. Threats, attacks, and disasters in cities will also create massive forced displacement of populations. If cities may be refuges, they are also targets of violence and homes of turbulence. Cities may be destroyed, locked, under siege, occupied. Cities can rebel ... Do acts of terror always happen in urban spaces? Does geography of violence exist? Cities may be targeted because of their role as symbols of power, identity, and cosmopolitanism. What is then the role of heritage and particularly this of places of memory?

All those interrogations show how vibrant and complex the topics are. Researchers in this field will have to be interdisciplinary in order to bring about the comprehensive data missing, and will have to be action-based in order to link theories and practices.

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Vulnerable Cities

Spatial Dimensions of Crisis Management

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Contemporary global society is witnessing many crises relating to politico-military conflicts, terrorism, natural disasters, infectious diseases, information disruptions, ethnic or religious violence and other causes. Many of these crises have a strong impact on the security and safety of people. In turn, many factors influence the emergence and development of these crises, such as for example spatial factors which have been very important. This notwithstanding, the role of such factors has been diminished and even disguised, as a result of intensive processes of globalisation and their impact on various contemporary security environments. Space has also been an analytically neglected factor in the scientific analysis of crisis management, despite the fact that most crisis and crisis management studies implicitly deal with spatial aspects (for example spatial causes of crises and spatial consequences). Space has not become an explicit object of research in crisis management studies. It is therefore both necessary and difficult to identify and analyse the actual role of space in contemporary crisis management.

My goal in this article is to explore the role of space in contemporary crisis management. The general importance of the spatial factor in traditional and modern crises will be analysed. Urban areas are concentrations of people and vital infrastructure which are highly relevant from the perspective of crisis emergence and crisis management. The article will show how complex urban areas affect crisis management. Some empirical cases of crises from Slovenia will also be used to support my arguments on the role of space in crisis management.

The General Importance of Space in Crisis Management

Many definitions of crisis exist in the literature. However the most comprehensive and usable is the one by Hermann. In 1972, Charles Hermann defined a crisis as a situation that highly threatens the priority goals of a decision-making unit, restricts the amount of time available

for response and surprises by its occurrence. What is the role of spatial factors in situations of surprise, threat and limited time for response?

Space, with its land, sea, and air dimensions is one of the key determinants of crisis emergence, development and management. It also influences the post-crisis recovery process. This means that space with all its characteristics strongly affects all elements of crisis and crisis management cycles. Relevant characteristics in this regard are the way space is structured and distributed. The way space is distributed refers to the number and distribution of natural and human objects (geographical distribution or position, density) and connections among these objects.

Urban areas as concentrations of people and infrastructure are among the most crisis-prone areas. Why is this so? We should be reminded that security, threats to security and crisis are all actually human-centric concepts. They were developed by humans to serve human needs. Threats refer to any social and natural phenomena that potentially or in fact decrease the security of affected targets such as individuals, groups, social communities, critical infrastructures, societies, states, the international community or human civilization as a whole. Most crises develop through the escalation of particular threats. As challenges to security, threats represent a danger because they can potentially cause death, injury, material destruction or create other kinds of security-sensitive situations. These types of damage are more relevant from the human perspective in urbanized areas. Two earthquakes of the same strength, where one affects a city and the other a rural zone, are not equally important from the perspective of society, or from that of crisis management studies. The damage caused by the first earthquake might be far greater than that caused by the second earthquake. This is why we can argue that human-centric crisis management focuses more on urbanized than non-urbanized areas. In crisis management studies and international relations, we increasingly use the term humanitarian crisis, which refers to situations where a large number of people are threatened with loss of life or becoming injured or homeless (IDP's or refugees). The use of this term reflects the real focus in crisis situations.

The Role of Space in Traditional Crises, Particularly Armed Conflict

Space has been one of the most important aspects of armed conflicts and wars throughout human history. The relationship between space and armed conflict is based on resource availability in a specific space and the desire to control it. This will be elaborated on later in this chapter.

Security crises emanate from threats, which relate mostly to people (individuals, groups, nations), institutions (critical state and non-state infrastructures) and territory (space). Threats to territory relate mostly to territorial sovereignty and national control. This is why geopolitical and conflict theory stressed the role of territory and its control. The control of territory has been important for people because the territory means space, food and other natural resources, such as water, minerals, fuels etc. Resources are understood as some thing, material or not material, that can be used to satisfy some human want or deficiency.¹ By definition, the existence of a resource depends on its value to humans. Resources are therefore a cultural and human-centric concept. Those things considered to be resources by one society may not be so considered by others.

In terms of availability of resources there are obviously popular/preferred territories and less popular/preferred ones. Some territories offer better land for agricultural purposes than others. Some are easily accessible, while others are hardly passable (i.e. due to high mountains). Some offer access to the sea, (historically often understood as access to the world), others are landlocked and so on. Control over a certain territory could mean wellbeing, more power, development etc. This is why social groups often competed for the control of territory. This means that they often fought wars for territory (attacking in order to acquire territory and defending a particular territory). Geopolitical theory stresses that the geographical dimension has become a key dimension of all armed conflicts. O'Sullivan (1986, 2) claims that territorial conflicts represent a key reason for armed conflicts and wars. The biggest threats emanate not from ideological differences but from the wish to control territory as a consequence of an existential dependence upon this territory. Historically speaking, wars are mostly responsible for creating territorial changes. Holsti (1991, 307) specifically analysed the causes of wars in the period from 1648 to 1991. He found out that territorial problems and conflicts caused most of the wars in this period. Around 50 percent of all wars from 1648 to First World War were motivated by territorial

¹ Resources are usually divided into human resources (e.g. population), capital or cultural resources (e.g. buildings) and natural resources. The later are further classified into renewable and non-renewable resources. Non-renewable resources have built-up or evolved over a geological time-span and cannot be used without depleting the stock and increasing the possibility of ultimate exhaustion of the resource in question. Renewable resources may be consumed in any time period without endangering future consumption possibilities, as long as the current use does not exceed net renewal during the period under consideration (Goodal 1987, 409-410).

conflicts. This percentage decreased to 30 between the end of the First World War and 1991, which still represented the most important cause of warfare.

The control of territory has been so important that one of the most recognized definitions of war and armed conflict by SIPRI² explicitly mentions territorial disagreements as causes of wars. In this respect, Wallensteen and Solenberg (1998) define armed conflict as a contested disagreement regarding governments and/or territory, where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Disagreements concerning government refer to disagreements concerning the preferred kind of political system, the desirability of replacing the central government or of changing its composition. Territorial disagreements refer to disagreements concerning the status of a territory, i.e. the desirability of changing the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession, or autonomy (intra-state conflict). To exemplify my claim about the importance of space in contemporary armed conflicts, I have identified the following inter- or intra-state territorial violent conflicts from the recent past:

- Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh),
- Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak territory),
- Croatia (Serbian part),
- Georgia (South Osetia, Abkhazia),
- Moldova (Dniestr),
- Russia (Chechnya),
- Spain (Basque)
- United Kingdom (Northern Ireland),
- Israel (Palestine),
- Iraq (Kurdistan),
- India (Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Manipur, Tripura),
- Indonesia (East Timor, Aceh),
- Myanmar (Mon, Arakan, Kachin, Kaya),
- Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)
- Phillipines (Mindanao),
- Sri Lanka (Tamil) etc.

Territorial conflicts are obviously spread around the world. Their highest concentration is in Asia, Africa, the Balkans and the Caucasus.

² Stockholm Institute for Peace Research.

Territorial proximity or distance has also played an important role in armed conflicts. Vasquez (1995) stressed that most of the wars in history have been fought between neighbours or at least closely situated countries. He found out that, since 1815, 90 percent of interstate wars and 85 percent of interstate rivalries took place between neighbours. The importance of territorial proximity actually implies that the problem of borders and their recognition lies at the heart of interstate conflicts. In this regard, a mutual recognition of borders is a precondition of peace. Researchers have found out that there were some 80 to 100 border disputes around the world in the nineties (see Glassner 1993, 84; Holsti 1991), albeit that most of these conflicts are somehow frozen and dormant.

Territorial divisions are however not only a cause of conflict. Once the territory is divided, provided that this division is considered fair, they represent also a cornerstone of societal stability. Recognized borders among relatively friendly ethnic groups and states create an environment conducive to long term stability, enabling societies to enhance their development, wellbeing and also democracy. This fact was recognized many times in human history. Perhaps the most relevant recognition is to be found in International law and the United Nations Charter. International law strictly prohibits territorial aggression and one of the main purposes of the United Nations is to prevent and react to aggressive acts and threats between states. With such a prohibition and as a result of the development of human society, countries have found other, more civilised ways, to compete for the control of territory, such as economic takeover. Owning and exploiting the economic output or natural resources does not necessarily mean the political control of the territory utilised and its people. In this case, the importance of space has continued in a different form.

The Role of Space in Non-Traditional Crises

It is difficult if not impossible to explain all aspects of the relationship between non-traditional crises and spatial factors. The problem boils down to the fact that there are too many variables and kinds of non-traditional crises. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, which makes some observations about the role of space in crises, a narrower focus has been chosen: natural disasters, terrorist attacks (and subsequent crises) and infectious diseases.

In all three cases the risks involved are highest in urban spaces with the highest concentration of people. Infectious diseases spread through mutual human contacts, which are most intensive in urban spaces. An

earthquake in an urban environment causes much more damage than an earthquake of the same strength in an unpopulated environment. Damage, in this case, is also a human centric concept. Typically, damage in natural disasters is basically measured by the loss of human lives, injuries (human damage), material and economic damage and environmental damage. All these categories, including the environmental damage, were defined as damage due to their effects on human society. Environmental damage is a concern because it has effects on people.

Terrorist incidents usually create a special kind of crisis. The most frequently used weapon for terrorist purposes has been a bomb, increasingly detonated via remote controlled devices. The level of suicide terrorism is on the rise and the risk that Weapons of Mass Destruction will be used is increasing. Hostage capture continues to be a terrorist weapon. The common denominator of these mentioned terrorist methods can actually be found in their relation to space. Terrorism, as the activity of achieving political goals through the use of extreme violence, is focused on urban areas. Some terrorists even defined their activity as "urban guerrilla" in contrast to the classic guerrilla. The later is based in rural areas and acts against a stronger opponent, while the former attacks his target in cities. The goal of terrorism is to deliver messages and change the policy of their opponents (for example governments, international organisations etc.). A most effective and practical way for terrorists to do this is through the use of extreme violence in densely populated areas. Global media attention in cities is guaranteed, which also amplifies the terrorist message. Some kind of paradoxical symbiosis between media and terrorism has been formed: terrorism needs media for spreading its message, while media needs to report on terrorist events in order to reach readers or viewers. Also the terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, nuclear and biological weapons) is often predicted to take place in urban and not in rural areas.

Urban Areas as Concentrations of Critical Infrastructures

Crises develop not only in direct relation to humans but also in relation to the fundamental and vital societal infrastructure, often called critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructures consist of basic socio-technical systems, organizations and networks that vitally support a large spectrum of social activities. These infrastructures are so vital that their breakdown or partial or complete failure would create a severe threat to society and a major crisis at national and even international level. The most important sectors of critical infrastructure are:

- transport (road, rail, air, sea),
- telecommunication systems,
- information systems,
- electro-energetic (electricity, gas, oil) systems,
- financial and bank systems,
- food supply,
- water supply etc.

Table 1 below shows the critical sectors and sub-sectors that have been discussed by the EU member states as potential EU critical infrastructure

Table 1

Sectors and sub-sectors of European critical infrastructure
(Green Paper on a European Programme on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2005)

Sector	Product or service
I Energy	1 Oil and gas production, refining, treatment and storage including pipelines 2 Electricity generation 3 Transmission of electricity, gas and oil 4 Distribution of electricity, gas and oil
II Information, Communication Technologies, ICT	5 Information system and network protection 6 Instrumentation automation and control systems (SCADA etc) 7 Internet 8 Provision of fixed telecommunications 9 Provision of mobile telecommunications 10 Radio communication and navigation 11 Satellite communication 12 Broadcasting
III Water	13 Provision of drinking water 14 Control of water quality 15 Stemming and control of water quantity
IV Food	16 Provision of food and safeguarding food safety and security
V Health	17 Medical and hospital care 18 Medicines, serums, vaccines and pharmaceuticals 19 Bio-laboratories and bio-agents

Sector	Product or service
VI Financial	20 Payment services/payment structures (private) 21 Government financial assignment
VII Public & Legal Order and Safety	22 Maintaining public & legal order, safety and security 23 Administration of justice and detention
VIII Civil administration	24 Government functions 25 Armed forces 26 Civil administration services 27 Emergency services 28 Postal and courier services
IX Transport	29 Road transport 30 Rail transport 31 Air traffic 32 Inland waterways transport 33 Ocean and short-sea shipping
X Chemical and nuclear industry	34 Production and storage/processing of chemical and nuclear substances 35 Pipelines of dangerous goods (chemical substances)
XI Space and Research	36 Space 37 Research

Threats to critical infrastructures directly or indirectly affect people who are increasingly dependent on these systems. The main categories of threats to critical infrastructures are intentional attacks (e.g. terrorism, information attacks, crime etc.), serious technical faults or malfunctions in systems and accidents. Cases of recent significant terrorist attacks show that most of them involved critical infrastructures beside human targets. Economic, military and political infrastructures were targeted, in 9/11. Transport infrastructure was targeted in the case of the Madrid attack in 2004 and in the case of the London attack in 2005. Consequently, countries and international organizations started developing policies on the protection of critical infrastructures.

Elements of critical infrastructures are often concentrated in more urbanized areas, because they are supporting the society. However, this means that a concentration in terms of human population correlates with a concentration in terms of critical infrastructure. Consequently, the conclusion on higher risks to critical infrastructure in urban areas can be

definitively reached. In cities, the risks of malfunctioning of critical infrastructures and the consequences of such malfunctioning are highest. Even terrorist groups know that their message can be delivered also by threatening people through destroying some parts of critical infrastructures.

Transnational Crises

Crises can be local, national and transnational (international). Some transnational crises can escalate to the global level and become global crises. Crises transfer geographically because of spatial autocorrelation (see Goodall 1987, 443) or spatial dependency. The variables of the observed object or process at one location are interdependent with the same variables at other locations owing to geographical proximity. In general, if high values of a variable at one location are associated with high values of that variable in neighboring locations, the set of locations exhibits a positive spatial autocorrelation with regard to that variable. Conversely, if high and low values alternate, negative spatial autocorrelation exists.

The development of new technology, especially in the fields of transport and communications, has led to the globalization of our planet. Globalization has contributed to the rapid escalation of many local crises into real transnational ones, with the presence of international media and the involvement of crisis management bodies from other countries or even international organizations. The role of state borders is still important for the existence of states and nations. Yet, these artificial borders cannot stop most crises from spreading. Smith (2000) indicated that crime, infectious diseases, terrorism, migrations and negative environmental phenomena are difficult to prevent from spreading across the borders. Some other authors observed that the traditional division between internal and international crises has been challenged (see Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993, 8) and that the line between internal and external security has been blurred (Patman 1999, 7).

It seems that space has retained its importance in the world of crises, yet in a changed way. Globalization has led to a shrinking of space and time. Two typical examples show how space has become less important with globalisation. The first example is about MAD – mutually ensured destruction in case of complete escalation of nuclear war among the superpowers. Civil societies and states became aware in the seventies that the military worst case scenario is not dependent on spatial distances anymore and that the whole of life on the planet can be destroyed (not only once, but some 250-times according to some calculations). Intercontinental ballistic missiles have reduced the meaning of distance.

A second example of shrinking space is global warming. Reasons for global warming stem from global pollution by human. The worst case scenario is in fact a security scenario: forced migrations, crime, and even armed conflicts are predicted because of the competition for territory. These and many other examples actually show that today crises spread faster through space (cities, states, regions, etc.) and they can also be managed faster.

Cyber-space and Crises

Human society has come to a point where it was able to create a new category of space. This unique feature cannot be left out of a serious analysis of the relationship between space and crisis. The evolution of cyber-space has added new dimensions to crises and crisis management. Cyberspace was mentioned for the first time in 1984, in a William Gibson novel titled "Neuromanacer" (see Gibson 1984). Today, cyberspace is a complex form of space comprising of many inter-related elements, such as material aspects (computers and links among computers), software and human elements. The transfer of information through material components is performed via software support and managed by the human component (Wautelet 1998). The fundamental form of cyberspace is the Internet, an expanding system of networked computers and a collection of inter-connected networks. It is a network of computer networks. Cyber-space has developed more in developed countries, such as in the EU, the US, China and Japan, than in rural and poor countries, such as many African countries.

Increasing human dependency on the information infrastructure involves many new risks and crisis potentials. It is almost unthinkable to have a functional modern society without strong reliance on Internet and the use of its services (www, e-mail, file sharing, remote access, etc.). Even most of the financial transfers between banks are conducted online today. It is only a question of time before a malfunction of or attack on information infrastructure will create a crisis. Typical cyber-threats are cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism, hacking, cyber-war etc.

Crisis Management and Urban Areas

Crisis management refers to more or less organized activities for solving and responding to any kind of crisis at (a) a specific level, (b) within a specific dimension or field, and (c) in periods before, during or

after a crisis (Prezelj 2005). The key focus of crisis management is the response during the crisis. However, the pre-crisis preparation or planning phase and post-crisis phase have also become increasingly important. The ultimate general goal of crisis management is to eliminate the crisis factors, restore the normal situation and regain control over events from the perspective of the affected or responsible actors. Accordingly, crisis management refers to managing and eliminating an unexpected threat under significant time pressure and amidst high uncertainty. Crisis management can also be defined as the organization, arrangements and measures relative to the above goal.

Space naturally plays an important role in crisis management as in the case of crisis (elaborated above). All phases of crisis management are influenced by spatial variables. The literature differentiates between the three phases of crisis management: pre-crisis preparation, crisis response and post-crisis restoration. Among the most important elements of the preparation phase are threat and risk assessment, early and crisis warning, along with crisis planning and exercising. Threat and risk assessment refers to scanning of the environment for threat and crisis indices or indicators. The findings need to be communicated to the key decision-makers and publics through early or crisis warning mechanisms. The spatial aspect in threat and risk assessment refers to the ability and capacity of competent authorities to find and gather risk or crisis indicators in the vast territorial areas, urban or non-urban. Naturally, there are probably more such indicators in the urban areas. The spatial aspect of early warning refers to the capacity of competent authorities to predict crisis emergence and development in space, which includes pinpointing the locations and areas at risk etc. Crisis planning refers to all preparatory activities such as drafting plans, testing plans, adopting other relevant documents, exercising roles according to the plans etc. Not all crises can be planned for, due to the almost infinite potential crises that could develop in relation to an actor. Consequently actors plan for the most foreseeable crises. Extremely important are crisis management exercises which aim to test the response approaches, concepts, capacities, technical support, links among actors etc. Countries and international organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE etc. conduct many such exercises. Also increasingly valued are crisis simulations which allow crisis managers to test their preparedness in an artificial environment. The spatial aspect of crisis planning refers to the capacity of crisis response institutions to involve adequate institutions from the adequate geographic area into the planning process. It is very important to gather the right institutions and involve them in the drafting the plans, exercising and simulating the response.

One of the key elements of the crisis response phase is crisis decision-making, which refers to adopting decisions amidst difficult circumstances and uncertainty. In an uncontrolled situation, it is unclear what the effects of adopted decisions will be. Key decision-makers are normally the same as those who decide in a non-crisis period. Empirical studies of crisis management have shown that the bureaucratic and geographic centralization of decision-making frequently occurs. It can take various forms, such as the concentration of power in the hands of a limited number of executives, in the central government in relation to state, regional or local agencies, in one agency in relation to other relevant agencies etc. Obviously decision making is required throughout crisis-affected areas. Yet centers where decision making power is concentrated will appear sooner or later, whether planned or unplanned. Small and geographically concentrated groups of decision-makers have played an important role according to many case studies. Many states and international organizations activate so-called crisis centers to collect, analyze, project and distribute crisis-related information. For such purposes, the USA has the Situation Room in the White House and other operational centers in various departments.³ The EU and NATO have situation centers (SITCEN) for the purpose of collecting, integrating, analyzing and distributing information at the international level. Netherlands, UK, Sweden, Slovenia, Macedonia and many other countries also have such centers. From the spatial perspective, it is important to stress that such centers represent geographic centralization of information flows in crisis. The typical output of such centers is a daily situation report which is distributed to the key decision-makers and other relevant actors and publics (for example media). So, geographic centralization of raw information is followed by the geographic dispersal of analyzed information. One of the key challenges in the crisis response phase is also the coordination of various agencies, institutions and ministries.⁴

Post-crisis restoration aims to normalize the situation and life of the affected population. Clearly after a serious crisis the life of people can never be the same as it used to be. But the restoration phase aims to reach the level of a conventional understanding of normalcy. Some of the most important activities in this phase are the material restoration and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, the psychological treatment

³ A very strong reference on the role and meaning of a situation room in crisis management was written by Bohn (2003).

⁴ For more on horizontal interagency, or inter-organizational cooperation, see Hilliard (2000).

of the affected population and post-crisis learning. The spatial aspect of post crisis restoration simply refers to the broad spectrum of activities going on in the affected areas aiming to overcome the crisis effects.

Levels of Crisis Management and Space

Levels of crisis management are directly related to spatial variables. It is the scope of damage and affectedness that determine the level of crisis management. Normally, but not necessarily, the level of crisis corresponds to the level of crisis management. Several levels of crisis management can be distinguished, such as individual, group, organizational, local, regional, national, international and global. Most crises have some kind of local consequences, which has contributed to the axiom of crisis management studies that the local level is the most important level of crisis management. The vertical transfer of crisis management responsibility is normally conditioned by the incapacity of lower levels of management to deal with crises effectively.

Consequently, scholars and practitioners distinguish between strategic and operational crisis management. The former relates to high-level crisis management by politicians and high officials, while the latter refers mainly to those working in the field and those directly controlling and supporting them.

I should also stress at this point that the above-mentioned correlation between the actual scope of the crisis and the level of crisis management can be blurred by some subjective or political factors. Some objectively small local crisis event can be so sensitive that the national or even international level of crisis management becomes involved. My survey of national counter-terrorist plans shows that any kind of terrorism in most countries immediately becomes a national event, as national authorities take over the main responsibility. This case clearly shows that political preferences affect the level of crisis response.

Crisis Communication and Space

Crisis communication can be understood as communication with publics, communication support to decision-makers or communication among the responsible actors.⁵ Crisis communication with publics refers

⁵ In this article, I will focus only on the crisis communication with relevant publics.

to the distribution of relevant pre-crisis and crisis information to the relevant publics and dialogue with them. Relevant publics usually refer to the affected people, the media, foreign interested actors etc. The role of the media is extremely important as it creates an image of a crisis and crisis management. In addition, the role of crisis communication with publics has grown in parallel to the enhanced role of the media in society. Crisis communication strives to give the public the right information at the right time before or during a crisis. The goal is to help create the best possible understanding of the situation and its various consequences so that the actors involved in the crisis and those who are affected by it are best able to take decisions in the areas for which they are responsible or which affect them.

Spatial aspects of crisis communication mostly refer to two kinds of public: the narrow and the broad public. The narrow public is the affected public, the public which needs fast and precise information about what happened and what to do. The broad public on the other hand consists of media, national public, international public etc. that need less precise information. Geographically speaking, distance to the affected areas influences the crisis communication process.

Complex Crisis Management in Complex Urban Areas

Urban areas are complex due to the density of peoples and infrastructures. This means that more complex crises appear in such an environment than in less complex environments. Crisis management is consequently more complex in urban areas. What do I mean by a complex crisis and complex crisis management? The fundamental characteristics of a complex crisis are multidimensionality and transnationality of security threats, and linear, or even nonlinear, connections among these threats. Extreme escalation of security threats in one dimension rapidly contributes to the escalation of the threats in other dimensions. For example, the escalation of war can quickly contribute to the escalation of other threats, such as organized crime, terrorism, forced migration, economic threats, environmental pollution etc. A complex crisis normally refers to many simultaneous threatening events with broad consequences, especially in urban areas. The concept of complex crisis management refers to the management of complex crises which are basically the most difficult situations for which a contemporary society needs to find appropriate solutions. It also refers to the management of a multidimensional crisis by many actors from different levels and fields of governance, for example civil protection, medical services, police, armed

forces, humanitarian agencies etc. (Prezelj 2005). The response could become more complex than the problem. Indeed, there were some 750 non-governmental and governmental organisations directly or indirectly active in Kosovo at the beginning of this century. The key questions in complex crisis management are: 'Who manages who? Who has the overall control and how is the responsibility to be divided among the actors?' This is an extremely complex question that is difficult to solve. In crisis management, we need to compartmentalize in order to achieve efficiency, yet different sectors need to be bridged at one point in order to get a comprehensive response. A kind of crisis network with a specific degree of centralization needs to develop in urban areas in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods.⁶

Some Findings from Empirical Cases in Slovenia

To support many of the theoretical findings above, several case studies of crises and crisis management in Slovenia were analyzed by a research group from the University of Ljubljana. The researchers of the Slovenian war for independence in 1991 (see Kopac, Groselj, Prebilic & Svete 2004), floods in 1998 (Prezelj, Malesic & Dolscak, 2004), earthquake in 1998 (Groselj, Svete & Malesic 2004), Kosovo crisis in 1999 (Napotnik, Kopac, Malesic, Frankovic & Pipenbaher 2004), and Y2K crisis (Kranjcec, Polic & Repovs 2004) did not directly take into account spatial variables. They used the internationally recognized methodology for analysing crises and crisis management developed by the Swedish CRISMART, which does not directly take into account spatial variables. It is therefore possible and necessary to look shortly at these cases and extract some spatial lessons. This sample of cases contains some of the most relevant crises in Slovenia in the period from 1991 to 2000.

The Slovenian war for independence in 1991 was in fact a territorial armed conflict that lasted 10 days and caused 48 casualties. After the declaration of Slovenian independence due to the economic and political chaos in socialist Yugoslavia, the federal army intervened (YPA). The first goal of the YPA was to occupy the borders of Slovenia and close the country. Efforts to block border crossings were countered by the efforts to block the YPA barracks and strategic communications by the

⁶ For more on centralization and related problems in crisis management, see T'Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin (1993), Rosenthal and T'Hart (1989) and Rosenthal, T'Hart and Kouzmin (1991).

Slovenian territorial defence forces and police. YPA also bombed key national TV transmitters and tried to occupy the national television office. A lesson about the value of strategic objects, communications and other infrastructure can be extracted from this case. The war immediately became internationalized as international mediators and many journalists arrived. The case for rapid spreading of the crisis in space is supported by this fact. There were many simultaneous security events happening in various locations in the country. The Slovenian government established a national coordination group and many regional coordination groups to centralize the information flows and coordinate efforts by many agencies and organisations. Let me say as simple as possible: the war would not have been won if the coordination and centralization had not been so strong.

Floods in 1998 affected more or less the whole country. There was one region that was affected more than others (the Western Stajerska region). Big quantities of rain created flash floods that damaged many buildings, roads, rails, telephone and electricity cables, mobile phone transmitters etc. Many landslides and spillages of toxic fuels also occurred in the disaster. The first spatial lessons to be derived are about the nature of the disaster in combination with the urbanisation process in Slovenia. Nature does not forgive mistakes in urban development and spatial policy in a pre-crisis period. Most of the buildings on flood prone areas were naturally flooded. In fact, channelling the river water in some parts of the cities, towns and villages contributes to the speed of water. The flooding is stronger where such channels are weaker or where they end. Confluences of rivers were points of certain flooding. The existing channel simply could not absorb extreme quantities of water coming from two rivers. Not only can flood prone areas be threatened by the flood. Inadequately built sewage systems at some locations also proved to be a weak link and a factor of surprise for many. High levels of underground water can also cause floods, through the sewage system, in places that are considered as not threatened. Imagine a house standing on the top of a little hill which gets flooded through its toilet and sewage system by some 20.000 litres of polluted water! One of the painful crisis management lessons learned is about the prioritization of the rescue activities. At a time when the rescue services also become victims of the disaster, they can hardly help other victims. Consequently the prioritisation of rescue activities is necessary, meaning that first attention should be given to public institutions, such as schools, hospitals, courts, kindergartens etc. and not private buildings. Flood crises can easily become internationalized as rivers flow from one country to another, in our case from Slovenia to Croatia.

A 5,5 strong earthquake⁷ occurred in Slovenia in 1998. The most affected region was Posocje in the west of the country. An earthquake is a natural phenomenon with an epicentre and urban damage depends on the distance from it. Key spatial lessons in this case referred to urbanisation, evacuating the affected people and distribution of aid. As in the case of floods, mistakes in urban policy in the pre-crisis phase took their toll in the crisis phase. Almost all older buildings in Posocje that were built before 1968, when the modern building standard was applied in former Yugoslavia, or that were inadequately built afterwards, were heavily damaged. One of the first crisis response measures was evacuating the affected people from heavily damaged settlements in order to minimize the effects of frequently recurring earthquakes. These people needed to be sheltered, fed and washed. Police needed to take over and pay special attention to security in these so-called ghost settlements. One of the key challenges was also to organise the distribution of the incoming international aid. A special regional distribution centre was organised for this purpose.

Y2K and Kosovo crisis were two very specific cases. The Millennium bug was a kind of implanted risk for computer systems and other computer dependent technical systems to malfunction at the change from 1999 to year 2000. Scenarios about the consequences ranged from mild ones to the worst case in which the society would stop functioning for some time, casualties and economic damage would escalate etc. Thanks to widespread national and international pre-crisis planning and software correction efforts the change in numbers in computer chips did not exact the toll predicted by the worst case scenarios. A very important spatial lesson can be deduced from this "non-crisis"; that most societal infrastructures strongly depend on computers. This means that computer technology is spread all over the country, and its general malfunction could literally stop the normal functioning of society. The risks involved in this field are enormous because they can be found everywhere and in almost all areas of human life.

The Kosovo crisis was not a Slovenian crisis. It was a crisis in Serbia regarding the status of its more or less autonomous region. However, due to the intervention by NATO, the crisis evolved into a regional and even European crisis. From a spatial perspective, it had effects on the Slovenian economy: refugees were accepted by the Slovenian state, more legal and also illegal immigrants arrived in Slovenia and the risk of a terrorist attack in Slovenia increased due to Slovenian support of the

⁷ Strength measured by the Richter scale.

intervention by NATO. The state needed to introduce special security measures at the borders in order to prevent some unintended ways of spreading the crisis. Moreover humanitarian aid was collected and sent to Kosovo. This case actually shows the reaction of a country that indirectly feels the consequences of one international crisis. Distance played an important role in the sense of preventing direct influence (as was not the case in neighbouring Macedonia). Yet territorial proximity contributed to many types of indirect consequences. At a cognitive level, also, a point regarding the Slovenian perception of this crisis should be stressed. Slovenians have been for some ten years after their independence denying the proximity of conflicts and wars in the region. Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo were in many respects perceived by the Slovenians as wars in distant Africa. The Slovenians consciously and subconsciously cut the ties with other former republics and for some time acted as if they were quite ignorant about the situation there. This perception was also a result of a strong eagerness to join EU and NATO. This teaches us that objective facts about the spatial aspects of crisis management should also be supplemented by subjective dimensions.

Conclusion

Space is one of the key determinants of crisis emergence, development, management and post-crisis recovery. Urban areas, as concentrations of people and critical infrastructures, are highly crisis-prone and therefore risky areas. The connection between the spatial dimension and crises has been proven at theoretical and empirical levels. Theoretical concepts of security, threat, crisis, risk, damage and critical infrastructure are all human-centric concepts. They have been imagined, conceptualized, developed and implemented for (human) social purposes. That is why urban areas are much more relevant from the perspective of crisis management than non-urban areas. Non-urban areas are relevant to the extent they influence humans, who are concentrated in urban areas. In this respect it is very unusual that space has attracted so little direct scientific attention in crisis management, humanitarian and security studies.

My analysis of traditional crises, such as armed conflicts and wars, has shown that many of them have been strongly related to some territorial issues. The highest concentration of violent territorial conflicts is in Asia, Africa, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Space has been relevant in terms of resources and the desire for control. The analysis of non-traditional crises has shown that space is equally, if not even more, important in natural disasters, terrorism and infectious diseases. The highest risks

and consequences of these crises are to be found in urban areas. These areas are especially critical because of the concentration of various types of critical infrastructures, such as electricity, transport, ICT, financial services, industries etc. Threats to these infrastructures directly or indirectly affect people who are becoming increasingly dependent.

Crises are increasingly trans-national. They spread in different forms from their place of origin over geographic space to other countries. Globalisation has actually contributed to their faster transnational spreading, which is definitely a negative side of this process. The international media also contribute to the speed of spreading crises. Borders cannot stop such diffusion of crises any more. Human development also brings along some negative consequences in terms of risks and threats. Accordingly, the cyber-space is a specific form of space where some major crises with humanitarian consequences can emerge.

Crisis management is conceptually and empirically influenced by spatial factors. Space is one of the key factors in all types of crisis management, in all phases and at all levels. One of the key space-related questions in crisis management in complex urban areas is interagency coordination. Complex crisis management involves many institutions and agencies that need to be harmonized and coordinated, provided that we want to create a rational and comprehensive crisis response.

This short analysis of some relevant cases from Slovenia supports the arguments being made about the important role of space in crisis management. Case analysis shows that:

- crisis management in non-urban areas is not a priority in case of heavy urban damage,
- political self-interest can contribute to the nationalization or even internationalization of some local crises,
- control of territory is important also in modern armed conflicts,
- interagency coordination is the key to efficiency in crisis management,
- crises can emerge despite a relatively good level of preparedness,
- missed opportunities in the pre-crisis phase cannot be compensated by the crisis response,
- prioritization in rescue activities frequently occurs, which is a defensible but also a disputed practice,
- the role of space in crisis management has also a strong subjective dimension as people can minimize or maximize this role etc.

The current state of affairs in the study of space in crisis management suggests that there is plenty of room for more direct research on this topic. There are plenty of cases that focus on the role of space only

indirectly, leaving an opportunity for a more direct approach. The correlation of space with time in the light of contemporary globalisation processes should not be overlooked. Space is relevant because we use it in a temporal dimension. Changes in spatial and temporal dimensions increasingly affect each other.

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The City as a Refuge

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Every year around 70 million people in developing countries enter cities (Seabrook 2007, p. 45). They seek work, shelter, and a better and easier life. The reality nowadays is that these cities have difficulty in accepting them. The numbers of newcomers increases the vulnerability of a city as well as the vulnerability of the newcomers themselves. This article addresses problems which developed in cities from their very creation, examining the reasons why people started to migrate into and construct cities. We will also try to discover some of the particular reasons for the significant phenomenon of vulnerability of cities today.

It would be good to clarify the terms 'migrant' and 'newcomer'. These two terms are occasionally used as synonyms and for the purposes of this article they will be used this way as well. However 'newcomer' will be predominantly used when referring to migrants who enter and stay in a city. The understanding of vulnerability in terms of social, economic and political conditions is explained as a phenomenon that differentially affects individuals, groups and the overall capacity¹ of the community to absorb shock and recover (Westgate, O'Keefe 1976, Winchester 1992 in Voutira 1998). Sokol (1998) claims that the more that urban life is made technically perfect, the more vulnerable it is. He is getting at the organisational challenges of urban life, such as the importance of interconnections, the dependency on electricity, water, sewage, public transport, etc. This assumes that cities in the so called developed world are not so vulnerable and are quite well prepared for the risks of possible threatening hazards due to the existence of systems such as: risk analysis, crises planning and further measurements e.g. early warning system, crisis plans on different levels and topics, etc.

It is important to be aware of possible risks, hazards and conflicts and invest in efforts to decrease vulnerability and increase the capacity

¹ $R = K.V/C$ This equation shows that the Risk is directly proportional to the Vulnerability and inversely proportional to the Capacity. In other words, the Risk increases with the Vulnerability but decreases with the Capacity of the society.

of the cities to deal with such vulnerabilities. A hazard in a vulnerable city could cause a major disaster defined as a "situation where there is substantial loss of life, increased vulnerability, great human suffering and distress, and large-scale material damage including damage to environment" (Caritas International 2007).

There is much debate about the issue of humanitarian assistance and especially about how a potential humanitarian response should be conceived. There is a general effort in humanitarian assistance (Anderson 1999) to learn from mistakes and to reduce the extent of possible damage that might be caused by humanitarian assistance.² The debate runs in many directions, regarding ethical framework, different methods of assistance, etc. However, the majority of debaters fail to specify the actual space of the crisis and the subsequent assistance (response, relief). The city has after all such a number of specifics that it is absolutely essential to map the space to be able to respond as much as possible to the real needs of the people affected in the particular situation.

There are many threats which could make cities vulnerable. Of all the problems a city may have, I would like to focus on the issue of vulnerability as a result of the city's expansion and the diversity of population groups living there. Consequently to this a question should be posed: *How do migrants/newcomers contribute to the vulnerability of cities and why is the city very often not able to protect them?* Let us create a hypothesis which says that to prevent vulnerability there is the necessity of building an effective rescue system. All rescue systems are connected to the basic requirement of building an effective information network, which would be able to reach all inhabitants in the city, who, after being informed would be able to respond to the system and communicate in an adequate way in case of emergency (Bastecka 2005). As for the rescue situation itself and the rescue teams, it is very crucial to have a good knowledge of the whole context of the situation (politics, social and human right situation, urban plans, infrastructure, services, human relations regarding minorities, etc.). If the city is not well organised, if there exist no information about the inhabitants, there is no possibility of information reaching the inhabitants. If there does not exist a common method of communication, if there does not exist any network, the rescue operations are very difficult, complicated and sometimes almost impossible.

² Humanitarian relief/aid or assistance refers to any immediate action which follows a crisis of some kind and is often short term and neutral. Development aid is more long term and is often more politically linked.

How do people in the overcrowded parts of cities live? How do the newcomers in contemporary cities of the world live? What supports and what decreases the capacities of the cities and its inhabitants? Why did people start to move to one particular place and construct cities, anyway?

Cities

The terms "Rural" and "Urban" imply very different spaces, each of them having its own particularity; however cities are increasingly attractive to many people. Unfortunately, very often it is again poverty that is waiting for rural migrants in cities. Seabrook observes: "Although urban poverty is different from its rural counterpart, it is not necessarily easier. It is attended by new forms of insufficiency, insecurity and violence, unfamiliar kinds of exploitation and sickness" (Seabrook 2007, p.14).

Reason for the Birth of Cities

In the year 2000, 40% of all inhabitants of the Earth lived in cities and cities in the poor world are expanding at a rate of 2.35% of existing inhabitants per year. In 2001, 30% of this urban population lived in slums; in 30 years this will amount to 2 billion people (Seabrook 2007, p.7-12). Cities from the very beginning played a crucial role in defence and trade. The surplus of products (of agricultural as well craft production) needed to be exchanged somewhere. That need gave rise to markets, usually situated in valleys, where people would travel to exchange surplus livestock or crops. Should they have wanted something more or something not produced in such homesteads they had to travel further, to a city. That was a place where people would come from far away to exchange agricultural surplus for things such as fabrics, jewels, and later for and by means of money. But such cities had already been in existence earlier, and originally probably for also other reasons, namely for defence. The existence of ancient cities, where the purpose of defence was especially accentuated, would have been impossible without agricultural surplus (Sokol 1998) produced in the country. For the nearby country people, the city would then, in the case of a danger, represent a safe sanctuary, providing protection by means of its walls or the presence of its armed garrison. The city was also the particular place, where political life as well as art and literature had its seat (Weber 1997). We can say that the birth and growth of cities was affected by three factors:

demographic growth, the needs of trade and the need for a more efficient protection of property (Sokol 2004), while Weber (1977) stresses consumption, production, market and fortress.

One of the elements uniting people in cities was a common temple. It was the centre of all activity and the sanctity of a city was thus of great significance – the boundaries of the community being sacrosanct. The building of costly temples was the expression of the longing for preservation, for eternity. While the possibility of social reproduction is usually ensured by having offspring, in cities it is mediated by the institution of the city as such (Sokol 2004), with people investing in buildings that are sure to outlive many generations – to be “eternal”. Despite the relative solidity of such stone structures, it was apparent that these buildings were somewhat artificial and “unnatural”. The need to connect with and show concern for one’s neighbour, which is crucial for the agrarian way of life is not so apparent in cities. Building temples and the formation of temple fellowships as well as the origin of a temple as the main assembling point in a city was also justified by communal and not purely religious concerns. Several centuries later, when cities started to re-emerge in Europe, (the condition for the birth of cities being peace and prosperity) Christian churches were built in the centres of the cities where citizens would assemble. Ancient and Medieval cities do not differ too much from this sociological point of view (Weber 1997).

Security in ancient cities rested especially on deities and their temples, strong rulers and the city walls. In the cities of the Middle Ages, its nature is much more profane (Sokol 2004). Gradually people started to move to cities more for the sake of trade and crafts and also seeking convenience and comfort. Naturally, original kinship patterns were modified (part of the family usually stayed in the country) and no new kinship bonds emerged here. The society began to individualise. To survive in a city, an individual did not need a big family to help him or her as he or she could survive on their own. This made the individual dependent on other people, of course, but indirectly through some organised exchange or trade. The individual became dependent on services, on the gradually emerging city infrastructure. He or she would treat the people he or she met politely but without obligation. Their life was no longer dependent on the weather but on their individual abilities. This was the start of the importance of individual success as well as the urge to excel over others. Religion, too, tended to become individualised and internalised, with the church no longer being the centre of all action (Sokol 1998). In western countries so called urban communities emerged, where citizenship played a very significant role (Weber 1997).

Building Urban Dependency

For a humanitarian and social worker, this moment is of great relevance. What social bonds/ links³ do people form in a city? To survive, people in cities no longer rely on one another, but develop dependence on mediated, artificial “networks” such as the market, continuous supplies of surplus food, water distribution, drainage, electricity supplies and so on. These networks do not function all by themselves. They need to be operated. There must exist some organizational rules and supply regulations, communication between providers and users. All this facilitates human communication of an absolutely new kind – the primary concern of survival makes way to time devoted to study and arts, giving rise to universities, painting workshops, churches as works of art, sculptures in the streets of cities, stately buildings. People bond via their wealth and interests. However these “artificial bonds/links” that enable and facilitate life in a city suffer from one major disadvantage – none of them make possible survival in a crisis situation. Sokol (1998) illustrates this by examples from wartime situations, when people in cities often survived only thanks to relatives and acquaintances living in the country. This can also be illustrated by the experience of the author from the former Soviet Republics, where especially in the 1990’s people in cities survived in their tower blocks of apartments solely thanks to supplies from relatives living in the country, heating being realised by making a hole in the wall to make place for a chimney, burning what they simply managed to get, water in the ruined sewers leaking out before it managed to reach anywhere and water supply, too, being far from efficient. It was absolutely evident there that should this distress have lasted another decade the cities would have ceased to exist because they were not meeting their mediatory role and the people’s primary concern returned to personal survival.

Still, medieval cities did pay attention to the up-keeping of their security and eternity. For many generations, people in cities built special networks of tunnels that would provide shelter and place to store supplies in times of danger and that would, in a case of need, take them out of the besieged city. However, with the influx of new inhabitants and the consequent growth of cities, these measures became totally insufficient. In Europe, this situation marked especially the 19th century.

³ Bond/link means a social relationship or contact which proves more stable (the contact could be repeated).

Expansion of Cities and Migration

The role of cities changed dramatically with the arrival of industry, attracting poor people from the country in search of a stable income for the subsistence of their families. Frequently the family stayed behind to join their provider later. Still, these families would gradually bring to the cities their customs and a certain kind of communal life (Sokol 1998). The gradual influx of labour force gave rise to working-class suburbs, pulling down the remains of city walls, expanding the infrastructure and developing transport in the city. We could say that 19th and 20th century Europe is Europe on the move with rapidly growing cities and an increasing concentration of urban industrial regions. In Europe by 1800 there were 23 big cities with populations exceeding 100,000, a total of 5.5 million inhabitants. By 1900, this number rose to 135 cities with a total population of 46 million. For example, in the period from 1850 to 1910 the population of the city of Essen in the Ruhr Area increased from 9,000 to 295,000 inhabitants. Immigration played a significant role in this process. In Paris, for example, only 15% of the 19th century increase in population was due to natural population increase, the rest being caused by immigration (Bade 2000). The rate of attractiveness of a city grows with its size – the bigger a city, the wider its radius of attraction. There may be various reasons for this – more employment opportunities, greater anonymity. But it has its pitfall – Smith and Feagin (1995) observe that while leaving their fields in order to go to the city, the migrants start their conversion from proud agriculturists into anonymous proletariats. That is a very important point – the agriculturists got used to making decisions independently but coming into the city they sometimes became something like slaves, very often dependent on some other's decision. What follows is disappointment of those newcomers – the majority of them do not find that the city lives up to their expectations.

Cities and Newcomers

We could say that most of the current city inhabitants are the offspring of migrants because most of our grandfathers (living in the mid 19th century) were country people (Sokol 1998). To describe the whole process of movement of various people and groups of people into cities would be very complicated. In order to understand the social links between them, it is necessary at least to try to do it.

There are three sources for the increase in urban inhabitants in the developing world (Seabrook 2007, p.48). These are:

1. *Migration of inhabitants*: since transportation is much easier nowadays we have to reckon equally with inside and outside migration although there are some differences between the case of rural-urban migration of citizens and migration of foreign-born people; an inability to (fully) understand the language makes foreigners more vulnerable in crisis situations and at the same time it exposes cities to greater danger. Within this category we should include:
 - a) Those that travel regularly from rural areas to cities in order to earn money
 - b) Those who started to live and work in cities (and probably send the money to their family)
 - c) Those who come to join their relatives already living in cities
 - d) Migrants, who came in whole families and communities because of eviction from their village due to draught, floods, conflicts
 - e) Those that lost their land due to public interest expropriation
2. *Expansion of city boundaries*: there are new suburbs constructed that enclose original villages, the middle class moves from urban centres into (relative) nature and the city poor stay in the urban centres. We could give, as an example, the Roma in the Czech Republic in the 50's and 60's of the last century who moved into the old centres with decayed old houses while the majority of the population moved into ugly (but new and well equipped) houses in the suburbs.
3. *Population born in the city*.
This kind of natural increase in population accounts for only one third of the whole population increase on average. This number is highly variable especially with regard to history and particular countries and cities. Again, this increased population could often have been caused by newcomers, because of their high fertility.

The Life of Newcomers in Cities Nowadays

Not all people coming to the city are poor, or at least stay poor. But the majority come to the city for economic reasons, because living conditions were unbearable in their own country. They are coming with ideas that they will be able take part in the luxurious way of life (which they have seen on TV), to earn money, to start new life, to feed their family, to become rich and famous. Many of them are also coming to

save their lives while being evicted from their homes due to conflict or long term crises. These people do not have so many expectations.

Living Conditions

It is not true, that the poor newcomers live only in slums. There are many of them who live in derelict accommodation in the centres of the cities or in suburbs. Anyway almost half of the inhabitants of cities in the developing world live illegally in houses or have built their shelters and houses illegally (they are not owners, or tenants of the land) (Seabrook 2007). The number will be lower in Europe and in the US, but nevertheless in the example of the Roma, the majority of Roma villages in Slovakia are in fact built illegally. (Scheffel, Musinka 2004). Seabrook (2007) continues that in the 50's of the last century, there were slums which were perceived as transitory dwellings, waiting only for economic take-off. Economic take-off came, but nothing happened with those living in the slums. In the 60's and 70's, slums were described as a cancer to the health of cities, while in the late 70's, governments came to accept "the longevity of slums".

A slum, as defined by the UN agency UN-HABITAT, is "a run-down area of a city characterized by substandard housing and squalor and lacking in tenure security." The term has traditionally referred to housing areas that were once respectable but which deteriorated as the original dwellers moved on to newer and better parts of the city, but has come to include the vast informal settlements found in cities in the developing world" (UN-Habitat). We find slums everywhere on the earth around the big cities. The people living there are those arriving in the cities or those who find themselves in a difficult life situation. A slum is a place, where they can live very cheaply. Slums are built sometimes in very dangerous places, such as next to factories, on depots, between the roads. The people suffer with strange and diverse illnesses and die early. They are excluded from society, helpless, vulnerable, and without respect for their human rights.

Many people want to live in slums, because the living costs are very low, as mentioned above. Coming only to earn money and send home to their relatives, it is the easiest way to survive. Sometimes these people live in the factories, in the yards of restaurants, cellars, etc. The family very often does not know about these conditions. These people coming to work and regularly travelling back to the country or sending money are very often anonymous singles. There were many mistakes made by thinking that people are poor, because their dwellings are bad. But peo-

ple's dwellings are bad, because the people are poor. It is not possible to remove poverty by giving the people better housing. There were many attempts made also in the middle of Europe, by giving poor people better houses. Unfortunately the services to these houses: electricity, water, gas, rents and maintenance, were very expensive. While having no stable jobs, the poor could not afford them (Seabrook 2007).

It is necessary to mention one important aspect of living in slums. Tens of millions of slum dwellers live under constant threat of eviction, in contravention of their rights and with no recourse to the due process of law (Majale 2008). There are many reasons for evicting them – governments need the land for other purposes in public interest, there are also evictions because of political reasons – slums were destroyed in Zimbabwe 2005 while supporting the opposition in the election. On the other hand, the people in slums could be misused and corrupted by politicians who promise them whatever in order to receive their votes (Seabrook 2007).

There were many attempts made to legalise life in the slums, to let the people pay rents, which succeeded in several western developed countries. At the same time there were many voices against this saying that it is institutionalisation of injustice (Seabrook 2007). Regarding slums it is necessary to point out that it is not only a problem of the developing world. There are many slums also in the so called developed world. The difference is that there is more money to manage them. However, sometimes money is not the main factor. Very often vulnerability is a similar complicated problem as found in the slums in the developing world, because of the psychosocial situation of the dwellers (Smith, Fagin 1999).

Livelihood

There are very few people living in slums who have so called formal employment such as in state administration, banks or the army. In India it is for example about 8% (Seabrook 2007, 83). Some of these slum inhabitants work in factories, restaurants and other services. Some of them work for themselves. We are talking about a series of legal and illegal activities providing a small amount of income, which are considered as more of a survival activity than as employment. Speaking about non-formal employment we talk about different sorts of begging, collecting things from depots and selling them, selling different curiosities, production and selling of illegally produced CDs and DVDs, selling of false trademarked products, smuggled goods, and last but not least offering their

children in the hope that it will ensure a better life for them. Working in the black market means to be part of a strange and dangerous network on the edge of crime, which does not support trust, communication and cooperation. However there are also good examples of entrepreneurship within ethnic communities (Smith, Fagin 1999), which enable better communication at least within this community (see further).

Security

Instead of security it would probably be better to speak about insecurity and crime in these situations. The origins of many crimes are connected with survival activities – people start to sell drugs or offer sex. These activities are not isolated and they are more than just episodic. That is the reason why in slums no civil law governs but the laws of drug barons, kidnappers, criminal gangs, people traffickers and prostitutes. As women very often carry the burden for the whole family economy, they sometimes also assume the role of finding a survival strategy. They are sometimes forced to work and find themselves in situations which are not traditional for the women (not only while offering sex but also in non-traditional employments, such as cleaning women, street sellers, etc.). This is the reason why these women are very often the objects of rape and sexual violence. Another reason for this could also be the loss of a moral and traditional way of life, and very often also the situation of anonymity, which could not have happened in a rural area. Crime and the fear of crime immobilise the majority of city dwellers. There are many fires in the cities; many of them are started intentionally, with the purpose of damaging the enemy group, for criminal reasons, or simply in order to threaten. Very often wrong wiring is blamed. This year there were also fires in slums, for instance in Tondo, Manila. Crime and fear of violence have added new forms of insecurity to all the familiar vulnerabilities in cities. Fear of course cannot add to communication. On the contrary it is a good reason for living in anonymity and for separation in fragmented communities or groups.

Services Including Health, Education and Transportation

Less than half of the urban poor population has water supply and electricity. Medical care is not organised. Health services are very often provided by a private doctor with a doubtful qualification. Social care is provided within the family, while migration and poverty tends to disrupt

the family support network (Seabrook 2007). This is why the survival of the elderly is understood as a mixed blessing: as long as they can be useful in the household, it is good; but being sick they start to be only "another mouth to feed". Education is something which does not fit into this world, although there are families, especially, who decide to give the children a chance to follow a better destiny. Nevertheless education is one of the crucial capacities regarding the ability to respond to some rescue system.

Another service which could be of crucial importance for communication is transportation. The cities are really huge. Greater Cairo including all suburbs is estimated to cover an area of 86.369.3 square kilometres (Cairo statistics). For this reason transportation is a question of big amounts of money which have to be invested. That is why very little was done in this field. There are however examples of successfully resolved transportation problems in Sao Paulo, Brasilia (Seabrook 2007). The administrations of cities where inhabitants of slums form an important part of the city, try to solve at least the problem of transportation. Transport is of course a very important part of infrastructure; it is always the start of every activity. It could facilitate social inclusion (Brian 2003). There were also other attempts carried out in several slum areas – for example, a new system of fire protection in Manila (Tondo) after the disastrous fire in 2004.

City Governments and Administrations

Almost all city governments have their promises and proposals to improve life in the slums. But the problems of slums are very difficult and a solution is not easy and very costly. Politicians are sometimes too reluctant to do something in order to improve the services effectively, although they have to play a mediatory role and have to represent all inhabitants. The problem is that the politicians very often pretend not to see the illegal inhabitants (Princova 2007).

Urban planning and management are crucial for a city to enable it to play the role of an effective refuge. A city's ability to protect its inhabitants decreases together with increasing numbers of newcomers unless migration is followed by proper urban management. Without it a city cannot be a shelter because it will be exposed to different crises, with the probability that it will not be able to manage them. Examples can be found in cities in developing countries like India (Chakrabarti 2001). The number of their inhabitants has been growing rapidly in recent years but the cities are not able to respond to major problems connected with this. People try

to move “into” a city by building provisional dwellings at (or near to) its suburbs. These “districts” however, can hardly be regarded as a shelter.

Non Governmental Organisations Working in Slums and Among City Poor

Almost all NGOs who engage in development cooperation are somehow involved in slums in different parts of the world. Church organisations are also trying to make life in the slums easier. Both these kinds of organisations engage in health care. They support women’s family responsibilities through small enterprises based on micro credit methods, income generation programs, organisation of waste removal, free time activities, education for children and adults. There are also programs, which try to include the inhabitants in urban planning using participatory methods in order to establish development strategies, such as the pro-poor and pro-employment urban development strategy entitled: “The Building in Partnership: Participatory Urban Planning Project” implemented in Kitale, Kenya, developed and supported by ILO, presented by Majale (2008). NGOs have a strong support in the Action Plan “Cities without Slums”, developed within the framework of the Cities Alliance, challenging donors, governments and slum communities in order to improve the lives of slum dwellers (Slum Upgrading). NGOs play a really significant role in upgrading slums and making the life of slum dwellers easier. The presence of an NGO, especially one that is doing long term work in particular countries and places, is very important in crisis situations because of their knowledge of the local contexts.

Solidarity

In the context of overcrowded dwellings, one next to another, and in the situation of the everyday fight for existence and survival, it is very hard to imagine how people understand their situation and that of their neighbours. Looking closely at how these slum cities subsist, they look as if they are about to collapse any minute. But this does not really happen. “There are great reservoirs of affection, resourcefulness and compassion among the poor, which make lives tolerable, when they might otherwise be unbearable...it is impossible to overestimate the spontaneous generosity and the accumulated wisdom of people who have, amazingly not been embittered by the troubles and losses they have sustained” (Seabrook 2007, 66). There are many good examples of solidarity not

only in “normal” life but also in disaster situations. Rescue personnel say that the huge majority of lives after a disaster are saved by local people. This could be the impact of the real solidarity and generosity described above. This kind of solidarity supports communicative capacities and plays a crucial role in crisis situations.

Integration of Newcomers in the City: Ethnic Groups Living Together

We assume that effective prevention or subsequent help in the case of need can reach people only through the system of existing or if possible created social bonds and stable social structures that enable sustainable development (Kniffki 2006). These could also influence crisis survival and coping with the consequences of disasters. From the previous discussion we could see that it would be very difficult for newcomers to form such networks. The population that could be integrated most easily in a city is a rural population with a similar culture as the population already living in the city. The situation tends to become more difficult in the case of people having different cultural backgrounds. If for example people within such a different culture group communicate well with one another, i.e. mostly people of the same nationality or ethnicity try to avoid conflict, they manage this because they communicate well and seek good relationships with others.

Already in the 1930's some academics, such as Lind (1930) or Taft (1933), pointed out that a distinction needs to be made between homogeneous poor ghettos where immigrants coming from the same country or region of origin live, and heterogeneous multi-ethnic districts. Searching for connections between criminality and migration, they found that in districts with homogeneous primary groups of inhabitants there is a great level of social control. This social control prevents criminality. In heterogeneous multiethnic districts the situation is different: the lack of social control increases the number of criminal acts (Taft, Donald 1933). Unfortunately, there has been no recent research carried out (or research that has not been widely published), verifying whether these findings from the 1930's are still relevant. From the perspective of this article it is a question if we can link up the relationship between criminality and social control to the relationship between social control and urban vulnerability: whether – due to closer relations between individuals in homogeneous neighbourhoods – these kinds of districts are better refuges for people: refuges more resistant to crises than the heterogeneous neighbourhoods? Do greater social control and social restraints reduce urban vulnerability?

Newcomers who come individually, one after another and not in groups, those who come from different cultural backgrounds, have no chance to preserve their own culture, habits, beliefs, rituals etc. On the other hand there are established groups which have their traditions and the new group has to adopt them. There is also a hierarchical dimension which needs to be taken into account. Those who have lived longer in the neighbourhood are in a better position. Those coming later are supposed to do second or third rate jobs or services until a new wave of newcomers arrive. It was important that newcomers 50 years ago had to adapt to the receiving culture and had to cope with the majority. Today very often they do not adapt to the receiving culture because they are received by a multicultural society, for instance immigrants from Middle America and Mexico to California (Smith, Feagin 1999). Thus, minority cities, regions and states are emerging.

Among migrants of different cultures it is possible to find people who migrated in the search of work and/or a better living, people fleeing famine or an armed conflict. A number of such migrants who have lost their dwellings and territories refuse to live in refugee camps and move to a city which offers them freedom, although frequently they become involved in a criminal way of life (Voutira 1998). These people who opt for freedom, or migrants who actually have had no choice, or people displaced by force, usually inhabit suburban slums. They build their destitute dwellings on land of generally lower value. They inhabit houses abandoned by the majority population in the search of better comfort and convenience. These inhabitants may, but need not, be included in some social networks. However in most cases they are not part of the common infrastructure – neither in its social, nor in its technical sense.

Conclusion

The hypothesis stated in this article is that in order to build an effective rescue system and facilitate rescue action, the communication of all participants including inhabitants is crucial. In this article we tried to discover where there are weak and strong points of communication in today's cities, being cities, especially in the developing world, where the majority of the population lives in slums. The first obstacle to communication is the isolation of people. Although the people have to live very closely together, in self made shelters, their lives are sometimes very isolated. This isolation is caused by so called informal employment, where people work on the edge of legality and crime. Many are part of organised crime. Illegality often leads to isolation, because it creates a

need to hide oneself, to be closed to others. Illegality is of course already embodied in the existence of slum dwellers – many of them are illegal migrants, all of them live on illegal land. The people in the slums live in constant fear, of being violated, of being evicted, of starving, diseases, etc. Fear also influences the isolation of people, because frustrated people are not open to communicate.

Many different cultures in one place could mean misunderstandings and mistrust and this tends to obstruct and not to support communication, due to linguistic and cultural differences. The more fragmented the city is, the more vulnerable it becomes and at the same time its ability to play the role of a refuge for newcomers is lessened. Very often, social bonds between the majority society and minorities or between integrated and excluded social groups are disrupted, or more probably, never even start to develop. There are numerous reasons for these disrupted bonds – possibly cultural diversity and the resulting different behaviour of the group, possibly other patterns of behaviour caused by poverty, possibly the frequent presence of illegal and/or marginal behaviour. These groups, however, tend to have strong internal social links. The stronger these links, the more likely the group is to lock itself away from extraneous influence. Frequently, however, the group consists of various people who find it difficult to communicate with one another and this makes building external relationships difficult. Another very important reason for not being able to communicate on a reasonable level is a lack of education. Illiterate people cannot respond to the rescue system properly. Last but not least it is poverty itself, which does not allow people to live, behave, bring up children, work, dwell properly, as they were used to, according to the ethos and legal system of the society, where they originally lived.

However there are many phenomena, which are very positive and which could, on the contrary, influence the communication and improve the whole rescue system. Among these could be the solidarity of people and their own coping mechanisms, as well as cooperation with many NGOs working in these places, using a participatory approach which could also improve communication among people. We cannot forget the women, who form their own infrastructures thanks to their survival strategies, where other strategies have failed. There is a UN Action plan which supports the upgrading of slums. This is the positive foundation, the capacities on which it would be possible to build. There exist links, although chaotic and weak, which can be strengthened and activated in crisis situations. Nevertheless the cities are growing and thanks to the obstacles and difficulties mentioned above they have often stopped functioning as an effective refuge.

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City as a Target

Gated Populations, Walled Territories Impacts on the Notion of Space and on Coping Mechanisms in the Case of the West Bank Wall

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Creating walls, segregation, borders is creating physical and symbolic facts 'on the ground' in order to differentiate spaces in which identities and otherness can be grounded. Partitions and divisions of space have immense consequences on the built environment but also on the way people can organise their space, identify to places, planned their actions and their mobility. Conflict in urban spaces has influenced the perception and the use of space.

Many purposes exist to the creation of walls and borders. Marking spaces, delimitating territories are of course the first ideas which would come to mind in order to state ownership, power relations, rules and rights of specific use. What ever spaces are marked – a house, a town or a country – belonging to a specific space will be one of the major identification factors which determine our potential mobility, our possible access to places, our environment. In stable societies, this link can be loosened due to transnational networks and virtual spaces. But in areas affected by sudden crises, the links between spaces and identities will be strengthened.

Linking spaces and identities brings directly to the dialectical notion of otherness. Marking a space, delimitating the place to belong to, determines the perception of the otherness – those others beyond the line, those behind Walls. In a conflict and in a turbulent environment, borders and walls may be created as a means for protection against invaders, against the "unwanted others". Communities will gate themselves in or in rare circumstances such as the West Bank Wall will lock others in. Security will be used as the main rhetoric. Mutual fear and feeling of threat will transform space.

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In turbulent environment or in space under threat, walls and borders have also as objectives to segregate communities. Wall divides between ways of life, ideologies. This can be understood either through the notion of closure with no control on the territory of the others (US-Mexico border – in order to avoid unwanted people to get in) or the Berlin Wall (in order to avoid the population to get out). Often imposing closure is correlated to the impossibility to meet and even to communication with the other side.

Locked territories are never experienced as a continuum but are perceived through safe passages and protected environments. Movements and mobility are controlled through check points. Permits determine access to the other side. In turbulent environment, when rhetoric of threat, terror and security are predominant, walls, fences and borders may become instruments of oppression. In some cases, that may lead to the denial of the others 'behind the wall', to a mental annihilation of the otherness, to a form of gradual ethnocide leading to the destruction of culture and memory. The case of the Separation wall between Israel and the West Bank is on that ground, quite relevant.

In 2002, the State of Israel started the construction of a separation wall surrounding the West Bank. Declared illegal by the International Court of Justice, the wall has been justified by the State of Israel as a right to protect itself against terrorism. For the Palestinian population, the wall is the last instrument used to reduce to its very minimal dimension their mobility. This wall is not a unique example. Walling policies have been existing for centuries in order to protect ourselves from potential hostile environment or population, in order to divide belligerents, in order to create what is perceived as sanctuaries or safety heavens. The wall is not standing alone but has to be studied and understood together with a complex system of land grab, check points, buffer zones, enclaves, exclaves, settlements and settlers roads. It has also to be understood together with a planned destruction of social and spatial environment and a planned destruction of houses, olive trees and cultural heritage.

Our paper aims to determine some impacts of the West Bank Wall on the understanding of the notion of space and to examine different coping strategies and modes of resistance used by the population in order to oppose the Wall and to adapt to the imposed new way of living.

Impact on the Notion of Space

Controlling one's own definition of space and time is the basis on which identity, feelings of belonging and organisation of social order can be made. The wall combined with check points or bypass roads for

settlers has drastically changed the notion of space, time and mobility for Palestinians. Space has become less accessible, always under control, creating no-go zones, buffer and liminal spaces. Sociologically, the wall has impacts on forced displacement², on the economy and particularly the access to labour market for those working in Israel or commuting to the major Palestinian cities. It also prevents the farmers from cultivating and harvesting their Olive orchards and fertile land. It impacts families separated by the wall and unable to meet sometimes even for major events such as religious festivals, marriages or funerals. It impacts even the health system by denying many Palestinians access to health facilities available in cities situated on the other side of the wall or because of road blockades multiplying the time necessary to reach any basic health services, blocking ambulances, depriving Palestinians from access to medication. The wall has been separating students from their educational institutions either by isolating schools behind the wall or by traumatizing the youngest in checkpoints every day, preventing them or their teachers from reaching schools on time (Piquard 2007a & b).

This idea of closure and sometimes of total closure such as in the cases of Bethlehem and Qalqiliya, is considered as a metaphor of symbolic violence. There is a clear idea of sealing territories and within the territories, sealing specific symbolic locations such as Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem, the Patriarchs' tomb in Hebron or Israeli settlements. This creates feelings of imprisonment or of encampment, expressed often in analogies with caged animals.

This can be understood as a form of symbolic violence. Symbolic violence, Bourdieu's soft violence (Bourdieu 1980, 219) occurs when a certain group or individual perceives a situation as unbearable because values, power relations, or one's world vision are felt to be threatened and if there is a common understanding and belief that those threats jeopardise life in society. It gives new meanings to power relations, can serve to legitimise to the use of physical violence and leads to a fear of disappearance. (Piquard & Petiau 2004) In most conflicts, those feelings of threat are reciprocal. The wall has impacts in terms of feelings of mutual threat, victimisation and mental borders. It is patrolled by the army on both sides, heavily mined, impenetrable. Through control over the Palestinian definition of space, time and identity the separation wall has become the architectonic machine of symbolic violence.

² See the report from Badil resource Center and the Internal Displacement monitoring Center published in Geneva and Bethlehem in August 2006.

Coping Mechanisms and Modes of Resistance

Many coping mechanisms and mode of resistance have taken place in order to respond either through adaptation or through opposition to the Wall and its impacts. Most of those modes of resistance are based on symbolic non-violent actions such as paintings, symbolic occupations or story telling.

Representation On and Of the Wall

Representing on the Wall is most probably the most obvious and common expression of opposition or adaptation. This way to cope is not specific to the West Bank. The first murals appeared in Ireland more than 70 years ago. The Berlin Wall has been also covered by paintings and graffiti too and even today the Bagdad Wall separating the Sunni area of Ghazaliyya and the Shiite area of Shula starts to be the support of slogans and expression of disagreement. One of the particularities of the paintings on the West Bank Wall is the fact that quite a few drawings have been done by International activists not directly linked to the Palestinian struggle but concerned as global citizens by the global issue of peace and justice. This has for consequences that the contents of the paintings may come from different registers not specific to the Palestinian culture. Some of them evoke peace representations (portray of Gandhi, peace symbols and slogans, etc.) or the anti-globalisation movement, linking and confusing anti-Israeli feelings with anti-American and anti-capitalist symbolism.

Most of the paintings though use symbols of the Palestinian resistance: the Palestinian flag, the Palestinian Keffiyeh or slogans such as "To exist is to resist". The aims to counter balance the annihilation of the Palestinian existence which is considered as a direct consequence of the Separation Wall. It can be a way to re-claim, to re-appropriate symbolically or even re-gain the occupied/confiscated space. The symbolism is directly linked to the identity quest. The Israeli policies will be portrayed as evil and are often compared to the creation of the Second World War ghettos or to apartheid in South Africa. Many representations will be linked to the notion of closure such as caged animals, representation of the lost view on the Al Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem or references to ghettos.

If the Palestinians express mostly the dichotomy identity/otherness, the international community will talk mostly about space and territory. The closure will be the main theme expressed through symbols of openness: windows, holes in the wall, ladders along the wall, open doors, and

children lifted by balloons, etc. (Piquard 2007a). In some places, such as in Bethlehem or near Qalandiyya check point, murals have been created by the well-known British artist Banksy who declared condemning the wall but also that Israel was “the ultimate activity holiday destination for graffiti writers”³. Drawing for all becomes clearly a political practice. But for some, the Wall has become the ultimate anarchist support much more than a means of solidarity for the Palestinian struggle. This created a lot of confused feelings for the Palestinian population considering themselves dispossessed of one of their means for action.

Those symbolic drawings may have an ephemeral life on the wall but can survive through reproduction. They can become emblems of the Palestinian resilience and being used for international demonstrations, exhibits or propaganda. They become in themselves ideological and symbolic markers sometimes escaping the very meaning given by the author (Piquard 2007b). This process is again not unique and has been witnessed again in the case of Berlin or the Northern Ireland (Jarman 1998), where murals and paintings over times have played different roles or taken different significations to the point that in Northern Ireland with time and with the prospect of a sustainable peace process the main murals and paintings have become part of touristic tours. We could imagine that alternative tourist routes in Palestine could include some of the paintings sites in order to create some awareness about the situation created by the wall as well as introducing non-violent means of resilience in order to break the image of violence in the Middle East (Piquard 2007b).

The wall as a vector of rhetoric and ideologies brings with it a series of mental images. The Israeli understanding of the wall has to be read through the lenses of the politico-architectural concept of “*Homa Umigdal*” (Wall and Tower), a system of settlement surrounded by walls, barbed wire and observation towers, central to Israeli architecture (Rotbard 2003)⁴. The wall, particularly the check points, proved to be a form of spectacular violence, a violence that must be seen, this in opposition to forms of more frequent suspended (latent, insinuated) violence. (Azoulay 2003, 2) This notion of spectacular violence is really central in site-specific drawings. This trivialisation of the wall follows the willingness to deny even the existence of Palestinians.

³ BBC, *Picturing Israel's wall*, on line

⁴ According to Rotbard, the *Homa Umigdal* project was initiated in 1936 by the members of Kibbutz Tel Amal. The objective was “to seize control of land officially purchased by the Israeli land’s administration but which could not be settled mostly for security reasons”. Rotbard, *Wall and Tower*, p. 42.

Paintings on the wall can represent a means for non-violent adaptation, creating coping mechanisms and reducing the efficiency of the symbolic violence of the wall and the psychological feelings of imprisonment. Peace activists or educationalists are using the drawing process on the Wall, particularly with children to manage them to represent it in their drawings or to paint on it. The purpose is to ensure that the children keep in mind the abnormality of the situation without fearing it (Piquard 2007b). The process of drawing is therefore dynamic. Paintings can be created, destroyed, re or over-painted in a very active way. This may explain why sometimes even very symbolic murals may be covered by graffiti.

Other Responses to the Wall

Different other responses can also be witnessed either directly linked to the Wall or to other symbolic spaces and buildings. Those actions aim to create space of communication either between separated communities or between Israelis and Palestinians. Conflict transformation NGOs have used mostly websites in order to create 'virtual homelands' or video conferencing screened directly on the Wall, projecting each other in order to re-create the type of visual perspective that would be seen if the Wall was not constructed. Another strategy can be to re-occupy confiscated spaces, to re-own spaces. This, at this stage and under the current circumstances of occupation can only be done symbolically, either by proposition of alternative use of specific spaces as the settlers colonies or by story-telling in order to keep alive the former use of space, to revive histories, to recall ancient use of particular places. Transforming place of exclusion, places of emptiness into place of life is another mode of coping and another non-violent mode of resistance. This can take different forms: the revival of traditional practices such as the use of harvest routes, organization of concerts given in buffer zones or symbolic Christmas star made out of torches near Rachel Tomb in Bethlehem. Finally, more classical methods of denunciation or advocacy campaign in order to refuse the wall's existence are carried out through non-violent demonstrations, exhibits, construction of Walls in foreign cities in order to propose to local population to 'experience' a wall, Web-based data collection, petition and campaigns.

Conclusion

All these impacts of the wall lead to more global phenomena of planned destruction of the culture of Palestinians through the destruc-

tion of their social and spatial environment, described as spaciocide and urbicide, referring to a massive destruction of space or cities. Indeed, as showed, there is a continuous redefinition of the space and the time through systematic control and denial of access to some Palestinian space, to Palestinian places of memories and social meanings. To those facts must be added the confiscation of land, the destruction of visual perspective, the closure and the construction of enclaves, the denial of the notion of privacy and the destruction of landscape.

But populations do not stay helpless even in those dramatic cases. Strategies and coping mechanisms are put in place in order to resist those forms of annihilation of their culture, their ownership of space and their very existence. Mostly based on non-violence mechanisms (named *Sumud* in Arabic) and on symbolic actions, those mechanisms aim to respond to symbolic violence.

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Invisible Vulnerabilities The Cases of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and San Salvador (El Salvador)

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Today, a micro level sort of violent conflict is spreading across the globe, habitually in peripheral areas of large urban centers, in the form of concentrated high-level armed violence. Its main actors (both direct victims and perpetrators) are socially marginalized young men. Brazil's Rio de Janeiro and El Salvador's San Salvador are used here to act as clear examples of a context submersed in this kind of conflict. They are situations that cannot be accurately described as either war or peace. While they are not engaged in an officially declared war, they experience some of the highest gun related death rates in the world.

These contexts of armed violence have specific impacts on the lives of both men and women. Because women are not seen to be the main "risk group", existing mechanisms have been insufficient in terms of both charting the complexity of women's engagement in armed violence and of revealing the full breadth of its impact on them.

With this article we intend to analyze women's roles in two urban contexts of armed violence specifically highlighting *the silences and invisibilities* within these environments, as well as the impact of these on their lives, being the most expressive impact their increasing vulnerability. By silences and invisibilities we mean the roles played by women in these contexts which are often neglected in the existing accounts on gender and armed violence, namely their direct participation, support and resistances to armed violence.

Redefining War and Peace: The New Geography of War(s)

War is a dynamic and complex concept. It is subject to several interpretations. An analysis of the evolution of concepts and practices of international conflict allows us, on the one hand, to observe the convergence tendency between the so-called war zones and peace zones, the

creation of spaces of indefiniteness and, on the other, to identify violence(s) *continuum(s)*, from the global to the local scale.

Many of the wars in the nineties began as an amplification of internal contradictions and relationships that shaped the formal negotiation of peace in previous historical stages – that after all matched a violent peace or a undefined zone. Nowadays we face the dissemination, or intensification, at the global level, of another kind of violent conflict, which has emerged in the margins of other kinds of war (both traditional – inter-state – and new wars) that we dare label as micro or *newest wars* (Moura 2005). It is the dissemination of armed violence at an increasingly micro scale, whose privileged scenarios are urban centres of countries living in formal peace, and whose actors (either direct victims or violent agents) are young men, most of them from the marginalised social classes. Although its manifestation occurs at a micro or local scale, these *wars* can be identified as a global phenomenon. They are both due to its global dissemination and to its dependence and articulation with war and post-war contexts.

The newest wars are distinct from the ordinary large-scale internal criminality. The border between the internal and the international sphere in these scenarios is increasingly less clear. It makes the definition or characterisation of this new type of conflict dependent upon the “lenses” or filters through which we analyse these contexts. If we focus exclusively on the internal dimension, we’ll see little more than a scenario of hyper concentrated criminality, with no political objectives. But if we understand the articulations between these local phenomena and the international context, we’ll realise that we face the emergence of new kinds of conflicts, with global dissemination. To label this kind of violent conflict as “newest wars” has the purpose of underlining this important difference.

Latin America constitutes one of the most expressive examples of what we call newest wars, where formal and institutional peace did not result in a decrease in violence, but rather a “democratisation of violence” (Rodgers 2003). This type of violence, which emerged in the 80s and 90s, resulted from the combination of several factors and has paradoxical faces.

The case of El Salvador is a good example of this. With the end of the Cold War and the reach of a military impasse, the El Salvadorian armed conflict came to an end after twelve years of struggle (from 1980 to 1992). It resulted in more than 80 thousand casualties and a flux of refugees, around 1.5 million, in a country of 6 million inhabitants. Nevertheless, the track-record of state repression, namely systematic massacres of the peasant community, torture and forced displacement is deeply rooted, having been reinforced in the eighties. Despite being

hailed as a successful case of post-war rehabilitation, currently, El Salvador is known internationally by the existence of some of the more lethal gangs in the world (M18 and Mara Salvatrucha), both with close ties to US gangs, namely those of Los Angeles, as well as gangs from other regions of Central America. Today, much violence in El Salvador can be characterised as urban and as associated with violent groups.

The climax of direct violence in El Salvador was reached in 1994 after the signing of the peace accords. At that time, there was a significant increase in the homicide rate, 165.5 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants. Currently, this rate is 55.5 per 100 thousand inhabitants, a figure far higher than in Colombia (37), which is still undergoing civil war and severe narco-trafficking issues (CDHES, 2005). In 2006, 3.928 homicides were registered where most of the victims were between the ages of 14 and 34 years old (72,6%). 79% of the homicides were committed with firearms (IML, 2007). Violence attributed to marginal groups (*maras*) mirrors the violence that cross-cuts society. Furthermore, as in many cases *maras* have learned the violent methods with which they operate from other types of groups, for many crimes it is impossible to determine author and motive.

Armed violence is not confined to the *mara* phenomenon nor organised criminality once access to and the use of small arms is quite generalised within civil society, both in urban and rural areas. Faced with the rising concern of San-salvadorians with insecurity and criminality, which frequently ranks higher than unemployment in the hierarchy of national preoccupations (PNUD 2003), often, *maras* are used as "scapegoats", which seems to incur other types of violence.

Nearly fifteen thousand young people participate in gangs (Luz 2007) in a country with high unemployment rates and where 37% of the population is under 18 years of age. Nevertheless, in the media, young males are typically portrayed as aggressors, when, in reality, they also constitute the majority of victims. They face spirals of violence characterized by socialisation into several types of violence, both as victims and aggressors, as well as imprisonment experiences and as victims or witnesses to intra-familial violence.

Given the disappearance of the ideological motivation for violence and the changes in space (rural to urban) and scale in which it occurs, the novelty of this new violence resides in the fact that violent actors are increasingly influenced by global symbolic fluxes (films, image and behaviour models) as well as material (drug and small arms trafficking, for example), which directly or indirectly promote the use of violence as a way of social affirmation and of obtaining status. Violence has changed in terms of scale, motivations and actors, but is as acute as or even more

acute than before. It affects the whole society to a greater extent than war itself, blurring the borders of peace and war (Bourgois, 2001).

Brazil, and Rio de Janeiro in particular, is a clear example of a context submersed in this newest kind of conflict. It is a situation that cannot be described as either war or peace. While it is not engaged in an officially declared war, it experiences some of the highest gun related death rates in the world. These are largely associated with highly armed and organized groups that vie for control of territory in the *favelas* or urban shantytowns with the police. Rio de Janeiro today has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Between 1991 and 2002, nearly 90.000 people were killed by firearms. The Brazilian population has 2.8% of the world population, but between 9% and 13% of the gun related deaths in the world in the 90s. The increases in violence are directly related to the emergence of narcotrafficking, of arms trafficking and of the groups that control them. In spite of the fact that drug trafficking in Rio is not recent (it dates from the beginning of the 20th Century), it was only at the end of the 70s and the beginning of the 80's, with the arrival of enormous quantities of cocaine to the city, that it became an important transit point for exporting cocaine to the United States, Europe and South Africa (Dowdney 2003, 25). The statistics show that direct armed violence, mirrored in the mortality rates, began to increase exactly after the end of the 70s: in 1980 there were 1,807 homicides in Rio de Janeiro (or 35.5 homicides per 100.000 residents); but in 1989 this number increased to 3.516, or 64.9 homicides per 100.000 residents. This rate has remained steady through the year 2000 (Dowdney 2003, 92).

As throughout Latin America, firearms are responsible for the majority of these deaths. In Brazil in 2002, firearms were responsible for 68% of all homicides (ISER 2005). In 1960, police in Rio de Janeiro state seized 841 firearms, but in 1999 this number increased to 11.633 illegal firearms, a great number of which were of a highly lethal and more advanced variety. This increase in seizure of weapons, from the end of the 80s, "[...] follows the emergence of drug factions, their fragmentation, militarization and armed territorial disputes, as well as increases in confrontations with police" (Dowdney 2003, 93). In Rio de Janeiro there are three types of drug factions or armed groups that dispute territorial control in poor communities or *favelas* with the economic objective of controlling narcotrafficking: Third Command (*Terceiro Comando*), Red Command (*Comando Vermelho*) and Friends of Friends (*Amigos dos Amigos*). Following the pattern of new violence in Latin America, in Rio de Janeiro, a large metropolis, violence is notably greater in some neighbourhoods and does not affect the entire population equally. As affirmed by Luke Dowdney (2003, 94), "Some regions have a number

of deaths similar to cities in Europe or the United States, with less than 10 homicides per 100,000 residents, and other regions have rates similar to areas in armed conflict or at war (with rates between 100 and 501 homicides per 100,000 residents)". In spite of gun related mortality rates that are comparable to losses suffered in many contemporary wars, the city and the country are not at war (Dowdney 2003, 13). However, the illegal drugs trade in Rio de Janeiro has given way to extremely high levels of armed violence, firearms-related mortality rates, a paramilitary organisation, geographical territorialisation, political domination of poor communities, and the participation of state authorities that reach levels rarely seen anywhere else in the world (*ibid.*, 239).

The scale of these manifestations of violence is different from the other wars. It is a concentration of great violence in very limited territories, or "microterritories" (neighbourhoods, urban communities, suburban areas), within a national context of apparent, institutionalised and formal peace.

The democratisation and inflation of young people's expectations in large urban centres correspond precisely to the attempt to construct and promote a model of dominant masculinity. In the context of newest wars, in which multiple situations of social and economic exclusion are exacerbated, the choices available to young people in urban areas are limited. Thus, the failures of traditional social institutions on all levels greatly contribute to the choices that some young people make to join gangs. On a macro level, the State fails to give meaning to citizenship, especially for the most marginalised (Winton 2004). The growing social fragmentation and polarisation that results is sometimes compensated by the development of alternative forms of social identity, and violence can become a resource through which a recognised identity is obtained (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002). Although they do not make up the majority, many young men "kill and die to attain a socially-legitimate version of masculinity" (Barker 2005, 83).

Even if concepts and practices of war change, the *sexual* character of wars seems to be permanent: all wars or armed conflicts rest on the construction of identities and on structures and mechanisms of power and domination that are at the heart of a patriarchal system, which some feminists refer to as *war system* (Reardon 1985). In order to perpetuate itself, this system requires the construction of a certain type of masculinity (hegemonic, dominant, and violent). It is heterosexual, homophobic and misogynistic, considering professional performance (the resulting gains from this profession) and the capacity to acquire material goods as the base for respect and social status. In its turn, this masculinity always requires masculinity(ies) and femininity(ies) that are silenced, invisible

and, therefore, marginalised, to serve as its antithesis, denial and counterpoint. This perspective highlights the need to analyse the existence of *continuums* of violence (armed, domestic, sexual, social, economic...) as an expression of a reality in which war is not an isolated social fact, but rather something that invades everyday life; a cultural reality that causes many to confuse war with peace.

In analyzing the new conflicts that manifest themselves particularly in Rio de Janeiro and San Salvador, it is clear that men are the main direct victims of armed violence. The face of this violence is not only male, but predominantly young.

On the other hand, young men are also the main agents of this violence. At play here are the mystics of masculinity (Fisas 1998) and all the symbolism of guns associated with it, with strong roots in the culture of violence that dominates in Latin America. The near-monopoly on the use and possession of firearms by males is in reality an expression of a kind of masculinity, violent and militarized, and of local and national cultures in which the use of firearms by men is the norm. In times of war and in "peaceful" countries, these weapons often are part of a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood among young men, who are frequently socialized into a familiarity and fascination with firearms (Connell 1985). These symbolic elements are associated with the other factors referred to above to characterize the singularity of these newest wars.

The Invisible Faces: Women and Armed Violence¹

When looking closely at relationships between women and armed violence, invisible femininities appear, as well as unknown or forgotten impacts of violence on women's lives: they are direct victims, they are involved as perpetrators of armed violence or they are survivors.

Direct victims

In Brazil, men constitute the majority of deaths by firearms (91%) and of hospital admissions due to wounds caused by these arms (90%). In El Salvador, in 2006, only 11% of total homicides were women. The presentation of this data, often in comparative terms, has been used to show that women and girls are not greatly affected by armed violence.

¹ Data from Brazil is published in Moura, Tatiana (2007), *Rostos Invisíveis da Violência Armada. Um Estudo de Caso sobre o Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras.

This comparison has, however, a double effect: on the one hand, it marginalises the specificities of direct impacts of firearms in the lives of girls and women. For example, in El Salvador, in 2006, Women representing only 11% of homicide victims, but 70% of these were murdered with a firearm. Already in 2002, in Brazil, 42% of female victims of murder were killed with firearms. On the other hand, the statistic only provides us with a partial picture of the real impacts of armed violence on the lives of these groups. We speak of the *use of firearm as a threat instrument* in contexts of already unequal power relations, and particularly in situations of intra-family violence. Intra-family violence, which affects women disproportionately and occurs in the private sphere in times of war and times of peace, is part of a culture that normalises, naturalises, privatises and makes these practices invisible. Frequently, this kind of violence has the firearm as an instrument of coercion, intimidation and threat that may be lethal.

Between September and October 2005, we conducted research² in eight of the nine Special Police Stations for Women in Rio de Janeiro, in which 615 questionnaires were spontaneously filled out by women denouncing violence. Although this was a pilot study, we believe it reveals important specificities of violence against women on a micro scale. Firstly, our study shows that firearms are a source of threat and fear not only in the public and visible sphere, but also in spaces considered safe, such as the private sphere. Secondly, it reveals articulations between two kinds of violence that usually are debated and considered in an independent and hermetic way: domestic violence and armed violence. Out of all the women who filled in the questionnaire, 60,3% had been attacked by their intimate partners or ex-partners (husbands, boyfriends, companions). Among those who knew that the aggressor had a firearm and those who said they did not know, 68.5% answered that they had already been threatened with a gun in some way. 73% also mentioned that the presence of the gun prevented them from reacting physically or verbally to the violence, with 68% stating that they would like to end the relationship with the aggressor, but didn't do it because they were afraid of being attacked with the gun. Especially important is the percentage of respondents who said they *did not know* if their intimate partner had a gun at home (24,6% of all the cases). Not knowing means having to deal with this doubt and, therefore, with the imminent discovery of its existence. And it means, above all, that in order to maintain

² For the "Women and Girls in Contexts of Armed Violence: a case study on Rio de Janeiro" Project, a partnership between The Peace Studies Group/Centre for Social Studies and the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio, supported by the Ford Foundation.

and perpetuate a relationship of domination and power, the gun does not necessarily have to be used, or even seen.

Women involved in armed violence and war strategies against women

Although the feminine sex often acts as a barometer or indicator of social recognition of a kind of masculinity, little debate has taken place on the construction of femininities in contexts of armed violence. On the one hand, we know that several versions of (dominant) masculinity depend upon the construction of its denial or opposition – vulnerable and passive femininities. But, on the other hand, we also witness an inflation or standardisation of girls and women's expectations, as well as their frustrations, in these contexts.

With the interviews conducted between July 2005 and September 2007, it became clear that the participation of girls and women in armed violence in Rio de Janeiro and San Salvador is heterogeneous and conditioned by several factors.

We divided female involvement in armed violence into three categories: 1) *incentive to armed violence*; 2) *basic or secondary roles* in that violence; and 3) *direct/active/visible involvement* in armed violence. Each one of these categories or ways of participation has its own expressions and results from specific factors. However, they are combined, accumulated and result in plural and complex ways of involvement.

The motivations presented for the involvement (of distinct kinds) in armed violence differed between girls and women. In the case of girls, the main motivations are the search for social recognition (mirrored in the possibility to obtain respect and have access to consumption goods and/or drugs), the feeling of belonging (faced with exclusion and family rupture and abuse scenarios) and of adrenaline.

For women, the justification often had to do with the attempt to fulfil basic needs and support their families, especially when they were unemployed. With this classification, we do not intend any motivational hierarchy between girls and women (considering the first more *superficial* and the last as more *legitimate*). In this sense, we understand that, although different, these motivations are the result of power relations to which girls and women are exposed, and of social expectations frequently imposed, both to men and women, as valorisation conditions within a certain social group.

In several interviews, motherhood appeared both as a causal factor and as continuity of involvement of girls and women in armed violence, and as a factor of behaviour change. On the one hand, involvement in

criminality and armed violence was seen as a way to “provide what they haven’t had”. On the other hand, violence was a factor that influenced change of values and behaviours. Girls and women could have promoted the use of arms, could have assumed peripheral roles in armed criminality, and could even have played more direct roles. But faced with the notion of risks and insecurities, they wished a different and “more lasting life” for their children.

When involved in violence, women are almost always simultaneously victims and aggressors. The strategies vary from group to group, in San Salvador and Rio, but they are greatly similar to those of war mobilisation and training, and they match the reproduction of power and differentiation relations between men and women. For example, in San Salvador, initiation rituals (to prove braveness and fidelity to the group) can be differentiated (Liebel 2002). Men have to be beaten up, whilst women can choose between that and gang rape, even if, for some, they are still not considered as a real member afterwards. Those who choose the second option are considered weaker, for choosing the “easiest” way, which shows the need of identification and polarisation of identities. Women often don’t see these practices as rapes, rather as a task among others, whose accomplishment is facilitated by the consumption of alcohol and drugs. In what concerns labour division, they adopt support roles, but also direct ones (although increasingly less). The preconditions to being part of the group are related to male characteristics, like strength, agility, speedy reaction; however, women are expected to correspond to the same patterns. After entering the group, women are sometimes subjected to the “compulsoriness” of providing sexual favours to the group’s men. Besides this, confrontation strategies between *maras* involve territorial domain, also associated to the bodies of women from the rival group, through sexual violation (many women that belong to *maras* are raped and not always murdered; the same happens to wives of gang members). Other groups, besides the *maras*, use the murder and torture of women as a way to scare civilian population, to create an environment of horror and panic, and to obtain political benefits. Despite all this, in Rio de Janeiro and San Salvador, women are still seen as secondary elements, with no social and development projects directed towards them.

Women as Survivors of armed violence

Armed violence does not only affect those directly associated with the gun. In El Salvador, a considerable part of the population is affected by the obligation to pay rents, either to *maras* or to organised crime

groups and forced displacement to other areas of residence becomes a survival strategy for many. And in Rio, a recent study revealed important data on the so-called secondary, indirect or hidden victims of urban violence. It is estimated (Soares *et al* 2006) that, in the period from 1979 to 2001, between 300.000 and 600.000 people survived violent deaths in Rio de Janeiro. These people, the ones who remain, are the ones who continue to have to deal with the cycles of violence, usually without the support needed to be able to return to a healthy and productive life.

For people who live this drama closely, these facts do not end and are not confined to the tragedy of collective or individual deaths. Their effects are perpetuated and unfold in other *continuums* of violence, in the daily lives of those who remain, whether through pain, through fear, through humiliation, through impotence, through disorientation or through the countless difficulties experienced on the paths that are only just beginning when the facts disappear from the news programmes. The visibility of these deaths and their trail of pain are temporary. Indeed, after the dramatic events, the survivors return to the condition of invisibility. As a rule, it is mothers, sometimes sisters and wives, but rarely fathers and brothers who start the journey through the paths of justice, in the hope of redeeming some meaning of what is left to them and in the effort, not always rewarded, of fighting against impunity.

The reports from mothers and other family members are full of stories of suffering, starting from the day in which the execution of the children/family members took place – remembered, relived and described in detail. The impacts that result from the deaths are obviously multiple, and intimately connected to one another. The ways in which they are felt, expressed and manifested resemble a web, making it difficult to isolate them individually.

Peace Time Policies Against Violence: Redefining Public Security

The relationship between women and guns is highly complex. In two cases from our study we can see that women and girls participate in and suffer from armed violence: they are members of armed forces or groups, they are involved in militias and gangs, and they are encouraged to use guns. As demonstrated above, contexts of armed violence have specific impacts on the lives of both men and women. Because women are not seen to be the main “risk group”, existing mechanisms have therefore been insufficient in terms of both charting the complexity of women’s engagement in armed violence and of revealing the full breadth of its impact on them. However, programs designed to re-inte-

grate combatants following conflict often fail to adequately address the needs of women and girl combatants. In conflict and post-conflict settings, as well as in contexts of declared “formal peace”, the proliferation of small arms significantly contributes to high rates of sexual violence against women – both combatants and non-combatants. Sexual and domestic violence are more likely to be lethal when a firearm is present. Thus research and action aimed at producing programs for the elimination of armed violence is integral to the elimination of violence against women.

The lack of studies and analyses that include women or use sex-disaggregated data, *is in itself a political option* to silence and marginalize determined groups. At the same time, armed violence (possession and use of firearms in general) is a result of a sexualized construction of gender. It depends on hegemonic and violent constructions of masculinity that oppose peaceful and passive notions of femininity and constitute an instrument to exercise masculine power over marginalized collectives, especially women. It is expected that women will accept social constructions of being *unprotected* women who *depend on* the status, power and protection of men³.

The broad spectrum of civil society and government efforts that specifically aim to reduce armed violence have focused mainly on this principal risk group (boys and young men), and consequently little attention has been paid to the roles and impacts of women on armed violence. Our point is that a gender analysis is fundamental to take into due account this fluidity, the blurred distinctions between war and peace (peaceful and war zones) and that it is essential to change policies and research agendas considering armed violence and gendered violence since they have been, hitherto, characterised by disconnected and incomplete discourses and nexus. However, more than a sectorial concretization, the *continuums* of violence experienced by women and girls in these contexts (as in conventional wars) is a synthesis of the main social ingredients of violence and of its cultural basis.

In cases like those presented here, social violence is supposed to be fought through a repressive perspective or manipulation to create widespread fear as if gang violence was the only violence. Attention is focused on social violence only as criminality, not looking for a deeper understanding of these diverse phenomena. By putting the focus on gangs as synonymous to criminality, governments stress repressive strategies, for example the Manu Dura (Strong hand) framework in

³ AI, Oxfam and IANSA (2005), “The impact of guns on women’s lives”.

El Salvador (and other central American countries), jailing anyone with a tattoo, changing laws to allow imprisonment for more than 48 hours without complaint, the attempt to diminish the legal age of imprisonment in Rio, and turning a blind eye to extermination and social cleansing groups.

This has led, in the case of San Salvador, to the spread of gangs all over the country and to their seeking refuge in rural areas. Repression makes it difficult to address members of gangs who would eventually consider leaving the violent practices for a job or a social program. Women are even more controlled by gang members since they are seen as more easily caught and vulnerable to pressure. They have strategies of adaptation, and mostly women assume even more invisible tasks. By promoting war between gangs, repression also increases the level of violence against women (members or family) which was before object of a code of conduct.

Still absent from most policies against violence in these urban contexts are social domination / legitimating processes. Society is not concerned with the structural causes of violence and accepts this criminalisation, so it is most often impossible to develop real prevention strategies; NGOs don't work with active gang members and even less with women. And programs which do only view them as victims and passive actors).

The power of the law: the case of the Disarmament Statute in Brazil

In December 2003, new gun-control legislation, the Disarmament Statute, was approved in Brazil, severely restricting access to firearms. The data for 2004 show the first signs of the efficiency of this measure: the rate of deaths by firearms decreased by 8%, the first drop in thirteen years, representing 3.234 fewer deaths in the total Brazilian population in relation to the previous year.

Female mortality by firearms rate, however, decreased from 2,7 per 100.000 inhabitants, in 2002, to 2,5 per 100.000 inhabitants in 2004. There was, therefore, a slightly smaller reduction in relation to the general decrease among the Brazilian population. In other countries, the introduction of stricter gun control laws had significant impacts on the reduction of female mortality. We believe that this discrepancy results from the fact that the statute has a more immediate impact on the proliferation and use of firearms in public spaces (the street), significantly reducing the risks and mortality rates resulting from brawls in bars, arguments in traffic, etc. – situations that present a greater risk for the male sex. We can suppose, however, that the statute measures which

make the acquisition of new firearms more difficult will, in the mid to long-term, reduce the mortality rates, especially for women, which occur mainly in the private sphere.

In 2004, in the State of Rio de Janeiro, 327 women and girls were killed by firearms, and another 198 were hospitalised due to firearm-related injuries. We can see that in Rio, as in Brazil, there are many more deaths by firearms than injuries, revealing the lethality of armed violence. However, it is interesting to note that the proportion of women injured by firearms (9,5%) is higher than the proportion of women who die as a result of the same weapons (5,4%).

Our first interpretative hypothesis is that the *intention* of killing is seen more within the male population. The second hypothesis is that men, and especially young men, seek medical assistance less often than women (Barker 2005) when they suffer injuries. This is particularly relevant in the case of firearm-related injuries, which may be explained by the fact that they do not want to be stigmatised or seen as criminals.

A recent study (Phebo 2005 *in* ISER 2005) shows that firearm injuries require a longer period of hospitalisation and bring more costs to the public health system than other types of injuries, such as those resulting from car accidents: the average cost of care by the Unified Health System (SUS) is R\$ 380, while injuries caused by firearms require an average hospitalisation of seven days and cost on average R\$ 5.564 per patient. Thus, as well as being the most lethal instruments, firearms are also those that create the most problems for the national health system.

On the other hand, the rates of mortality caused by firearms increase the disparity between the number of men and women in Brazil, especially in the states with the highest rates of violence. According to data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE),⁴⁶ in the State of Rio de Janeiro, the average life expectancy for men is 62 years, and for women, 74 years. That is, for each 100 women, there are 87 men.

Conclusion

The near-monopoly by men on the use and possession of firearms is an expression of socialization in a type of violent and militarized masculinity. The manifestations of these violent forms of masculinity equate firearms possession with an exercise of power, and constitute a significant threat and source of insecurity for women.

The exacerbation of hegemonic and militarized masculinity is the common backdrop that unifies the cultures of violence present in all the scales of war (the "old", the "new" and the "newest").

Articulating these types of violence, with greater emphasis on subjectivity, represents an enormous contribution to redefining and recognizing unclear zones, where (micro)wars are diluted in an apparent context of (macro)peace.

Armed violence often becomes an alternative means of affirmation. Growing social fragmentation and polarisation are compensated, in some cases, by the development of alternative forms of social identity and the search for economic and symbolic power (Winton, 2004).

However, there has not been much debate on the construction of femininity(ies) in contexts of armed violence. On the one hand, we know that certain versions of dominant masculinity depend on the construction of their negation or opposition – vulnerable and passive femininities. But on the other hand, we have also observed an inflation or standardisation of the expectations of girls and women, as well as their frustrations, in these contexts. Thus, it is imperative to consider and analyse the emergence of very new identities or femininities and understand in what way and through what practices they are constructed. That is, to make the simplistic analysis that a dominant masculinity opposes a vulnerable femininity more sophisticated and subtle, and to understand what type of relations cause these constructions of identity.

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City as a Refuge

Transforming Mourning into Fighting: Survivors of Armed Violence

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The analysis of male and female involvement in armed conflicts and in scenarios of political violence has been guided by a stereotyping and universalising approach, which has limited itself to the most visible practices and actors of violence. The omission of women's participation in combat situations as well as in peace operations, the invisibility of men's involvement in pacifist movements and the underrating of female political activism in both war and disseminated violence scenarios, constitute a few examples of this approach. This approach has furthermore contributed to legitimise and perpetuate traditional identity constructions and power relations, sustained by the identification of men as active and violent actors and women as passive victims and natural peace advocates. This interpretation has notably had important repercussions in situations of armed conflict, post-war and also in less studied scenarios, namely those characterised by organised or non-organised armed violence, which take place primarily in urban centres. An incorrect or incomplete analysis of male and female involvement in both violent acts and in the design of violence containment and response strategies can ultimately lead to the implementation of policies of violence response which are detached from reality or even counterproductive, hence contributing to increase the vulnerability of those involved in and affected by violence.

Masculinities and Femininities at War

The roles and contributions of women have historically been marginalised, in both peacetime and wartime. This phenomenon has its roots in the very process of social construction of the meanings of war and peace, stereotypically associated to both sexes. Women have been *naturally* linked with informal peace, while men have been associated with war and formal peace processes. The stereotypes 'violent men' and 'men as agents of formal peace', which emphasise the role of men in the

conduct of warfare in the name of the defenceless (male and female) and in the design of negotiated solutions for conflicts, as well as the stereotypes 'women victims' and 'peaceful women', which result from perceived female dependency in relation to men and maternal biological determinism, thus reflect a system of hierarchical dualisms of patriarchal matrix, which have prevailed in time and subordinate women and other marginalised groups.

Departing from the observation that one of the structural and cultural factors sustaining violence is indeed the patriarchal system, and based on the analysis of specific kinds of violence experienced by women, feminists establish a *continuum* between several kinds of violence and injustice (Pettman, 1996, 31), domestic, armed, social and economic violence amongst others. In line with this understanding of kinds of violence, feminists not only question traditional concepts of war and peace, which they perceive to be artificial and narrow, but also expose their problematic character. These concepts tend to neglect structural and cultural kinds of violence, which operate in the long term and are at the heart of several large-scale episodes of violence. They consequently naturalise the kinds of micro-violence which occur in the inter-personal sphere (mostly, though not exclusively, on women) and which are very common throughout the world and this, in turn, feeds new spirals of violence.

Along these lines, some feminists have contested the analytical separation established between contexts of declared war and other violent practices, namely phenomena of highly intense concentration of violence in very limited territories, or micro-territories (neighbourhoods, urban communities, suburban zones), within a national context of apparent formal and institutionalised peace, highlighting its constructed and counterproductive character (Pureza and Moura, 2005; Moura, 2005). By drawing attention to the proximity and connections that these micro expressions of violence maintain with conventional war theatres internationally – particularly in relation to actors and victims of violence, mobilisation factors, war strategies and funding sources and mechanisms – these researchers deconstruct the conceptual basis of violence analysis, surpassing its dichotomous and exclusive nature, and reveal the implications of its inadequacy in terms of the formulation of alternatives to violence (Pureza and Moura, 2005, 56-57; Moura, 2005, 89-94).

Departing from substantially different premises, particularly the idea that the conventional paradigm of security constitutes in itself a mechanism of insecurity production, especially at the individual level, feminist thinkers propose a wider concept of peace and security, which embraces a multidimensional perspective (economic, social, cultural and military) and applies to multiple scales (macro, formal and micro, informal) (Tick-

ner, 2001, 62), corresponding to the expanded understanding of violence. This conceptual and potentially political expansion corresponds to an attempt to disrupt the traditional separation between public and private violence. By refusing to silence private expressions of violence one contributes decisively to render visible the existing connections between these types of violence.

It is within this feminist peace and security agenda that this article is positioned, with the purpose of giving visibility to alternative peace-building processes emerging amidst contexts of various kinds of violence, contexts which are often marginalised and silenced due to their micro-cosmic character and due to the role that women tend to play in them.

Surviving Loss and Violence: Activism for Human Rights, Memory and Reconciliation

Together with lobbying initiatives for negotiated solutions to traditional armed conflicts and the minimisation of the effects of war, women's groups have been actively engaged in fighting impunity, defending human rights and advocating for reconciliation, particularly in the Latin American region. Submerged in a history of civil war, state repression, impunity and widespread poverty, countries such as Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and El Salvador witnessed the emergence of groups of mothers, grandmothers and widows, namely the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the Chilean Relatives' Association, the National Committee of Widows of Guatemala (CONAVIGUA) and the El Salvadorian Committee of Mothers Monsignor Romero (CoMadres). These groups, which were mostly made up of women belonging to economic middle/low classes, with very little political experience, soon became symbols of the struggle against impunity and for social justice, historical memory and national reconciliation.

War experiences, although traumatic, particularly in the regions where violence against women was rampant, as in the case of Guatemala, have not prevented women from organising themselves collectively, participating in public protests and leading judicial inquiries or campaigns for truth. Quite the contrary, in many cases, as expressed in some of the activists' testimonies,¹ it was these same personal experiences of

¹ For instance, Fanny Bendersky, an activist of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, stated "the dramatic moments that we experienced, the fears and doubts, have brought us closer together, and united we began to feel strong, very strong" (Peluffo, 2007, 80). Guadalupe, a boarding member of CONAVIGUA, said "We didn't know what to do [after

various kinds of violence (physical, psychological, social and economic) and the accompanying feelings of loss and grief, that prompted women to engage in political activism.

As Jennifer Schirmer (1989, 3) explains, the practice of forced disappearances, common to several repressive regimes, constituted, in the eyes of regime leaders, the perfect crime. It was hard to prove its authorship, which resulted in the denial of the status of victim to the disappeared and rendered impossible the completion of the mourning process on the part of the relatives of the disappeared. For these reasons, this strategy appeared to be an indispensable tool of social control; instigating a climate of suspicion and terror among the population and hence frustrating the possibility of the emergence of collective forms of resistance. In reality, however, the uncertainty of the whereabouts of the disappeared was transformed into hope and then translated into protest by the several associations of relatives of the disappeared that were created in these contexts and which were not exclusively female, but chiefly led by women.

The organisation Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the main precursor of the “militant motherhood” movement (Magallón, 2006, 132), was set up in 1977, at the peak of the military regime, by a group of middle-aged women, mostly housewives, who started to meet on a regular basis at the Plaza de Mayo, the Argentinean governmental centre, to share information on the whereabouts of their children and protest against their disappearance. United by their loss, these mothers became human rights activists, marching weekly in silence, displaying candles, photographs of their children and other personal objects, such as handkerchiefs embroidered with the names of the disappeared, and demanding truth and judicial accountability for the disappearances. In fact the Mothers were protagonists of the first public demonstrations against the dictatorship (Bejarano, 2002, 132).

Despite having enjoyed freedom of speech at the initial stages of their formation, as a result of their success in portraying themselves as non-violent and apolitical, namely through the resort to symbols associated to motherhood and religion, as time passed by the Mothers themselves became targets of the military regime. In fact, some of the activists ‘disappeared’, namely the Mothers’ founder Azucena de Vicensi (*ibid.*, 143). Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties felt by the movement in conducting its initiatives, the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo

the 1982 massacres]. We couldn’t cook, eat, our children cried of fear and hunger. [But] we ended up realising that it was now our responsibility to take care of our family, feed our children, besides coping with our own pain” (Schirmer, 1993, 30).

represented (and still represent until today) pioneer ways of constructing cultures of resistance that have inspired many other human rights activist groups.

The Chilean Association of Relatives of the Political Detainees and the Disappeared, an initiative founded by thirteen mothers, was officially formed in 1974, a year after the onset of Pinochet's military regime. Besides sharing common goals with its Argentinean counterpart, such as the search for truth and judicial accountability for the disappearances and other violent political acts perpetrated by military regimes, and their *modus operandi*, most of these mothers also belonged to underprivileged segments of the population and although some were politicised, the majority of them did not have any previous experience of political organisation.

In line with these first militant motherhood initiatives, others surfaced in the 80s, namely the Guatemalan organisation CONAVIGUA and the El-Salvadorian CoMadres. CONAVIGUA, constituted mainly by indigenous women who were usually widows and relatives of the disappeared, was set up in the 80s, in response to the pervasive violence that characterised the country and that mostly targeted indigenous people. Its main spheres of action included protest against forced disappearances; the provision of assistance to victims and relatives of the disappeared and the demand for truth, closely connected to the demand for judicial accountability.

CoMadres, the El Salvadorian Committee of Mothers and relatives of the political detainees, disappeared and other political victims, was created in 1977, by a group of women. These were mostly mothers of rural origin driven by the desire to find their relatives, who were targeted by the long-lasting civilian war that opposed the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) to the forces of successive right-wing dictatorial governments and which witnessed a significant female participation in the FMLN front's (Ibáñez, 2001, 18). The projection of femininity constituted an important appealing factor for other marginalised segments of the population, such as the mothers of the mobilised combatants and indigenous organisations, as well as for the political figures of the regime, who, at least initially, perceived the CoMadres as just another "organisation of suffering mothers" (Shayne, 1999, 92).

The two experiences previously discussed are, to a certain extent, indicative of a type of activism that crosscuts ethnic and class boundaries and associates human rights demands directly and explicitly with women's human rights claims, while the other organisations described do not recognise it as explicitly. To a certain extent, this might be explained through the sexualised nature of violence in Central America,

if compared to the Argentinean and Chilean cases. On the other hand, there are some features that are common to all the organisations and that go beyond the similarities of goals, action strategies and organisational forms, namely the rupture with women's image of passivity and victimisation and the recognition that physical and cultural protection from repressive regimes is done, to a certain extent, through better political, legal and linguistic literacy.

Inspired by the success of the Latin-American mothers and prompted by the identification with their discourses and strategies, other Mother activist groups have begun to emerge, such as the Mothers' Front, in Sri Lanka, which have been demanding the bodies of their children and the truth about the war, and the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in the Russian Federation, which has dedicated itself to the advocacy of soldiers' rights and the challenge of the Chechen War.

As the experiences of activism analysed above show us, women, and particularly mothers, have played a critical role in the processes of confrontation with the past, defence of human rights and the struggle for justice and national reconciliation, paving the way for the intervention of other groups. In fact these examples of political militancy demonstrate that one should not only question the binary oppositions that associate women to passivity, but also acknowledge that women are social and political agents, who engage actively in several facets and demands of peace-building and violence prevention.

The previously examined examples of political activism have several limitations, namely concerning their support base, internal cohesion, organisational model, agenda, action strategies and connections to other political actors. Nevertheless, in our opinion, these constitute important reservoirs of experiences, strategies and action methodologies that can be seized and adapted, to a certain extent, by other *de facto* survivor support groups and human rights movements in contexts of pervasive armed violence, like Brazil.

Mothers' Groups in Brazil: Small but Important Steps Forward

Brazil is currently one of the most violent countries in the world, with gun-related mortality rates similar to those of many war scenarios. In fact, in 2002 alone, out of every 100 thousand inhabitants, there were 22 deaths which were caused by armed violence (Fernandes, 2005, 16). In the city of Rio de Janeiro, according to data from the Instituto de Segurança Pública, in the year 2005 alone, the police were responsible for the death of over one thousand civilians (Lira, 2007).

To this day massacres and summary executions, with roots in the period of military dictatorship,² constitute extreme, visible and frequent expressions of armed violence in Rio de Janeiro. And if in the past, in the words of José Cláudio Souza Alves, they marked the frontier between the civilised world and barbarism, currently they are spread out, escaping their geographical limits and becoming part of the city's reality (2003, 16). And this geographical dissemination is matched by the dissemination of destruction and the rupture of ties and other lives.

According to a recent study (Soares *et al.*, 2006), it is estimated that in the period from 1979 to 2000, between 300 and 600 thousand people survived violent attacks in Rio de Janeiro. Thus armed violence affects peoples' lives in different ways and goes way beyond the official statistics on firearms-related deaths and injuries, which reveal only the most visible impacts of this type of violence. In the spirals and *continua* of armed violence that are manifested internationally and are expressed locally in Rio de Janeiro, the ones who die (male and female) do not constitute the sole victims (Moura, 2007).

Indeed, relatives and friends of direct victims of violence suffer differentiated impacts, physically, psychologically, socially and economically. Besides the trauma of losing a loved one and having to cope, on a daily basis, with violence and its effects, these survivors, (generally mothers, sometimes sisters and wives but rarely fathers and brothers), still have to confront the ineffectiveness of the judicial system and the absence of networks of social support.

It is not easy to transfer the stories, experiences, sorrows and struggles of these women onto paper. And considering them examples of *indirect impacts* of armed violence has contributed to legitimising their invisibility. These impacts, which result from the death and loss of loved ones, and which are often lived in silence and are difficult to express, affect very directly the lives of those who are left behind and try to deal with the loss. To ignore and suppress them means to perpetuate cycles of violence, in the absence of answers.

Confronted by this scenario and as happened in other contexts of overt violence, namely Latin America in the 80s, as well as Sri Lanka and the Russian Federation, groups of relatives of victims of armed violence, particularly victims of police-led massacres, have been emerging. These groups are mainly mothers' groups, seeking collectively to cope with violence and its effects, mainly by fighting against impunity. In fact, rela-

² When the extermination groups were formed in Baixada Fluminense with the direct and indirect participation of police officers and the approval of shopkeepers, businessmen and local political groups (Alves, 2006).

tives of victims of police massacres such as the Acari massacre, in 1990, Vigário Geral in 1993, Candelária, Borel and Via-Show, in 2003, among others, have come together and constituted groups such as the Mothers of Acari, Mothers of Vigário Geral, Mothers of Borel and Mothers of Rio, to name a few. More or less organised and institutionalised, these groups have been conducting research, presenting complaints and following closely the evolution of police investigations, as well as judicial proceedings.

The group of mothers and relatives of victims of massacres with which we have been working³ constitute an example, albeit embryonic, of this kind of collective activism. Similarly to the Argentinean, San Salvadorian and Guatemalan mothers, they face serious financial and emotional distress, as well as family disarticulation and often social stigmatisation. This last happens whenever they are accused of being a "thug's mother" and hence required to prove their children's innocence. We are here talking about a stigma with a similar weight to the 'subversive' label, commonly used in the contexts of political violence described previously. Analogously, the mourning of these women, their subjective experience of violence, has been transformed, at first spontaneously, into a desire to struggle. The objectives of their struggle, namely the search for justice, dignity and memory, are also the same. Keeping in mind these affinities, the analysis of other experiences of activists can be useful in developing strategies and methodologies for action. In fact despite similarities in terms of feminine leadership, the way violence has impacted upon them and in their objectives, there are important differences between the members of this mothers' group, mainly connected to their degree of politicisation and their socio-economic profiles.⁴

Many problems remain despite the existence of collectively planned and coordinated initiatives, namely public demonstrations and monitoring of judicial proceedings and trials; particularly in terms of the shared demand for public policies consistent with the struggle against impunity and police abuse. To a great extent, at the origin of these obstacles are the socio-economic profiles of those who make up the groups of rela-

³ Project "Survivors of armed violence", a partnership between the Peace Studies Group/CES and Centre for Security and Citizenship Studies (CESeC)/ Cândido Mendes University, Rio de Janeiro, which comprises a legal empowerment course, a psychosocial support programme and a network of psychological and legal assistance for the elements of the group, constituted mainly by women.

⁴ Interview with Renata Lira, lawyer of the Brazilian NGO Justiça Global, June 12 2007.

tives. In fact, contrary to other mothers' movements (the mothers of the disappeared, for instance), most victims' relatives in Rio de Janeiro belong to the poorest segments of the population, being not only structurally more vulnerable to violence, but also in a more difficult position when it comes to taking political action.

Regardless of the fact that the long path towards ending impunity walked by these mothers continues to face obstacles, we observe that the traumatic loss experience has led many relatives and friends to share their pain and struggle with other relatives in similar circumstances. In their search for accountability for their children's deaths, some mothers have found in other mothers the necessary support to carry on their struggle, which, in the end, is a shared one. The similarities of their testimonies, the pain lived and re-lived since the tragic event, and their own struggle to hold the murderers accountable, hitherto pursued individually, constitute the foundation on which they associate. Consequently, they monitor each others' lawsuits, share their pain and grief and search for a new meaning of life collectively (Moura, 2007). In the words of one of the mothers of the group, "We are driven by our grief and no-one knew. Our pain was transformed into fighting, right?"

Furthermore, once these mothers try to set up, albeit in an embryonic way due to the absence of support, other social networks to assist them to overcome their suffering, then their entire network of social relationships, which was destroyed following the assassination of their children, can be reconstructed. Activism becomes a new motivation for life; while the realisation that they can contribute to social transformation by struggling against impunity often contributes to attenuate the loss of meaning. Thus the process of mourning becomes shared. That is, the individual understanding of what occurred grows into a collective memory and the struggle for justice gains new motivations. Many mothers/relatives with wider activist experience and hence with greater knowledge about the necessary legal steps to take, are often able to help with recent cases and support new members.

Existing groups, such as the Mothers of Cinelândia, the Mothers of Rio, the Mothers of Acari, the Network of Communities and Movements Against Violence, SOS Queimados, Fórum Reage Baixada and many other NGOs, facilitate, to a certain extent, interaction with the state and bureaucratic agencies and the denunciation of rights abuses. The role of these movements is thus considered essential by the group of relatives.

A rarer phenomenon, which sometimes occurs, is that these mothers manage to link up with international movements, as with the Moth-

ers of *Plaza de Mayo*. For these relatives, this type of connection, albeit exceptional, allows them to give visibility to their struggle at both the national level and especially the international levels.

Conclusion

In Brazil, as in other urban scenarios of armed violence, men are the main victims and perpetrators of gun-related violence. In response to this global trend of increasing armed violence, survivors often attempt to counter violence, committing themselves to the development of mechanisms and strategies to restore normalcy and re-establish peace and security. The face of survival is frequently female. At first individually and, later on, collectively, women's reaction against violence is normally marked by informality and spontaneity. However, as time passes, some of these groups of women begin to structure themselves politically and strategically. Women's collective and organised participation is thus, like that of men, a product of a deliberate choice; itself often motivated and shaped by their personal experience of violence, the broader political context (war, dictatorship, hybrid scenarios), their individual circumstances (namely if they are politicised or not), as well as their social, economic and cultural backgrounds.

Even if manifested at a grass roots level, the reaction of these women constitutes a proactive political form of intervention, which assumes a distinctive form from traditional political activism; particularly due to their preferred *modus operandi* and the centrality of aesthetic forms of demonstration and claim making. Frequently, however, the kind of activism represented by these women is undervalued or even rendered invisible, since it is perceived as natural and apolitical. In hybrid contexts of violence like Brazil and particularly Rio de Janeiro which resist definition in terms of traditional concepts of war and peace, this marginalisation appears to be even more evident. In this case various analytical frames overlap and this is expressed through the invocation of traditional concepts of politics, power, war and peace, each manifestly insufficient to capture reality, and particularly the complex varieties of violence and strategies of resistance.

In our view, the group(s) of mothers of Rio de Janeiro, which are presently taking small but important steps, in their search for justice, some of which are preparatory while others are more consolidated, illustrate the emergence of *innovative* peace proposals or new forms of peace (Moura, 2005), constituting a focus of refusal of and response to violence. In the light of this development, ignoring or marginalising

these initiatives means wasting potential resources of minimisation, prevention and transformation of violence that arise in particularly difficult contexts.

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Recovering Cities

War, Cities and Planning: Making a Case for Urban Planning in Conflict-affected Cities

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Sudden crises that affect cities can take the form of either natural or human-made disasters (conflicts). In this paper, we focus our attention on the latter. It is estimated that from 1975 to 2006, the number of natural disasters increased fourfold, while the number of human-made disasters went up tenfold (UN-HABITAT 2007).

The emergence of post-conflict reconstruction as a specialized area of study and application is the result of a growing recognition that reconstruction of war-torn societies is an extremely complex process, which needs to address a wide range of issues. These issues pertain to physical destruction and social and economic recovery, but also to peace building, especially where the conflicts are intra-rather than inter-state². These issues are further complicated by the lack of institutions and the fragile social fabric that often emerge after a conflict (Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998; Barakat 2005). Post-conflict, or post-war, reconstruction has been defined as including a range of inter-related activities designed to reactivate economic and social development, while at the same time creating a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence (Barakat 2005). Defined in this way, it extends beyond simply reverting to *status quo ante*, or 're'creating what existed before the war, to include strategic choices which would pave the way for a better future.

This paper looks specifically at the role of urban planning in post-war reconstruction efforts, especially under the aegis of international transitional administrations. Planning has played different roles ever since cit-

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² Most conflicts of the post-Cold War era are internal: only seven interstate armed conflicts have been recorded in the period 1989–2003 (Eriksson and Wallenstein 2004). While no inter-state conflicts were recorded in 2006, five intra-state conflicts, including, inter alia, those in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, were noted as "internationalised" (Harbom and Wallenstein 2007).

ies first came into existence – it has been used to build defensible cities, cities that are symbols of power and prestige, cities that are functional, and cities that are sustainable and equitable. Its role in the aftermath of conflict has also changed and evolved over the years, sometimes driven by design, sometimes by circumstance. In general, however, planning, cities, war, and reconstruction have always gone hand-in-hand. In this paper, we use a range of examples to build an understanding of the roles played by urban planning in conflict-affected cities.

Pursued with less than ideal objectives, urban planning can be an important tool in the hands of the majority to assert social control over the minorities, eventually leading to a revival or intensification of ethnic conflict in divided or polarised cities (Yiftachel 1995; Bollens 1998; Yiftachel 2000). We argue that these negative roles of urban planning have not been fully understood in practice, especially by the international community and by the so-called Transitional Administrations. At the same time, the potential positive impacts of urban planning (increased participation, equitable development, sustainability and reconciliation) also have not been adequately appreciated or utilized by international actors in the aftermath of conflict. In fact, contemporary cases of post-war reconstruction suffer from an ever-increasing emphasis on relief and early recovery at the expense of addressing longer-term issues. Today's reconstruction processes only seem to offer an illusion of possibilities of real change. Based on an extensive review of literature, a wide range of practical experiences between the two authors, and in-depth study of select cases, we suggest that the neglect of planning by international administrations in conflict-affected cities and countries has served to undermine their efforts in terms of long-term development and ethnic reconciliation.

The paper begins with a brief case-study of post-war reconstruction in the absence of a planning framework, in Pristina, Kosovo. It aims to demonstrate that the international community's neglect of planning has important implications for (non-)achievement of their goals of sustainability, equity, and reconciliation in a conflict-affected territory. This is followed by a historical overview of the relationship of urban planning to disasters and conflict, destruction and reconstruction, and the evolution of urban planning into an important force for reform in the aftermath of the two world wars. The article also briefly touches upon the disillusionment with planning and the emergence of concepts of urban management and urban governance, as well as the subsequent revival of urban planning as an instrument of good urban governance. We then go on to discuss the different ways in which planning has been used (and abused) in the aftermath of conflict, using illustrations from the second World War, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the Iran-Iraq war, and civil war in

Lebanon. The concluding section returns to the theme of the disregard of urban planning shown by international transitional administrations, proposes some possible reasons for this, and then suggests that this is an area for further research and exploration

(Non-)planning Under Transitional Administrations: The Case of Kosovo

A Transitional Administration can be defined as an administrative system installed in a war-affected territory which acts as an interim government for the territory. The UN administrations in Kosovo and East Timor and the Coalition Provisional authority in Iraq are recent examples. Transitional administrations have become more common over the last two decades because of the growing number of fragile and failed states, and the complexity of administering these territories, mitigating conflict and preparing for the settlement of their eventual territorial status. Transitional administrations are *“distinct in important respects from complex peacekeeping and peacebuilding. [...] international territorial administration is in fundamental ways a political enterprise.”* (Caplan 2005, 12)

The reconstruction of Kosovo after the NATO bombings in 1999, under the aegis of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the European Union, illustrates the approach of the international community and the little importance it attaches to planning, despite (or perhaps, because of) the very strong planning tradition that existed prior to the conflict. In the former Yugoslavia, planning was a central function, and planners at the city level mainly executed plans made in Belgrade. Human settlements conditions (including standards of housing and quality of settlement infrastructure) in Kosovo had been lower than in the rest of Serbia even much before the war, and this difference was exacerbated in the years preceding the conflict. Regional and urban plans facilitated exploitation of Kosovo’s natural resources, inducements were offered to Serbs to settle in the province, Serbian was imposed as the sole medium of instruction, education, and conduct of official business, and a systematic policy of expulsion of Kosovar Albanians from all major government agencies was adopted to “encourage” them to leave the province.

Following the NATO bombings and the exodus of the Serbian forces, an assessment conducted by a joint UNEP/UNCHS³ Balkans Task Force in

³ UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme; UNCHS – United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, now known as United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)

May 1999 reported widespread destruction of housing, public buildings, and infrastructure facilities, leading to complete disruption of services such as water, sanitation, and power, across Kosovo. Towns with mixed Serb and Albanian populations such as Peja and Mitrovica sustained massive damage. It was estimated that 120,000 houses were damaged in 29 municipalities of the province, with most of the damage caused by fire, but also by gunfire and artillery. Equally important was the institutional damage caused by the war. It was clear that public administrative and service structures – the municipalities – were largely inoperable due to factors such as neglect, war damage, and departure of trained staff. The mass exodus of Serbs who had held key positions in all the municipalities prior to the war left enormous skill gaps (UNEP/UNCHS 1999; Leurdijk and Zandee 2001).

Resolution 1244 passed by the UN Security Council in June 1999 outlined the main tasks of the international civil administration in Kosovo. These included, *inter alia*, performing basic civilian administration functions, as well as supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other forms of economic reconstruction. Civil administration was the responsibility of UNMIK, while reconstruction (economic and physical) was the responsibility of the European Union (EU). Reconstruction and economic recovery was to take place in “...three overlapping phases, encompassing immediate humanitarian relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential services (power, water, sanitation, health, education), and the creation of a viable market economy and social system.” (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001, 110).

Urban and/or regional planning, however, did not receive any mention in either the reconstruction mandate of the international administration in Kosovo, or the strategies that were developed subsequently by the leading international players.⁴ This was despite the fact that the general and detailed urban plans in all the municipalities, prepared by centralised institutions at least two decades earlier, were outdated and un-implementable. The municipalities had limited capacity with respect to the preparation and implementation of development plans. Urban

⁴ UN-HABITAT’s Urban Planning and Management Programme in Kosovo, initiated in 2002, was the first intervention by any international agency that focused on issues of urban planning. This was a comprehensive capacity-building programme focusing on strategic planning, covering all 30 municipalities and involving nearly 100 urban planners. The programme trained local urban planners to develop plans that were strategic in nature, responsive to local needs and priorities, and prepared in consultation with all stakeholders. The programme did not, however, force the pace of plan preparation, which did not begin until 2004 in most municipalities.

planners were dispirited and focused on routine administrative tasks, rather than on developing a new vision or new development strategies (Narang and Reutersward 2006).

The rebuilding of Kosovar cities has been piecemeal and unplanned right from the beginning, responding to concerns of the moment but with no overall framework, visions for the future, nor with any thought to goals of reconciliation between the deeply-divided communities. In Pristina, due to the absence of any spatial or urban plans, illegal and irregular construction is rampant. In September 2000, Rexhep Luci, the city's leading urban planner, was shot dead within days of issuing instructions to demolish three of the most blatant illegal structures. A new regulation on construction, promulgated soon after, was named after him (UN-HABITAT 2003; ESI 2006). Despite the new regulation, however, it was estimated that there were about 15,000 illegal constructions in Kosovo in 2003, most of these in the capital Pristina. Unplanned housing and commercial developments encroach on open spaces and place major strains on infrastructure, leading to frequent water and power cuts and deteriorating road networks and sewage systems. Rooftop construction, another major problem found in Pristina, has both legal (ownership) and safety implications. In addition, illegally constructed fuel stations on agricultural land, located all along the main roads leading out of the city, pose a serious threat to the environment (UN-HABITAT 2003). Towards the end of 2003, four years after the conflict, the municipality signed a contract with an international consortium, led by a Pristina-based company, for the preparation of a new strategic plan for the city – 'Strategy 2020'. The plan was prepared rapidly, based on limited and often inaccurate data, weak situation assessments, and virtually no public consultation. It was adopted by the Municipal Assembly in July 2004 – to date, however, it remains unimplemented. Meanwhile, reconstruction in Pristina (and across Kosovo) proceeds without a plan (ESI 2006).

Destruction and Reconstruction: The *Raison d'être* for Urban planning in the Modern era?

Historically, planning of cities was closely associated with building the state. Planned cities were seen as providing a tool for defence against the outside world, as well as a structure for internal socio-political organisation. The relationship between war, planning, and reconstruction is a recurrent theme in the work of Lewis Mumford (1961), who argues that since the beginning of urbanisation, war has

shaped both the physical form and institutional structure of the city. This is reflected both in the planning interventions which aimed to mitigate the effects of war, as well as those which were undertaken to rebuild the city in the aftermath of war. Conversely, as cities came into existence, the nature of war changed as well – from aiming to capture a few sacrificial victims from the opposing side, aggression now meant ‘mass extermination and mass destruction’ (Mumford 1961, 55). This in turn led to further development in the art of fortification. Stronger, higher walls, deeper and wider moats and ramparts, all developed, changed, and evolved in ways that reflected the evolution in the nature and technology of warfare. Medieval towns adopted a radial layout, with a series of fortifications in the form of concentric walls.⁵ On the other hand, cities that formed part of the powerful Ottoman Empire between the 16th and 18th centuries such as Cairo, Tunis, or Damascus, were “*relatively well-protected from outside aggression*” (Raymond 1984, p. 2) due to the security offered by a powerful state, and thus the city rulers did not construct any major fortifications to protect the populations from aggressors. These phenomena are once again reflective of the relationship between cities and conflict (Unwin 1911; Abercrombie 1959).

Destruction of human settlements by natural disasters also gave an impetus to planning in the 17th and 18th centuries. Planning in England, for instance, which lagged much further behind its European counterpart during the Renaissance, witnessed a revival when the great Fire of London destroyed large parts of the city in 1666. Christopher Wren’s famous plans for rebuilding London were subsequently developed and implemented (though only partially). Thus the revival of planning in Britain is closely linked to the objective of reconstruction rather than the establishment of new settlements.

The post-fire reconstruction of London also served as one of the models for the reconstruction of Lisbon after the earthquake of 1755,

⁵ A similar phenomenon (though on a much smaller scale) was also observed in the 1990s in the form of the “ring of steel” in London following the IRA bombing campaign. Coaffee provides an interesting and eloquent description of a “ring of steel” that was systematically and effectively erected around the City of London (or simply, the City) as a response to the IRA bombings of the early 1990s, and its long-term impact on the City. A combination of physical changes (temporary and subsequently permanent), traffic management measures, security and surveillance measures, and other restrictions, the “ring of steel” cordoned off the City to protect it from terrorist attack. Interestingly, turning the City into a “medieval-style walled enclave...a walled city-approach...with access through a number of small ‘gates’...” is said to have been an explicit objective of the policymakers of the time. (see Coaffee 2004)

which (probably) measured 8.5-9.0 on the Richter scale and triggered both a tsunami as well as series of fires across the city. Between 10,000 and 15,000 people are said to have perished, and one-third of the city destroyed. According to Maxwell (2002), the city was rebuilt on the basis of completely different principles as compared to the old city, with a rejection of the former opulent and grand style in favour of a more utilitarian and modern plan. While the planners of the new Lisbon drew inspiration from the rebuilding of London, in many ways the reconstruction of Lisbon was far more radical and comprehensive than that of London. This is attributed mainly to the inability of London's planners and politicians to break away from the old street patterns, property lines, and ownership rights.

In the mid-18th and early 19th century, the industrial revolution generated unprecedented growth and densification of cities across Britain, the rest of Europe, and North America. This in turn led to the emergence of an *"industrial working class and a distinct urban underclass."* The contrast between the advances in technology and industry and the disorder and squalor in cities was striking (LeGates and Stout 2000). The modern urban planning profession was founded in the late 19th and early 20th century in order to address the deteriorating physical, environmental, and public health condition of these newly industrialized cities. This was also a period when planners had a free hand to design and execute utopian urban development schemes. Hausmann's remodelling of Paris between 1856-70, the subsequent utopian visions of Ebenezer Howard (*Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, published 1902), and Daniel Burnham (the *Chicago Plan of 1909*), and the integration of social and physical planning by Patrick Geddes (around 1915), were all significant milestones in the development of the planning profession, as we know it today. However, contemporary planning, to a large extent, has its roots in the reconstruction following the two world wars.

The First World War (1914-18), surprisingly, spared most major European cities. Only the cities directly involved in the fighting (for instance, Lille and Liege) suffered noticeable damage. Thus, the period after the war was dedicated more to the construction of public housing and expansion of industrial areas, than to the planning of new settlements. In Britain, housing was the immediate priority, and a strong push was made for state provision of housing through local authorities, which led to the 'homes for heroes' campaign. Recommendations on density, site planning, and house design were also adopted, though town planning legislation was most definitely 'an appendage of housing' (Cherry 1982, 23). In Germany, the preparation of the first city-wide, comprehensive urban development plan – for the city of Hamburg – was a

significant innovation. In other parts of Europe, France, for instance, the influence of modernists like Le Corbusier increased.⁶

World War-II (1939-45), on the other hand, had a devastating impact on cities across Europe, as well as in Japan. The period after the War was marked by a rise in the profile of planners and the significance of planning in national recovery efforts in various European countries (*inter alia*, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland). A large number of planners and decision-makers viewed the destruction of cities during the War as an opportunity to address the ills that existed earlier and 'build back better'. Planning for towns and cities was clearly an integral part of national recovery efforts as a large number of cities were completely or partially destroyed. The widespread destruction provided the space (physically as well as politically) to rebuild on a large scale⁷, and reform the entire planning system, at national, local, and even international levels. It is as a result of some of the new approaches adopted after the War that ideas such as extensive land acquisition, zoning, density control, and pedestrianisation of city centres came to the fore (Diefendorf 1989; Cherry 1990; Jankowski 1990; 1993; Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002).

In Britain, bold approaches to rebuilding with a vision of a new and sustainable future were encouraged in the immediate aftermath of the war. There was consensus on the need for improved circulation, open spaces, and a better quality of the living environment for rich and poor

⁶ The Athens Charter, an outcome of CIAM IV held in 1933, promulgated what it claimed were collectively agreed guiding principles for modern urban planning. However, the version that appeared in print in 1943 was under Le Corbusier's own name, and largely reflected his personal thinking and approach, focusing on high-rise residential blocks, strict zoning, the separation of residential areas and transportation arteries, and the preservation of historic districts and buildings (Ward 2002).

⁷ Grebler (1956) argues, however, that the rebuilding of cities in Western Europe after World War-II exhibited a distinct pattern of continuity and persistence with the pre-war approaches to urban planning. Despite the 'tabula rasa' opportunity offered to many cities in by the war, most didn't choose to rebuild in a manner that was radically different from the pre-war city, whether in terms of location of the cities and distribution of population, or new land use patterns and physical improvements in the urban environment. Nor were any efforts made to create 'a new urban pattern designed for protection against future war.' (p. 463) Others also suggest that there were strong continuities in the planning approaches adopted before, during and after World War-II, and that many European countries, had in fact a head start as 'radical urban reconstruction was in the air' even during the inter-war period (Cherry 1990, 210, emphasis original; Fischer 1990; Diefendorf 1993). Davis (1987) also proposes that the potential for bringing about radical change in urban plans and city development after conflicts is rather over-estimated in most situations, and the opportunities to introduce radical/ utopian planning schemes can be quite limited, thanks to factors such as, *inter alia*, previous investments in services and the complex patterns of land ownership.

alike. The Coalition cabinet seemed in favour of radical reconstruction. Lord Reith's famous exhortation to 'plan boldly and comprehensively' echoed in every city planner's ears as planning, and planners, enjoyed unprecedented political and community support (Cherry 1990; Diefendorf 1990; Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002). Plans were developed quickly and considerable progress made in their implementation even as the war went on. There was a surge of interest in town planning as media campaigns were launched soon after the bombing raids to engage the citizens in developing a new vision for the cities.

However, although planners had powerful visions about how their cities should be rebuilt, their efforts were soon undermined by the broader political and economic context, as well as the changing perceptions of the decision-makers and community alike. Within a span of a couple of years, even before the war was over, the same Coalition government seemed to have retreated from its commitments, and was no longer prepared to support any radical efforts – whether in the area of legislation, policy, plans or resources – until the war ended. Some concluded that '...the real purpose of the ideas proposed in the dark days of 1940 and 1941 was simply to raise morale. Once they had served their purpose, they could be quietly *killed off*...' (Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002, 6, emphasis original). At the local government level, too, a similar trend was observed, and was further reinforced by the disenchantment of the private sector with the government's extensive involvement in reconstruction. Property owners and developers, as well as retailers and other traders, resisted any suggestions of radical changes in urban layout and form, and in some cases agitated for restoration of *status quo ante*. Public enthusiasm for reconstruction flagged and the very necessity of town planning began to be questioned. The repair and provision of homes seemed to be the top priority – indeed, sometimes it appeared to be the only priority – of the people. Planning slowly became synonymous with housing.

In the long-term, however, the post-war period gave an enormous fillip to planning in Britain, eventually providing direction to future growth and development, both physically and sectorally. Since the war, there has been a continuous reinvention of planning in post-war Britain. New Towns, in particular, are an important innovation, and 32 of these have been created in the UK since 1946. (Hall 1974; Department of Planning Oxford Brookes University 2006).

In Germany, too, most cities and planners eventually adopted a pragmatic approach to planning, although a number of radical and utopian approaches to reconstruction were proposed. The focus was on modernizing cities using the opportunities afforded by the bombing, such

as the complete destruction of inner city slums. In many cities, plans prepared under the Nazi regime (which was strongly pro-planning) were applied whole-heartedly without the planners realizing that they failed to respond to changed realities. Diefendorf (1993) and Fischer (1990) assert that there were strong overlaps in planning ideas, approaches, and activities between the Nazi and post-war periods. Nazi planning had generated not only "*megalomaniac monumental buildings*" (Fischer 1990, 132), but also technocratic, modern town plans, as the regime was willing to support planning with the necessary legal backing and financial resources. Urban renewal programmes, creation of new residential suburbs and new industrial cities, regional planning, and redesign of 23 large cities, were all activities carried out during the Third Reich (Fischer 1990; Diefendorf 1993).⁸ To a large extent these pre-war planning models helped shape post-war planning propositions. The final shape and form of most West German cities, including Munich, Bonn, Frankfurt, and Kiel, was determined by an over-arching emphasis on modernisation and functionality.

In Eastern Europe, planning systems after 1945 were largely modeled on the Soviet approach, with an emphasis on centrally-directed, planned economic development, and a focus on sectoral, rather than physical planning, especially in the years immediately after the War. Spatial/physical planning was subservient to economic planning and was mainly seen a technical tool to help realize the objectives of economic plans, and ensure rational allocation of resources and distribution of economic activities in order to promote equitable development. (Dawson 1987; Nedović-Budić 2001).

In Japan, urban planning never gained the popularity or the support that it had garnered in western Europe, even though over 100 cities and towns across the country were classified as 'war-damaged'. Planning for reconstruction was initiated very soon after the war ended, with the fundamental aim of preventing the uncontrolled expansion of large cities and conurbations, and promoting the growth of small and medium-sized provincial towns (Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002). However, this eventually failed because both architects and businessmen wanted big cities to remain dominant. The reconstruction of Tokyo was the other

⁸ The most far-reaching of all the planning activities during the Third Reich was the nationwide programme for redesign (Neugestaltung) of a large number of existing cities. The implementation of this programme required the acquisition of large tracts of land – either through purchase or by force – as well as large-scale demolition and clearing of areas that were to be redeveloped. These proved to be an immensely valuable asset after the war and facilitated enormous the task of post-war reconstruction.

main preoccupation of leading political figures as well as architects and planners. Once again, although 28% of the city was destroyed in the War, planning finally played a much smaller role in the rebuilding of Tokyo than was envisaged. It failed as a result of the lack of support from the Metropolitan and national governments, and the prevarication of local officials. The rapid and uncontrolled growth of the city, financial constraints, and an orthodox financial approach, too, played their part, as did the American disapproval of “*such idealism in a defeated and shamed country*” (Ward 2002, 214).

Within the United States, of course, the planning ideal did not receive such disapproval. In fact, the period after World War-II witnessed an increasingly closer link between urban planning and national defence strategies (Farish 2003; Light 2003). Defence of the city and its population played an important role, not just in influencing the pattern of city development, but also in the formation of coalitions of diverse professionals such as urban planners, scientists, defense strategists, and the police. This is reflected in, for example, the discussion on “defensive dispersal” in America during the Cold War period.⁹

The problem with the widely-accepted perspective on urban planning history before World War II is that it implies that the basic objectives of planning were positive across the board, that improvement of living environments and provision of housing and basic urban services to all, green cities and public good, were the overarching goals. This perspective often ignores the class divisions promoted by Hausmann’s remodeling of Paris, for instance; Hitler and Speer’s implicit Nazi ambitions that were played out through urban planning and housing policies between 1933-45 (Jaskot 1996); and the exclusionary, racist objectives of planning in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and many other colonial outposts (Mabin and Smit 1997). In the post-World War-II analysis as well, these negative dimensions of planning are often obscured, and the focus remains firmly on urban planning as a tool for economic recovery, social reform, and the protection of cities and their populations, rather

⁹ Light (2003) describes how the idea of “defensive dispersal”, or deliberate dispersal of population and industries to reduce the vulnerability of cities to a nuclear attack, gained currency in the 1940s and 1950s in the US. However, the suburbanization that eventually occurred in America was actually a product of many other factors, and cannot be attributed to the dispersal movement. The improvement of highway networks and the policies of the Federal Highways Agency, federal housing policies of the time, and private developers, all played an important role in promoting suburban housing. Middle-class white citizens who could afford to do so, moved out from inner-city areas to suburbs, and were replaced by poorer, black populations. Industries, too, were already decentralizing prior to the emergence of the dispersal movement. (Farish 2003)

than an instrument of oppression and division, in its intentions as well as methods (Yiftachel 2000; Kamete 2007).

The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Planning in the Second Half of the 20th Century

To understand the crisis of identity and relevance faced by planning today – especially in conflict-affected cities where, ironically, planning is needed the most – we need to briefly review the rise and fall of urban planning over the last fifty years. From a means of defending the city, to a tool of socio-political organisation and an instrument to demonstrate power, urban planning evolved into a mechanism for improving the quality of life in cities and towns, especially after the industrial revolution. Slowly, however, it simply became another bureaucratic exercise and lost its significance in urban and national governance, except in cases where it was used for questionable objectives, which are discussed in Section 5.

Since the 1950s, the urban planning profession has witnessed a tumultuous cycle of rise, fall, and resurrection. The 1950s is viewed by many as ‘the golden age’ of planning, and era when planning was seen as a positive, progressive force, the means by which a government could deliver equitable and efficient development and contribute to the greater public good (Hall 1988; Cherry 1994). In the 1970s, however, it came to be viewed as an expensive, long-drawn, unrealistic exercise wound up in red tape. Comprehensive, expensive, and un-implementable masterplans characterized planning during this period (Taylor 2004). Urbanization progressed at a speed which made city planning impossible, and in the 1980s, the concept of ‘urban management’ gained currency. This was in fact a rejection of the increasingly physical, land-use orientation of planning, a response to its inability to deal with new challenges of increased urbanization of poverty and exclusion, deterioration of the environment and natural resources, and natural and man-made disasters. (Biau 2005; Mehta 2005)

Over the last decade, however, urban management has given way to ‘urban governance’ in the international development lexicon.¹⁰ Gov-

¹⁰ In fact, the introduction of urban governance in the mainstream of international development was one of the key legacies of UN-HABITAT’s Urban Management Programme, which ran from 1986 until 2006. UNDP’s Urban Governance Initiative (UNDP-TUGI) and UN-HABITAT’s Global Campaign on Urban Governance (GCUG) were derived directly from the UMP experience.

ernance is defined in many ways, but all definitions focus on the relationships between the State, civil society, and private sectors. The key aspects to be emphasised are that (a) governance is not government, a crucial distinction between the two being the notion of civil society; and (b) governance emphasizes the processes of decision-making as much as, or even more than, the decisions themselves or their outcomes (see Harpham and Boateng 1997; UN-HABITAT 2002; ODI 2006). UN-HABITAT's Global Campaign on Urban Governance puts forth the following definition of urban governance:

“Urban governance is the sum of the many ways in which individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens.” (UN-HABITAT 2002, 9)

While the relationship between urban planning and urban governance has never been fully clarified, the revival of planning over the last decade has coincided with the increased focus on good governance. It is increasingly argued that a renewed planning can be a tool for realizing good urban governance, with its focus on citizen participation in decision-making, transparency and accountability, and efficiency and effectiveness of development and investments. Since planning offers citizens and communities an opportunity to participate in something tangible that has a direct impact on their lives because it potentially improves their immediate living environment, it may be a more effective approach towards civic engagement than promoting democratic participation in more general terms (Carley, Jenkins et al. 2001).

Further, the increasing global awareness of issues of economic inequity, endangered sustainability, and greater vulnerability to natural and man-made disasters, has provided policymakers, practitioners, and thinkers with the opportunity to redefine and re-establish the planning agenda (Narang 2006). Led largely by Western European cities, innovative strategic planning approaches have come to the fore, integrating the spatial and the sectoral. Among developing countries, South Africa has shown the way with the introduction of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) which aim to transform the divided cities which were a legacy of *apartheid*, by focusing on service backlogs and inequalities (Boraine 2004). City Development Strategies (CDS) is yet another tool, though not spatially-focused, which has been used in a number of cities to move towards inclusive and well-governed cities, linking development priorities with investments while retaining a pro-poor focus (Mehta 2004). In

other words, over the last few years planning has become assimilated into development, and it is this phase that has had the most impact on contemporary approaches to reconstruction planning, after both natural and man-made disasters.

In the discussion on recovery after crises, there is a growing acceptance that sustainable recovery and development warrants a swift and smooth transition from relief to development stages, with the application of a combination of crisis mitigation, response, recovery, economic development and sustainability strategies. Planning is slowly being seen as an important part of an inventory of potential solutions that can facilitate such a transition and lead to sustainable development (Zetter 1996; UN-HABITAT 2004). However, the role of planning in promoting inclusive governance and ethnic reconciliation, the particular responsibility of transitional administrations in this regard, and the type of planning needed in post-conflict situations are all aspects which are yet to be fully understood.

Urban Planning in Contemporary Post-war Reconstruction

“The greatest challenge is to use the reconstruction process [in Beirut] to weld the divergent sectors of the multireligious society and to create, along with economic prosperity, a stronger sense of national unity. Yet reconstruction also has the potential to aggravate old tensions between groups and to renew internal strife.” (*Stewart 1996, 487*)

After World War-II, planning has been used in post-war reconstruction mainly in situations of strong central control, whether under an occupying power or a strong national government. In Jerusalem, for instance, following the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel has used urban planning to reinforce its occupation of the Palestinian Territories. In Beirut, Lebanon, the plans and the process of reconstruction after the end of civil war in 1990 were pushed through by powerful elites without sufficient consultation with the local stakeholders. The liberty given to the private sector in planning for reconstruction has been widely criticized as divisive and exclusionary. Another case of the use of urban planning for assertion of power, but with little positive impact on the lives of those affected by the conflict, is that of the reconstruction of Fao after the Iran-Iraq war that lasted between 1980 and 1988. The explicit aims of the reconstruction ‘campaign’ (as it was called), were to restore peace and to entice displaced families to return to their original settlements. The implicit objectives, however, were to establish the cities of Basrah and Fao as icons of resistance to the Iranian forces, as symbols of Iraqi

pride and Iraq's ability to rebuild itself, and to establish the President as a "hero of war and defence as well as of peace and reconstruction..." (see Barakat 1993, 20)

In the following sections, the examples of Jerusalem/the West Bank and Beirut are discussed in greater detail. It is important to understand the predominant objective and envisaged outcomes of the planning process (which may not always be positive), the tools utilized, the timing of plan preparation (if at all), and the extent of involvement of stakeholders, in order to be able to appreciate the importance and impact of planning in conflict-affected societies.

Planning for Control and Division

"... in the West Bank planning is war carried out by other means."
(Coon 1992, 210)

According to Yiftachel (1995; 2000), the negative roles of urban planning have rarely been considered by prominent thinkers and writers in this field, who have chosen instead to focus on its role as a positive force and an instrument for reform. However, there are a number of examples where urban planning has been used by one community to subjugate, control, or marginalise another.

In Kosovo, Israel, Palestine, and South Africa, for instance, planning has been used by powerful actors to assert the dominance of an occupying power, or that of one community over another. In these cases, the planning process is punitive rather than supportive and relies heavily on what is often selective interpretation of existing laws, regulations, and plans. Planning is used as a tool to displace 'undesirable' segments of the population (usually another community), and in extreme situations it becomes a means for ethnic cleansing. This was seen in Israel in the 1950s, when 'development towns' were built to house the less desirable (and less influential) members of the Jewish community, namely the Mizrahi Jews (Yiftachel 2000); in Kosovo during the period of Serb domination, especially between 1989 and 1999; and in South Africa during the era of *apartheid*.

A more extreme example of the use of planning for furthering the goals of occupation and control is that of Jerusalem and the West Bank. It has been argued that although town planning may appear to be an insignificant aspect of a rather more complex political and military situation in occupied Palestine, it has in fact proved to be one of the foremost tools in sustaining the Israeli occupation. (Coon 1992; Weizman 2007)

The Israeli approach to planning in Jerusalem has been described as 'partisan planning', which blatantly serves the interests of one community over another (Bollens 1998; 2000).

Indeed, Israel's goal, as well as their strategy, in Jerusalem has been to expand Jewish neighbourhoods to such an extent, and in such a manner, that physical division of the city becomes impossible. Thus the Old city and the Palestinian areas have been surrounded with the Jewish population, which would make it impossible to return to the pre-1967 status.¹¹ As Jerusalem is governed under Israeli law, the local government is allowed to expropriate up to 40 percent of private land without compensation while preparing a detailed plan, as well as to re-distribute land in any way it chooses.¹² Other national government agencies also have extensive powers to expropriate land for developmental purposes (Coon 1992; Bollens 2000). Interestingly, there is no statutory planning framework for Jerusalem – the last statutory plan for West Jerusalem was prepared in 1959 and no outline plan has ever been prepared for the areas annexed in 1967. Development is guided by the selective application of zoning and other regulations to the different parts of the city.

Partisan planning by Israel is by no means restricted to Jerusalem alone. While Jerusalem is administered under Israeli law (however questionable this may be), the remaining area of the West Bank should, in theory, be governed under the Jordanian laws prevailing in 1967. However, Israel has used "security enactments" or military orders, ostensibly concerning security issues, to supersede all previous laws, including the Jordanian Planning Law. The development of the Palestinian villages and towns has been restricted through the deployment of planning tools such as built area restrictions, density, and zoning regulations. Furthermore, no development plans of any sort have been prepared for most of the Arab areas, which has meant that the Palestinians cannot apply for any building permits at all, and thus cannot undertake any construction on their own land. This has had a direct impact on the lives of the Palestinian people, their livelihoods, living conditions, and national aspirations (Coon 1992; Bollens 1998; 2000).

¹¹ The UN resolution of 1947 proposed the creation of an international zone around Jerusalem. However, Israel took control of West Jerusalem in 1948, and East Jerusalem in 1967, subsequently merging both to form the Jerusalem municipality which is administered under Israeli law.

¹² These powers are based on The Planning and Building Law. The land expropriated is supposed to be designated for public use only, but this is seldom the case on the ground.

At the same time, the development of Jewish settlements has been promoted and supported, and efficient road infrastructure constructed across the West Bank, to serve the dual goals of connecting the Jewish settlements and slicing Palestinian settlements and agricultural lands into unviable and disjointed parts. Pullan *et al.* argue that while much attention has been given to the separation barrier that Israel has been erecting in recent years, the road system developed by the Israelis in Jerusalem and the West Bank is in fact a far more important and permanent feature "...designed to segregate and dominate the Palestinian movement in order to ensure the continuity and safety of Israeli passage." (Pullan, Misselwitz et al. 2007, 175).

Planning to Restore Pride and Consolidate Power

In many cases, especially after 'liberation' of any sort, reconstruction of symbolic structures and sites emerges as top priority for the nationalist powers and becomes a key goal of planning. There are many examples of the use of planning for restoring national pride and asserting power, including Warsaw (Poland) after the second World War, Fao (Iraq) after the Iran-Iraq war, and Beirut after the end of the civil war in 1990. In each of these cases, planning was also used by the regime in power to consolidate their position after a devastating conflict.

The reconstruction of Beirut downtown (*Centre Ville*), following the war in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990, is an excellent example of the application of planning to assert power. The conflict converted the city into a battleground and witnessed the creation of the "Green line", a demarcation zone between the main warring militias. The city centre was part of this zone and was closed off and virtually emptied out. Businesses, offices, and residents all moved out towards the suburbs. Between 1975 and 1990, Beirut's infrastructure was shattered, about 180,000 housing units destroyed and a similar number damaged. The destruction left between 300,000 and 500,000 people homeless or displaced (Davie 1993; Khalaf and Khoury 1993; Tabet 1993; Stewart 1996).

Numerous plans were also developed during this period specifically for the redevelopment of the Beirut city centre, first in 1977, then in 1983, and again in 1991. The last of these formed part of a broader programme for the reconstruction of Lebanon, titled Horizon 2000. It was also proposed at this time that a single (private) real estate firm appropriate all the land in the centre and take over the rebuilding process. Law 117 of 7 December 1991 provided the legal basis for the creation of such a company, known by its French acronym *Solidere*. Billionaire

businessman and then Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and his family were the largest shareholders in this company, and those who had their properties expropriated were also given shares. When completed, the Beirut Central District (BCD) would house 40.000 people and host 100.000 daytime workers within 4.5 million square metres of mixed-use space, including offices, retail, government buildings, and leisure and cultural facilities (Stewart 1996; Makdisi 1997; Charlesworth 2003).

While the planning and reconstruction of Beirut is largely seen as a positive and forward-looking exercise, critics of the process believe that the reconstruction of the *Centre Ville* in line with the vision of one man (Prime Minister Hariri) has simply served to reinforce the power of the political and financial elites. Conceived and implemented without any public participation and/or accountability, the process of redevelopment of BCD has deepened the divisions in Lebanese society rather than promoting or facilitating reconciliation. It has exacerbated social polarization by creating islands of prosperity and privilege for the rich while excluding the poor entirely (Stewart 1996; Charlesworth 2003).

“The failure to thoroughly address the needs of the poor is perhaps the most risky aspect of Beirut’s reconstruction.... Violence rooted in poor urban areas, where groups such as Hezbollah and Amal operate, could squash economic recovery before it even takes root.” (Stewart 1996, 502)

The examples above illustrate how planning has been accorded priority in situations of strong occupier or national government control, with objectives that are more political than noble. In situations where an international transitional administration has taken charge, however, the role of planning has been rather different. As discussed earlier in this paper, in Pristina, Kosovo, reconstruction under the UN transitional administration has proceeded (since 1999) without any planning whatsoever, with disastrous consequences for the city and its living environment (UN-HABITAT 2003; ESI 2006). In Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, significant results were achieved vis-à-vis housing reconstruction and repair of basic infrastructure, but attempts to develop an urban plan for the city were largely unsuccessful (Yarwood 1999). According to a report by the International Crisis Group, between 1994-2000, the international community invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Mostar, with the EU alone spending approximately 200 million Euro. Although a fair amount of Mostar’s infrastructure, some public buildings, and some housing estates have been rebuilt, international community and EU efforts have failed in terms of actually achieving reunification of this divided city. “*After six years of international community assistance and supervision, the*

administration, economy, infrastructure, education, police and legal systems of Mostar remain sharply divided along ethnic lines." (ICG 2000, 1) In fact, most international organizations (especially NGOs) involved in reconstruction across Bosnia have done so without any planning framework, and without any involvement of planners (Skotte 2003). This has resulted in reconstruction that is *ad hoc*, piecemeal, and often bitterly contested, and recovery that is at best partial, thirteen years after the conflict ended.

In East Timor, although the immediate priorities identified by the UN-TAET (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor) included the restoration of public services through the reconstruction of essential infrastructure, as well as the revival of economic activity, there was no role of planning in the reconstruction of human settlements. Similarly, in Iraq, following the US-led invasion four years ago, the Coalition Provisional Authority (2003-04) emphasised the restoration of essential services such as water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, health, and education, but no attempt was made to address these issues within a wider planning framework (http://www.iraqcoalition.org/essential_services.html).¹³ The result in all these contexts is that the planning and reconstruction processes have done little to build a widely-accepted or endorsed vision for the future, and consequently, to encourage reconciliation.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article comes at a time when we are witnessing the revival of planning as an instrument of sustainability, good governance and inclusion. Yet, as far as contemporary post-conflict situations are concerned, planning still plays a marginal role (if any) in the reconstruction of cities and towns after a conflict. However, historical experience has demonstrated that planning can be a vital ingredient in the process of national recovery after wars. The post-World War-II period, in particular, was a time when urban planning occupied centre-stage, as a *tabula rasa* was presented to planners and reconstruction was seen as an opportunity to introduce extensive physical improvement measures as well as policy change. It was inevitably an extremely political process, yet, some results were achieved. In

¹³ It is only recently that some efforts have been initiated for the preparation of master plans for various cities in Iraq and Afghanistan, with financial support from international donors. The timing of these initiatives reinforces the stereotypical view of planning as a 'development' (as opposed to 'humanitarian') activity, which must, by definition, take a backseat in the initial stages after a conflict.

this era, planning had an important role to play in the continuum between relief and development. It was also crucial for achieving a balance between the short-term priorities of the people and the long-term perspective for local and national development, as well as between the demand for historic reconstruction and the pressure for modernisation (Diefendorf 1990; Zetter 1996; Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002).

This paper has attempted to demonstrate the important role historically played by urban planning in the aftermath of conflicts, using a wide variety of examples. The illustrations have shown the negative impact of planning when it is an instrument in the hands of dominant political forces with divisive agendas, the positive outcomes of well-planned reconstruction, and the implications of the neglect of urban planning by international actors. It is therefore imperative for the international community to pay attention to this area in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.

The presence of international actors and transitional administrations can in fact be both a challenge and an opportunity for urban planning. External actors such as, *inter alia*, the occupying powers (e.g. the US-led Coalition in Iraq, Israel in Jerusalem and the West Bank), UN, EU, specialized agencies, international NGOs, and others (for instance in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan), often play important roles in contemporary conflicts. These groups bring to the table their own political agendas and reconstruction approaches. Institutional structures in the immediate aftermath of conflict are weak or non-existent, legislation and policy-making fuzzy at best, and the involvement of a third party, any external actor, leads to increased complexity in the governance system. At the same time, however, it also offers an opportunity to make decisions in a systematic yet swift and effective, if less democratic, manner. For these reasons, it is critical to address these new decision-makers on the application of urban planning to provide a framework for reconstruction, a vision for the future, and a means for reconciliation.

Unfortunately, while planning has been used and abused by local political interests as a mechanism to establish control or advance particular ethnic and/or national interests, the international community – including an array of actors such as the UN, EU, occupying powers, international financial institutions, donors, and NGOs – has been slow to embrace urban planning as a critical element in its own relief and recovery approaches. There are no clear answers as to why this is the case. One of the factors could be the dominance of the liberal market paradigm. In the aftermath of conflict, most international agencies, particularly the World Bank but also other organisations and donor countries, prescribe a formula combining physical reconstruction, economic development,

and structural transformation to facilitate recovery (Bojčić-Dzelilović 2002; Caplan 2005). An overwhelming emphasis on the last of these – stabilisation and structural transformation – has meant that planning, which is traditionally associated with centralised/socialist systems and large scale land acquisition by the state, has been discarded in favour of market-driven approaches.

Another consideration could be related to whether it is actually appropriate or legitimate for international administrations to take a long-term view on behalf of the places and people under their jurisdiction.¹⁴ Alternatively, this neglect of planning could be attributed simply to the inefficiency of large international operations, and their unwillingness to do more than what is absolutely necessary.

A final possibility, of course, is that there is a general lack of understanding of the importance of planning in post-war reconstruction. Due to a paucity of baseline data, which takes time and resources to generate afresh, and often changes by the time plans are prepared, planning is seen as a long-drawn exercise and therefore set aside, as piecemeal interventions take priority. To some extent, this is also because the traditional forms of planning have failed to respond to the particular needs of post-conflict situations. Planning for conflict-affected cities would need to be more selective, area-based, action-oriented, and focused on immediate sectoral and spatial priorities, but would also need to promote a collective vision for the future, linked to budgets and resources, and incorporate concerns of environmental sustainability, poverty, and exclusion.¹⁵ Determining the precise reasons behind the international community's disregard for urban planning is an area for further exploration.

The approach of the international community in recent years has been to gradually move from humanitarian relief to recovery and development. We propose that urban planning can be a positive force in all these phases. However, the role of urban planning in building economi-

¹⁴ To an extent, this was also seen in post-World War-II Germany. The occupying powers, in particular the British, made concerted efforts to rebuild (and reform) the administrative infrastructure as well as the Civil Service, but refused to intervene in matters that could be handled by local administrations, or were deemed to be the prerogative of a future German national government, including planning (Turner 1989)

¹⁵ A UNDP strategy paper prepared in 1999 for regional socio-economic development of South Lebanon, which aimed to formulate a coherent vision and integrated development strategy for the region in the aftermath of the war, is a rare example of a more strategic approach towards post-war urban planning and reconstruction. An important element of this strategy was achieving a balance between the priorities of large and small cities, urban and rural areas, rich and poor populations, and the different ethnic groups/communities. It was, however, never implemented.

cally self-reliant, sustainable, peaceful, and stable communities and societies in the aftermath of conflict is yet to be clearly understood in practice. While there is no single successful paradigm or model for achieving reconciliation and preventing future conflict, there can be no doubt that historical, present, and future needs of all communities must be taken into account in the process of post-conflict reconstruction. Urban planning is an important tool in this regard, and a space needs to be created in order for it to evolve into an instrument that is useful and responsive to complex post-conflict situations. Building this understanding amongst policy-makers, donors, and, indeed, planners themselves, is the final objective of this work.

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Social Trust in Urban Crises

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In recent years we have experienced a considerable increase in crises and in media interest in crises. Crises may be caused by various phenomena: man-made or natural disasters, earthquakes, social conflicts, bad governance, war, acts of terror, etc. In general terms a crisis is a sudden, but often predictable event that can be described in terms of its magnitude, duration and restoration after it. The term crisis is generally reserved for events that affect large groups of people whose lives and livelihoods risk serious harm, physically, spatially, economically, socially, and psychologically. Crises also pose threats to society as such to the extent it is able to cope by 'normal procedures'.

This paper reports from a pilot study investigating social trust in an urban crisis. The project is contextually embedded in crisis discourse between the mass media as one stakeholder and their audiences amongst the general public as the other. The aim of the project is to identify to what extent the mass media's treatment of a crisis event affects trust dynamics in society. Agenda setting is a competitive negotiation among issue proponents to gain media, public and political attention (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). To succeed in getting an issue on the agenda therefore represents power; and to construct an event as a crisis event imbues enormous persuasive power. In general terms, negotiated issues are likely to be related to who will be held responsible for the crisis, how the crisis should be managed and what crisis prevention measures should be adopted.

We often find 'the city' conceptualised in cognitive, rational or instrumental terms (Simonsen, 2005). The importance of emotions in the construction of 'the city', in particular trust dynamics, should therefore not be underestimated. Urban life is a vast number of encounters between 'foreigners', and when people meet they have to define their relationships with 'the other', which, in turn, will influence social practices. In the encounter both positive and negative feelings may be generated. In an extensive US-based analysis, Robert Putnam (1995) found that ethnic and racial neighbourhood diversity exerts negative short-term effects on trust in other people, as well as many other civic at-

titudes and behaviours. Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston (2008) contribute to the debate by expanding the analysis to compare the influence of ethnic/racial diversity in US as well as Canadian neighbourhoods, finding that particularly for racial/ethnic majorities, neighbourhood-level diversity is associated with decreasing levels of interpersonal trust. Sociopsychological research as well as work in political theory, suggests that trust should prosper in homogeneous settings, and suffer when faced with heterogeneity. Trust seems easier to develop when we are familiar with the people around us, and particularly when they appear similar to ourselves (Stolle, Soroka, Johnston 2008). The background to this theoretical insight is the supposition that individuals who share racial, ethnic or other salient characteristics create an in-group bias through which trust and affection are most easily developed for other members of this in-group. Emphasis on shared identity fosters not only in-group affection, but also out-group hostility. Consequently, we may see how trust dynamics intervene in urban planning and development when public authorities pursue strategies aimed at creating social order and reducing the risk of social minority groups, e.g. ethnic minorities, disrupting everyday social practices. We may, therefore, observe certain urban spaces socially and discursively being categorized as ghettos. Such spatial categorization makes host citizens think in terms of 'us' and 'them', and are as such seen as a necessary construction in an urban society that suffers from other-anxiety. There are confidence-building measures both inside and outside the ghettos. One of the social positions that male minority groups may take up is an identity as a second-generation youth gang that is perceived to be dangerous and violent. This, in turn, makes the host society think in terms of assimilation. It is the minority groups' own responsibility to adapt to the host culture, and a conflict spiral may arise as ghetto residents are caught in a double bind. On one hand they meet surroundings that want neither to pay respect to them nor to accept them. On the other hand the ghetto is seen as a problem that politicians and public authorities have to solve.

Trust and the Media

The mass media's role in crises is two-fold. First, it may be implicated in the manufacturing of a crisis, not only by its coverage of crisis events, but also in its representation of risks attributable to life in a modern, complex, globalized world (Silverstone, 1994). In this way the mass media plays a significant role in the creation of 'risk societies'. Secondly, the mass media is involved in risk, and thereby crisis management. Risks are

distributed globally, as well as unequally. Individual strategies to reduce risk may be of limited effect and therefore global risk management is an important societal function in which the media plays a major role.

Much media research concerning trust in media has gone under the guise of media credibility and has had as its main area of focus the estimation of source credibility in an effort to determine the relative credibility of various mass media (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). Another significant portion of the research has dealt with the ramifications of a decline in media trust for democracy (eg. Cook, 1998). While relevant background for our study, this work differs in two significant ways. Firstly, in previous work media trust has generally been assessed during 'non-crises' times and, secondly, trust has generally been studied, most often psychometrically, as the purview of sole individuals. Our focus on trust in relation to mediated crisis and as a socially constructed phenomenon signifies this contrast.

According to Lolk and Horst (2001) it is tempting to hold the view that the media contributes to the creation of a general feeling of mistrust in society. Public attention is a scarce resource, and the gate keeping processes of the media are a key determinant of which issues will receive public attention or not. Moreover the media needs to make things interesting enough to maintain sales and interest. To cope with these problems, the media imposes more intense coverage of an issue than changing circumstances would objectively warrant. They are fascinated with conflicts and competition, violence and crime, and an increasing number of events are now framed as crisis events by resorting to damaging clichés and stereotypes of the 'other' as well as exaggerated claims (Marthoz, 2003), which are probably considered unethical by most journalist schools. Sociologists argue that we live in a culture of fear (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Glassner, 1999; Rasborg, 2003).

But is it mistaken to interpret mass media's construction of the crisis event as exclusively leading to mistrust?

According to Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (2003) 'during' and 'post' crisis audiences need to hear that there is a system of control and authority that take appropriate action. Dearing and Rogers (1996) see society as an 'issue processor' which functions to consider, debate, and sometimes institutionalise responses to conditions that we perceive as social problems. With this view in mind they introduce the so-called 'issue-attention cycle', according to which an issue will not drop off the agenda until potential solutions have been debated. If the media frames an event as a crisis, they cannot leave the citizens all on their own in an alarmed discovery stage. They cannot drop the issue until the responsible crisis producers have been identified, causes and motives for the cri-

sis have been explained, trustworthy and efficient crisis managers have been found, and the proper solutions have been pointed to. In all, the movement through these stages may be described as a trust restoration process.

To what extent citizens trust the crises managers, or the media themselves, is of course up to the citizens, but when public authorities act as crisis managers, and they express their opinion in the media as to what happened and what needs to be done in order to re-establish social order (i.e. to bring crisis producers under control and to relieve the victims), trust relates to the extent the general public believes that decisions will have an effect and the extent to which the public believes that the decisions will be implemented or not.

Blogging

Generally speaking, media scientists believe that functional interactivity that provides opportunities for interactions between members of the public will improve the quality of public communication. The more debate, the more open society will be. Debates strengthen democracy, and are trust-creating mechanisms (Kahn & Kellner, 2004; Matheson, 2005). These often inflated theoretical claims are now subject to more empirically informed examination. It needs to be investigated if on-line journalism actually possesses distinctive, possibly unique, characteristics for the democratization of mediated conflicts. Mainstream news sites offer a selection of daily news and, at most, provide a highly filtered and moderated form of participatory communication. Typically such sites do not differ much from established mainstream forms of journalism (Cottle, 2006).

Therefore, if the media co-construct social crises, in the present case between ethnic groups, it may be hypothesized that whereas general trust in the urban society as such will not suffer from the mainstream media's urban ethnic crisis discourse, the relationship between the host society and minority groups might be affected, and the crisis may lead to conflict escalation generating a certain degree of distrust across groups.

Trust and Mediated Social Crisis

Simmel stated in 1908: "For the individual trust is a hypothesis certain enough to serve as a basis for practical conduct" (Simmel, 1950), this quotation highlights the ambiguity of the concept. Trust is to be

found somewhere between no knowledge and complete knowledge. It is both rooted in experience and not rooted in experience. The ambiguity is due to a knowledge deficit that makes trust necessary. If you have no knowledge at all, trust will be blind. If you have complete knowledge, there is no need for trust. Trust as a function compensates for our knowledge deficit. To trust is to leap into uncertainty.

Trust can relate both to the past and to the future. Each orientation gives rise to different questions. Past-oriented trust invites us to think in terms of true/false. If trust is oriented towards the future, it is intimately related to risk. Risk has to do with social uncertainty, and in particular it is related to decisions. There is always an inherent element of risk in any decision, and at the same time, decisions are taken to manage contingencies and to absorb uncertainty. Will others implement the decisions they have made and what will the consequences be? This question not only relates to whether we believe that our expectations will be fulfilled or not, but also to whether we believe that the decisions will be for our common good. In social trust there is a rational and an affective level. Good reasons to trust are expectations based on positive experience and prior histories. The affective concomitant is a feeling of confidence and sufficiency. Reasons to mistrust are based on negative experience and argumentation. The affective concomitant is a feeling of insecurity and fear.

Analytical Framework

The above considerations have led to the construction of the following two-step analytical framework. In the first step we apply a *crisis model* including two levels.

At one level we consider who the main actors are. Three discursive identities are particularly relevant. *Crisis producers* can be held accountable for the crisis event, *crisis victims* are those who suffer from the crisis, and *crisis managers* are those in charge of the crisis restoration process. Our analysis will focus on how different stakeholder groups are related to these identities in mainstream media and the blogosphere.

The second level concerns the temporal dimension including 'pre-crisis', 'during' crisis and 'post-crisis' stages. At this stage, the results of our crisis model are related to trust dynamics.

The second step relates to the question of how trust can be analyzed as a *discursive manifestation*? Although our argumentation can never be complete, as our knowledge will never be complete, we assume that people are able and willing to state their sincere intentions (Bordum, 2001). If this expectation is not at least partially fulfilled, communication

will break down. Moreover we know that trust involves positive expectations, which in turn implies that trust is embedded in argumentative discourse marked by positive values.

The possibility to communicate a collective representation of crisis and of risk implies that crises as well as risk can be seen as socially constructed, and the way in which risk society observes, describes and explains itself reflects on-going complex discourse activities among stakeholders with common as well as conflicting interests. For the purposes of this project, crises are viewed as communicative events caused by unsuccessful risk management that interrupt normal social activities and invites society to engage in reflexive discourse.

Analysis

Background

Denmark, once acknowledged for her liberal stance and social egalitarianism, has over the last years become an increasingly polarised society where the differences between the Danish majority and migrants and especially Muslim migrants have been the dominant political agenda. The crisis selected for our analysis is the 'global crisis' that erupted in 2005 in the wake of the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed by the Danish News Paper, Jyllands Posten: According to the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen "We are now facing a growing global crisis" over the cartoons (BBCNews 2006/02/07). In February 2008, The Danish police uncovered a plot to kill one of the cartoonists whose depictions of the Prophet Mohammed had been published in a Danish newspaper a year before. The cartoons sparked outrage across the Muslim world, but also resistance by inner city youths in Denmark. The events culminated on June 2, 2008 with an attempt to blow up the Danish embassy in Islamabad.

Data

Our analyses concern media representation and communication within the 'blogosphere' during the so-called 'Mohammed Crisis II' in Denmark. Of particular scrutiny will be the event in February 2008, following the arrest of two Tunisians for planning to kill one of the Danish cartoonist for his drawing two years ago of the Prophet Mohammad. Here we chart discursive figures, temporal dimension and argumenta-

tive patterns at play in online discussions vis a vis media reporting concerning how the crisis disrupted life in Copenhagen. We will investigate discourses of media trust in response to crises reporting as they are engaged in electronically by audiences representing various stakeholder constituencies. Interactions between stakeholders will be analyzed within the various web-based functionalities provided by media institutions, for example discussion fora attached to online newspapers, as well as functionalities provided by other groups or individuals, for example user-net groups, mailing lists, etc.

The data consists of 19 newspaper articles and four blogs initiated by blogging journalists, which elicited approximately 200 comments. The selected newspapers are the Danish papers: Berlingske Tidende, Ritzau, Politiken, TV2 Online, Information, Jyllands Posten, Kristeligt Dagblad, J.dk. will be analysed. Data covers the period during and immediately after the outbreak of the crisis. (11.02-26.03.2008).

Analysing media representation of the event

The event can be divided into three main phases:

1. RIOTS ON NØRREBRO

The first phase covered the first 3 days (11.2.2008-13.2.2008), with initial riots on Nørrebro. Containers were set on fire as well as several cars and firefighters needed police protection. The police used tear gas to disperse the vandals. 11 were arrested. On Feb. 12, there were more container-fires as well as bonfires in the street. The trouble spread to Vesterbro – another neighborhood – two cars were burned. One person was arrested. Immigrant workers attributed the cause of the riots to the massive presence of the police at Nørrebro:

The troubles Monday should mainly be attributed to the fact that the youngsters feel harassed and stressed by the police due to the new search areas on Nørrebro. (Ali Haseki, Politiken 12.2.2008).

In all the newspapers we collected, the event was referred to as 'riots on Nørrebro', whereby the troubles were confined to a specific sensitive part of the inner city in Copenhagen, known as an immigrant ghetto and reputed as a site of many riots over the years. The police were immediately quoted for having established that the culprits were 'youngsters with immigrant backgrounds', also using the term 'second generation immigrants' (Berlingske Tidende 11.2.2008), an expression

that is semantically stigmatised by its frequent use in the media in connection to words such as *arrested*, *gangs* and *young criminals*.

2. A COMMON CAUSE

The second phase covered the following three days (14.-16.2.2008). The trouble had now spread all over Copenhagen and to main cities in the rest of Denmark. Two cars were set on fire in Vesterbro and four people were arrested in conjunction with that crime. In Århus, Jutland a city bus was bombarded with rocks and had to be escorted out of danger by police. An apartment building had to be evacuated in the middle of the night as a fire nearby was threatening to spread. The power grid was sabotaged and an entire neighborhood was blackened out. All in all 17 people were arrested for arson and disturbing the peace. 14 cars were burned as well as 20 garbage containers. There were 14 reports of vandalism such as smashing store windows.

According to social immigrant workers, the riots had been fuelled by the arrest of two Tunisians and a Dane of Moroccan decent for planning to kill the Danish cartoonist for his drawing two years ago of the Prophet Mohammad. Further, it was claimed that the actions were a protest against the reprinting of the prophet cartoons, which took place the previous Wednesday when a unified Danish press decided to reprint the cartoon depicting the prophet Muhammad with a bomb in his turban. The event was seen as giving the rioters a common cause. Immigrant spokesmen pointed to the fact that the arrest of the two Tunisians and their possible deportation from Denmark confirm the youth's of themselves as marginalised citizens (Mohammed Rafiq in *Kristeligt Dagblad* 15.02.2008).

The Danish police referred to the culprits as 'troublemakers of immigrant origin' and 'rioters', and apart from expressing some confusion about the cause of the troubles, they talked about 'boredom during the winter holiday', partly supported by the fact that kids at the age of 10-11 years were fond among the rioters.

3. TIME FOR REFLECTION – WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

During the third phase the situation seemed to have been somewhat normalized, and it was now time to reflect and identify possible causes and responsibilities. At this point the event was constructed in the media as a part of the second Mohammed crisis:

Mohammed Crisis II paralyzes Helle Thorning (the chairman of the Social Democratic Party in Denmark)

The more or less explicit connection between the Mohammed Case and the unprecedented wave of vandalism has increased the need for a value-laden political debate about drawings, Islamism and immigrant youth. (Information 22 Febr. 2008)

Crisis Victims

We find very limited focus on actual victims among the urban population. We mainly receive media reports of damage to property.

Crisis producers and cause of event

Two groups were given voice in the news reports, the public authorities (the police) and immigrant social workers. They clearly had different representations of the culprits (crisis producers) and the cause of the event.

According to public authorities (the police): Those responsible for the riots were *kids and youngsters down to 10-11*, who were bored in the winter holiday. We find, however, expressions like: *Troops, men wearing black masks, troublemakers, young immigrants, second generation immigrants*.

The cause of event was by the police attributed to boredom and troublemakers.

According to immigrant social workers:

Those responsible for the actions were not the usual troublemakers, but ordinary youngsters with immigrant background, not the hard core.

According to the immigrant population, the cause of event was attributed to annoyance at constant police searches, just because they are immigrants. They feel powerless and marginalized and mobbed by the media. They see themselves represented as losers in the media. The Mohammed cartoons were the last straw. They boil over“.

Media Responsibility – Trust and Mistrust in Authorities

According to Anders Bordum (2001:71), we find a number of linguistic expressions that relate to ‘trust’ and ‘mistrust’, respectively, that may help us recognize and conceptualise ‘trust’ in discourse. Of particular relevance to the present analysis are concepts that semantically relate to the positive expectations connected to trust, like *reliability, security, controllable, justice and fairness, sincerity*. Concepts that semantically relate to negative feelings of mistrust are found in expressions like *hopelessness, lack of faith, unfair, insecurity as well as manipulation*.

During the initial stage of the crisis *trust* was established by frequent reference to police action, as they quickly were quoted for having the situation *under control*. By trivializing the riots and focusing on police action and controllable situations it is clear that the citizens can trust the police to provide *security*:

“We quickly got the situation under control”
(Copenhagen Police, Politiken 12.2.2008).

“We don’t know why they’re rioting. I think it’s because they’re bored.
(Commissioner of the Copenhagen Police Hanne Bech Hansen, Jyllandsposten 15.2.08)

And by including daily reports about the number of people that have been arrested they are responding to the population’s need for *justice and fairness*.

“All in all 17 people have been arrested for arson and disturbing the peace”

On the other hand, social immigrant workers see the riots as caused by mistrust to the police and the media. Immigrants feel ‘victimized’ as they are constantly being harassed by frequent police searches and mobbed by the media. They frequently – see themselves represented as losers in the media which indicates that the riots are not caused by troublemakers, who are bored during their winter holidays, but has a much deeper felt cause grounded in mistrust in authorities kicked off by the Mohammed crisis.

“The Mohammed case – a spark – a cause that sets of a charged gunpowder barrel filled with years of locked up social frustration, powerlessness and marginilisation – the Mohammed cause is the last straw.” (Kristeligt Dagblad 15. Febr. 2008)

By relating the event to the Mohammed Crisis, and naming it Mohammed Crisis II, the media constructs the event as a crisis, whereby it becomes a serious matter for the parties involved. And from the above analysis we see how trust dynamics are affected by mass media representations of the event. If we relate the analysis to the crisis model, we see on the one hand that the media attempts to strengthen trust relationships among citizens and public authorities by presenting public authorities (the police) as responsible, trustworthy, and efficient *crisis managers* and by quickly attributing blame to specific groups i.e. ‘young immigrants’, and thereby identifying the *crisis producers* as belonging to ‘them’. At the same time they are generating distrust to the authorities

and the media among the immigrant population by this representation of the event in an 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy.

Analysing bloggings on media responsibility

Issues introduced by the following four blogging journalists not only concern media credibility, but also the medias' social role as such.

SOCIETY'S FAULT, MEDIA RESPONSIBILITY OR PARENTS' DISREGARD OF THEIR CHILDREN?

On the first day of the crisis the prime minister announced on TV that the riots could neither be explained as neglect on the part of society, nor on the part of politicians. There was only one group to blame, and that was the youngsters' parents, and the cause of the problems was to be found in their cultural background. They should be held responsible, socially and financially. The journalist utterly disagrees and calls it a step back to dark medieval times. He states that various stakeholders bear responsibility: Danish society as such, the police, politicians and in particular he points out that the media coverage of ethnic conflicts is biased. The media has always treated immigrants as violent and criminal. When members of ethnic minorities make riots, the media will rush to the scene. Racist violence against immigrants and their property will not be covered at all. The immigrant issue has developed into a vicious circle and what is important is how to defuse the events. Likewise is it important to seek motives and causes to prevent new confrontations. (This blog received 60 comments.)

THE MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE

The chief editor of an important newspaper posted a blog under the headline *The media are also responsible*. In that, she referred to the police, who argued that the media and the way in which the media covered the crisis made the crisis spread to other Danish cities. For this very reason the police had asked the TV-stations to reduce the amount of breaking news. She admitted that the youngsters might have become so fascinated by the media coverage of their vandalism that it intensified the crisis and made it spread to all parts of the country. She also introduced Western video-games as a source of inspiration to make riots in the streets. Not long ago there were rather severe riots in French suburbs that were covered extensively by French TV. At a certain moment French TV decided not to cover the crisis in direct live TV night after night, but

only to report on the crisis in a matter-of-fact way. CNN and BBC-world continued their intensive live coverage. It turned out that no fires were lit until the cameras were turned on. According to this blog, this merits a debate about the social role of the media. Should the media create the news, and then bring the news which the media themselves have created? She suggests that maybe the media should also display political and social responsibility. (This blog received 102 comments.)

THE MEDIA ADD FUEL TO THE FIRE

During the crisis two integrations experts published an article under the headline *The media adds fuel to the fire*. They argue in the first place that the media contributes to an escalation of the conflict by their extensive coverage of the events. Subsequently they argue that the media (public debaters and academics) for years have constructed an image of the young immigrants as victims that should be pitied. They are the weak and the outcast fighting against the system. They also argue that in general the young immigrants hate the Danish media because they, in their re-construction of international affairs where Arab countries are involved, always favour the West. In the present crisis the media even cooperates with the police to identify the rioters. According to the two experts, the solutions could be to confront the youngsters with their own acts, try to understand their motives and to stop reproducing a false story. (This blog received 4 comments.)

WHEN SHOULD THE MESSENGER BE KILLED?

This article is a response to the previous one blogged by another Danish journalist living in Paris, in a small, critical Danish newspaper. She argues that reality is created by the media – whether cars are set on fire or not. The solution is not that the media should exert self-censorship but to break a sick symbiosis in which the media exaggerates violence while the youngsters feed the media in their eternal pursuit of news and pictures. In this game, the media and the youngsters get what they want. The media consumers are the losers. The media should invite reflection and analysis. (This blog received 8 comments.)

Analysis of bloggers' comments

If we relate the blogging articles to the crisis model, the bloggers claim that the media to a certain extent can be held responsible for the

crisis event. In fact, mainstream media is seen as a stakeholder that can be related to aspects of the model as well. Mainstream media, together with the Muslim youngsters, are seen as crisis producers.

Relational level

In the blogging community, apart from the journalists of course, people do not have to reveal who they are. This does not imply that their social identities as bloggers are not negotiated. We are particularly interested in how bloggers present themselves and how they are seen by the others both in terms of ethnicity and in terms crisis identities.

In mainstream media the crisis is seen as an escalation of an ethnic conflict between 'them' and 'us'. It is therefore interesting to examine how the bloggers present themselves in the blogging community in terms of 'them' and 'us' and how they negotiate social identities. It turns out, however that Muslim participation in the debate is extremely low. A blogging journalist (article 3) asked two integration experts who are immigrants themselves to give their opinion. This article only received four comments. As far as blogging comments are concerned, a total of 192 comments were received, of them only 7, from one Muslim blogger, representing 'them' and 185 from bloggers representing 'us' (Danes and other Scandinavians). Danish bloggers attack the Muslim blogger arguing that Muslims have done nothing good to Danish society. He sees himself engaged in a defense-attack spiral and is excluded from the blogging community. So in this case blogging does not contribute to generate trust between members of different ethnic groups.

Topic level

This level concerns the crisis itself and the fact that some journalists think mainstream media are co-responsible for conflict escalation. Generally the bloggers' comments are framed in terms of the crisis model in three distinct types of discourse: A) media discourse, B) political discourse and C) ethnic discourse.

a) MEDIA DISCOURSE

There is of course no doubt that the youngsters initiated the riots. But how can it be argued that the media is also responsible?

Media-youth relationship

One position is that (left-wing) journalists for years have categorized (young) Muslims as marginalized victims. They are treated as losers, and used as walkers-on in the media's production of indignation. Another position is that they transmit their messages via cyberspace and other electronic media, and that they also use mainstream media strategically. Whenever they set fire to a container the media rushes to the scene. In this way the media escalates the conflict. The media represent the crisis from a perspective of violence and using an inflammatory language because mainstream media consumers love it. When the police arrives to the scene to re-establish order, they wear cameras on their uniforms, and also journalists are by law obliged to deliver recordings that reveal criminal acts to the police. Exactly the opposite position is also held. In mainstream media's way of representing the event, they lose credibility, for which reason the consumers can be seen as losers. Some bloggers think we need to debate mass media's role in society. Should they be more self-critical and more socially responsible and not only think of journalism in terms of business? If the media wants to report on a specific event, should they proceed in a more neutral, indirect way not making direct breaking news live TV, but report in the literal sense of the word? Is more critical, investigative journalism needed?

Media-politician relationship

The media-politician symbiosis is also introduced by the bloggers. The media creates news that can influence the political agenda, and politicians can use the media to promote themselves. Both parties can benefit from the crisis. It is, however, the media's role to control the power elite. Finally, the reprinting of the Mohammed drawings is introduced, although this was not the issue that the blogging journalists wanted to introduce. Positions vary from one extreme to the other. One is that the media's freedom of expression should be protected. The other is that it is Jewish journalists that abuse their freedom of expression as an act of revenge toward cultures that have been the Jewish people's enemies in the course of history.

b) POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Bloggers that treat the crisis mainly from a political perspective present either a left-wing or a right-wing type of discourse. From a right-wing perspective the main line of thought is that it was (left-wing) politi-

cians that in the first place imported huge numbers of immigrants to the country to get cheap labour. These immigrants cannot or do not want to integrate. The victims are the Danes and their safety. Consequently, immigrants should be sent back to their home countries. From a left-wing perspective it is the Prime Minister, his government and its racist supporting party that are to be blamed. Danish integration policy has failed and Denmark does not comply with international conventions. To solve integration problems the causes of the crisis needs to be established, the youngsters should be held responsible for their own acts. Muslim mothers should learn Danish, get an education and get a job outside the family arena. Hitz bu Taria should be prohibited.

c) ETHNIC DISCOURSE

Bloggers that frame the crisis in terms of ethnicity introduce the 'us-them' dichotomy. The main line of thought is that the young Muslims produced the crisis and used the media strategically. Their parents are to be blamed. It is all due to their religion. They do not want to integrate and the women are oppressed. To reduce the risk of future crisis there should be more police in the streets. The victims are the Danes, in particular Danish companies and Danes who lost their jobs due to the trade boycott of Danish products in Muslim countries. The opposite position is also presented: Muslims are daily being offended and oppressed by the Danish society. We should change our attitudes and treat each other with respect.

The Mohammed Crisis II and trust

In our analytical framework, three different, but parallel analytical foci have been introduced. In the first place we have conceptualized the multicultural city as an emotional construct in terms of trust. We have argued that public authorities as a confidence building measure in their housing policy prefer that immigrants live in specific residential quarters. Secondly we have seen how mainstream media constructs a specific event in such residential quarters, not only as an escalation of an ethnic conflict, but even as a social crisis represented in an 'us' and 'them' dichotomy. To construct an event as a crisis is bound to generate a feeling of distrust in the general public, therefore the media must also report on how the crisis is managed in order to initiate trust restoration processes. We therefore looked at how blogging communities as representatives of the general public perceive the crisis.

Mainstream media framed and constructed the event as a social crisis. The basic issue is the relationship between the host society and ethnic minorities. In terms of social trust, when mass media present an event as an urban crisis, the general public must expect that normal social practices have been seriously disrupted, and that large numbers of citizens have been seriously harmed. It must also be expected that the crisis will prompt strong emotional responses by the general public, who as stakeholders might perceive their interests to be seriously at jeopardy.

Blogging journalists, however, blamed the mass media for sharing responsibility in conflict escalation, and the blogging community seems convinced that the media's discursive representation of the event is a construction that does not correspond to what happened in 'real urban life'. General trust in the city's normal operations and practices were not disturbed. There is a general attitude that the troublemakers are easy to control, although bloggers do not agree on which measures should be taken. What the media do achieve is to generate strong negative emotional responses, in particular towards Muslim minorities.

Conclusion

The Muhammed II Crisis is an example of a rather new media strategy that concerns the media-youth relationship. It is highly problematic to create a media event as an urban crisis in which the general public must process a trust game on false premises. In the long view such media strategy will harm media credibility even more and will lead to further stigmatisation of young immigrants as a group that represents a threat to urban society, rather than a group that might offer opportunities for creating social wealth.

As stated above, media scientists' generally consider blogging to be a tool that may revitalize participatory democracy. Based on the results of the present analysis we hold that the opposite may also be claimed. Mainstream media's blogging sites do not significantly differ from mainstream journalism. Like mainstream media, the blogging community also indulges in stereotypes, seeks drama and simplifies complex issues to damaging clichés of the 'other'.

Most of the knowledge that the general public have about urban social conflicts is gained through mass media. This gives the media great power over millions of people's lives. Instead of playing an important role in conflict escalation, they should play an important role in conflict

prevention and search for ways to make conflict prevention newsworthy. If the media provides reliable and credible information of the risk of future crises, they could live up to their social responsibilities and contribute to creating trust in society as such and between the host society and ethnic minority groups.

The aim of the project was to identify to what extent mass media's treatment of a crisis event affects trust dynamics in society. The results of this pilot project calls for more research on the importance of web-based functionalities in how different stakeholder groups negotiate burdens and responsibilities in urban trust restoration processes.

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Public Communication in Times of Urban Crisis: A Programmatic Discussion and Case Study

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The goal of this paper is to provide a brief empirical excursion into and an open-ended discussion of the role of interactive public communication (IPC), as a variety of public communication, in times of urban crisis. It explores one aspect of the way in which IPC engages societal institutions, in this case media institutions, in terms of the trust accorded them. It also explores trust between interlocutors engaging in IPC. I hope the paper demonstrates the utility of investigating IPC in times of crisis for two reasons. Firstly, it provides an empirical ground for understanding how the general public is reacting to and managing the crisis itself, as well as to its varying institutional representations. Because of this, it may, secondly, offer insight into how various institutions might more fruitfully engage in crisis management.

This paper is a companion paper to the paper by Grindsted and Jensen in this volume. As part of the same research project, we are working with a shared conceptual framework. So as to avoid repetition I will refer to discussion in their paper where possible, and hope readers will indulge us by reading both the papers.

By 'public communication' I mean the various ways in which society's members, within a mass medium, produce and consume their own discourses. Of particular interest here are discourses which can be heard as making some comment on the status quo of society, in particular its public and private institutions and other seats of power. Thus public communication is distinct from public service communication, given an understanding of it as something produced for the benefit of the citizenry by governments and their institutions. Public communication can be seen as generally distinct from other forms of mass medial communication in that: 1) It is not the work of institutions, private or public, though they may be marginally involved in enabling it; 2) It is nonetheless mass medial, often thanks to affordable communication technology, in the sense of it being widespread, one-to-many communication, and 3) It is often anonymously produced. To put it more simply: Public commu-

nication is the talk and texts of everyday citizens which is broadcasted, in some fashion, indiscriminately to others in society. Interactive public communication is simply a variety of public communication in which citizens communicate directly with each other. In terms of mass media, it is 'a few to many' communication. As such it may be conversational, or conversation-like as the case below, but it may also consist of more formalized forms of interaction, such as debate, interview, and so forth. The case below is conducted via writing, but I will argue it nonetheless shares many features of speech. As an example of what is perhaps the oldest form of public communication, consider graffiti (Coffield 1991). Graffiti are patently not the work of public or private institutions. They are mass-medial and cheap to produce. They are most often, for good reason one assumes, anonymous. And finally, they are often transgressive and (Cresswell 1998; Stewart 1991). The data for this study are not graffiti, but sequences of communication on a web forum devoted to crime generally, and, in particular for this paper, missing persons. There are clearly differences between graffiti and web fora. For example, graffiti are known for their 'inscribed' character and for the semiotic connection this entails to their place and time, while the relevance of space and time for understanding internet communication is still an issue of some dispute (See, for example Davis & Crabtree 2004).

Nonetheless, the stipulations above characterizing public communication hold rather well for web fora. It is a mass medium, widely available to users who most often use it anonymously. While not necessarily transgressive in the way graffiti are, due to large part to graffiti's illegality in most societies, web fora arguably provide an arena for social and political commentary (See, for example, Castells 1996; Hampton 2003, for debate).

An important question, however, is what aggregate body, if any, does social commentary on web fora represent? Is it the society-at-large or limited to the computer literati, or does it represent users located in virtual communities reflexively constructed through their participation in the web fora themselves? These are very significant questions which can not be explored here in any detail (but for discussion see, for example Bromberg 1996; Baym 2000; Jankowski & van Selm 2000; Postil 2008). The position I hold with regard to representativity is simply this: Given the increasing number of people in developed and developing societies obtaining internet access, and given the wide range of uses of the internet, it is reasonable to expect that the 'talk' we 'hear' in a web forum is indicative of talk on the particular topic we might hear offline, if participants in the forum were to meet. There is some discussion concerning the harshness of some internet communication which is at-

tributed to the unlikelihood of people meeting offline and which would perhaps lead to caution in assuming representativity. But this is to ignore the overwhelmingly 'orderliness' of the vast majority of communication which actually occurs and orderliness indicates generality. We will see examples of how this orderliness is established and maintained below, but allow me to exemplify it here with a personal anecdote.

Two years ago there was a referendum in the county where I live. The county comprises 10 islands off the coast of Sweden, and the referendum concerned the building of a bridge to the mainland. Some 6 months before the referendum, the county government set up a web forum in which citizens could anonymously debate the issue. The debate was long and hard, over 10.000 forum contributions, for the issue struck at the heart of what it meant for county citizens to live an island life. That it was possible to remain anonymous in the debate, and some 90% of the debaters chose to do so, was crucial. So contested was the issue that, had anonymity not been possible, peaceful neighboring and even marriages would surely have been at risk. On only three occasions, as best as I can recall, was a contribution removed by the moderator, and on two of those occasions, it was due to 'commercial advertizements' according to the moderator. The normative underpinnings to civilized debate were not set out before hand, other than the usual 'netiquette', rather they came about organically as the debate ensued. Intolerance, personal attack and similar were quickly admonished and even chastised by forum contributors independently of their stance on the issue. Debate remained orderly despite anonymity, and because of self-sanction, almost as if the contributors were meeting face-to-face. Was the discussion representative of the population at large? Unfortunately there is no real metric by which to explore this, but this much is certain: there was a significant number of perspectives provided which also were heard in the fish market, over the hedge, and at the beach.

Urban Crisis

The bridge to the mainland could be thought of as a potential 'crisis' for those against it, and a crisis if it was not built for those for it. Crisis may be too strong a term, but if we take the definition offered by Grindsted and Jensen (this volume, p. 131) where crises are events affecting "large groups of people, whose lives and livelihoods risk serious harm, physically, spatially, economically, socially, and psychologically", then the bridge issue, for county citizens at least, had at least crisis overtones. The case study in this paper, however, does involve a crisis proper, what

is referred to as 'the urban crisis', yet differs from the 'Mohammed Crisis' discussed by Grindsted and Jensen. The term 'urban crisis' refers to a crisis which is not a sudden act of nature nor human, rather it refers to the decay of urban areas. The term has been extensively used for the northeastern cities of the United States and the deterioration they have suffered after large numbers of African Americans and new immigrant groups moved into the cities and equally large numbers of middle-class Euro-Americans moved to the suburbs, taking their businesses and business, as well as taxes with them. And as inner-cities became impoverished, crimes rates grew, infrastructure deteriorated, schools and housing became segregated, and so forth. Hirsch (1983) referred to this malady as the 'second ghetto' and places blame in the racism of earlier resistance to the War on Poverty of the 1960's. More recently crime plagues even relative affluent suburban areas, leading to reactions such as gated communities and other security measures.

The urban area of relevance in this paper is Richmond, the capital city of the state of Virginia which lies just below Washington, D.C along the southeastern seaboard of the United States. Richmond's history is different from the northeastern cities mentioned above, for example it did not go through demographic changes mentioned above. It being a southern city, segregation, for example has long been in existence there. Nonetheless flight from the city by middle-class Euro-Americans has occurred as have the consequential deterioration mentioned above. My data comes from 2006, a year which saw Richmond suffering from the 8th highest murder rate in the country, 39 murders per 100.000 inhabitants.

Social Trust and the Media

For an overview of social trust, I refer to Grindsted & Jensen (this volume),. Here I will relate that discussion to the particular sort of data and their analysis within this paper. The point of departure here, as well as there, is Simmel's (1950) "For the individual trust is a hypothesis certain enough to serve as a basis for practical conduct". And of relevance for my data is the further specification of Simmel's 'practical conduct' as web fora communication. Trust can be seen as a sociological concept, ie. as a property of groups (Lewis & Weigert 1985, Misztal 1996) with affective/moral dimensions (eg. Simmel 1950; Möllering 2001). Trust is also a fundamental pragmatic property of communication (eg. Grice 1989; Garfinkel 1967; Misztal 2001; Origgi 2004) and other forms of cooperation (Gambetta 1988) which, in their turn, can be seen as logically prior to social groups.

Möllering's (2001) extension of Simmel's work proffers trust as a mental process of interpretation, suspension (i.e. 'leap of faith'), and expectation is particularly apt for discussing trust and communication. In this regard, however, I do take issue with Mollering's contention that observation studies are 'strongly limited' (p. 415), my argument being that trust's involvement in our collective and communicative lives brings to bear its negotiable order and thereby its availability to observation. Brownlie & Howson (2005) hold a similar position vis a vis Möllering:

"... while we agree with Möllering's emphasis on the need for trust research to have an interpretive focus, we argue that to understand the 'leaps of faith' involved in trusting, we need to also return to Simmel's emphasis on the multi-layered nature of trust and to locate leaps of faith within particular relationships/interactions and systems." (Ibid: 221).

In terms of interpretation I shall seek to uncover the evidential bases for trust implicit and explicit in the communication under study. From a communication perspective, the evidential bases of thought are intrinsic to quite basic pragmatic phenomena related to inference, and there are therefore an array of analytic tools through which they may be recovered (Origi 2004). Regarding suspension and expectation, my focus will be on tracking the decisive moments in which a determination of trust is established, namely in some response to an interlocutor's communicative act. From Ethnomethodology/Conversation analysis (EM/CA), I will use the notions of agreement and alignment, for example, referring here to the processes through which interactants display some sort of consensual perspective.

Data and Method

The data for this paper were found at: <http://websleuths.com/forums/forumdisplay.php?f=60> and are including in slightly modified form in Appendix 1¹. The sequence of 22 contributions comprising the data is one thread in the sub-forum for 'missing persons' at the website 'Web-sleuths' which is a home base for a collection of such fora. Reading the fora is possible for anyone, while contributing to them requires a login. All relevant information from the thread is preserved in the modified ver-

¹ As will become clear later, it is somewhat untoward of me to offer a 'representation' of the case in summary form, but I do so nonetheless here as an aid to the reader. The case analyzed concerns a young woman, Kate, who seen getting into another person's care in the parking lot outside of her place of work. She was later found dead and her suspected murderer was also found dead, apparently killed by his own hands.

sion presented here. Only the first name of the victim has been used and a picture of her posted in the forum has not been included.

Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis are concerned with how people live their everyday lives through talk and other embodied practices. The general foci of research in EM/CA include local interaction orders, ordinary practices of action, and the organized details of conversation. The distinction between Ethnomethodology and Conversation analysis can be seen, very roughly, in Ethnomethodology's interest in ordinary practices of action generally, while Conversation Analysis focuses its efforts specifically on the organized details of conversation. Both approaches are very 'bottom-up, eschewing preconceived categories of explanation, such as underlying normative structure, focusing instead on the orderliness of actions as an emergent property. For an overview of Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (see Day & Wagner 2008, Maynard & Clayman 2003). The use of EMA/CA in the analysis of written texts is still very rare, and my use of them in this analysis must be seen as somewhat experimental. On the other hand, there are many features of these particular which I feel warrant an approach used predominately for spoken interaction. I will show below that the 'text' under study is similar to spoken interaction in that it is, firstly, interactive, which in this case means it comprises exchanges, consisting of communicative acts and responses to those acts, and that these exchanges are visible to all potential participants. The fundamental difference between spoken and written interaction lies in the former's taking place in 'real time' whereby interlocutors can monitor each other's contributions in the making as it were. This is not possible here, but in this form of multi-party written communication, it is at least possible for all potential contributors to see all the communication that is there. Secondly, many of the sequences of communicative interaction here are quite conversational in appearance. Predominately this effect is brought about by the use of spoken language in the texts, but also by other communicative phenomena reminiscent of spoken interaction which I will explicate below.

At a very fundamental level, Möllering's notions of interpretation, suspension, and expectation map straightforwardly onto any act of communication. Consider the following from the web forum:

12: MaxMoMom 08-28-2006, 03:14 PM
Oh no...

<http://www.richmondtimesdispatch.com...=1149190256318>

13: englishleigh 08-28-2006, 03:20 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by MaxMoMom

"<http://www.richmondtimesdispatch.com...=1149190256318>"

Oh... man!!

In turn 12 (turn # will be written T # hereafter) MaxNoMom produces an exclamation 'Oh no...', or more formally a receipt token of, in this case, bad news. We take the link to refer to some grounds for the exclamation. Englishleigh in T 13 quotes the link and provides a similar exclamation. We have then a very simple act of communication between two people who we can say display alignment in their interpretation of the relevance of what is at the end of the link. But how can englishleigh know with any certainty why MaxNoMom sees the link as bad news²? She/he can not, but she/he can trust MaxNoMom with regard to the particular social activity in which they are engaged, i.e. participating collectively in this particular web forum.

Englishleigh, just as we, can readily interpret T12 and T13 as alignment, or less technically, agreement, concerning receipt of bad news vis a vis the link. The language as such demonstrates that she/he trusts her/his understanding of what is relevant in the link such that it is bad news and this was the same for MaxNoMom, but this only holds if she trusts MaxNoMom to be 'carrying on' with the doing of this particular activity. She then aligns her contribution with MaxNoMom's with the expectation that such is the case. This is thus a display of her 'expectation' of what MaxNoMom has meant. Given no further work on this by MaxNoMom, for example an account of what she found to be relevantly bad news in the link at odds with what she might believe englishleigh might find relevant, the act is complete. Englishleigh has taken a 'leap of faith' with regard to MaxNoMom in T13.

This very basic form of trust is delineated in philosopher Paul Grice's Conversational Maxims (Grice 1975) and it is necessary, simply because the semiotic resources at our disposal, such as language, are vague. Understanding then is largely inferential, and a basis for our inferences about what people mean comes from our trust in them and their

² Although I am convinced the analytic points can be made here without knowing anything of the text to which the link refers, I will aid the reader in providing a gloss: the article concerns the finding of a dead woman's body, and it is believed to be Kate's

intentions. In our example above, we may say that englishleigh takes MaxNoMom receipt token-link to mean what she would mean by the same utterances. And this is straightforwardly displayed in her using, not exactly the same, but the same utterance for all practice purposes. Interpretation in this perspective demands suspension – a leap of faith – and this can be displayed to us in the response to what is being interpreted, which in its turn can be seen as an expectation in Möllering's terms.

All of this we can see and understand as an orderly social process, just as it can be seen and understood by participants. Some may wish, however, to have some more 'explanation': Has englishleigh calculated from some premise the odds concerning his/her matching of the receipt token with the link, or; is there somethings about MaxNoMom as a person such that she/he is due trust on affective grounds, or; is the social world so complex that englishleigh simplifies that world by trusting MaxNoMom? All of these are intuitive possibilities, but none of them are evident in these data. What is evident is what 'anyone', including participants, can see – receipt token-link → same link – similar receipt token. And the connection between the two, alignment, we arrive at through our understanding of language and the indexical reflexivity holding between it and its context. We see the language and arrive at its sense through seeing its accountability to a context, and we see the context through the language which instantiates it. The context in this example is the missing persons forum as a site of social activity. Englishleigh's leap of faith is that MaxNoMom's turn is relevant within this activity, at the same time as it instantiates that very activity. Her aligned response does exactly the same with regard to context as MaxNoMoms, and things run smoothly³.

Mass media, in the form of a local newspaper article also plays a role in this most minimal of communicative acts. As discussed above, the trust between englishleigh and MaxNoMom concerns their aligned perspective on its import in the case at hand. My analysis of forum participants trust in the media will be along the same lines as trust between forum participants. I will investigate participants responses to the media in terms of how they use the media in formulating their contributions and how those contributions are received by other participants in order to reveal what these actions say about participants' trust in the media.

This may seem a particularly circuitous way of investigating trust in the media. Most research concerning this would proceed by directly con-

³ For a similar discussion of this from a more discourse analytic but non-interactive perspective, see Wang & Lu 2007, and from an epistemic philosophical perspective, see Origg 2005

fronting people with mass media texts and probing for trust, or inquiring more generally as to people's predispositions to put trust in media. Here, as in Grindstedt & Jensen (this volume) the approach is to see what people do with the sense they make of media, and from that 'doing', draw inferences as to trust in the media. The advantage of this approach is that it is grounded in the everyday use to which at least some consumers put media. Mass media are central parts of our everyday, mundane existence, and by methodologically staying close to this field of play, we are more apt to produce results with resonance in that field or, to put it another way, results with some ecological validity.

For the data segment above, we may first note that the link to the newspaper article is, in T 12 simply and minimally inserted into the text following the receipt token. There are no instructions as to what it is, nor how one should deal with it, technically, and from this we may surmise that part of the competence in doing forum discussion is that links are to be clicked and the content addressed by the link is to be read or viewed. Nor is there any part of the link's content made available, as a 'preview'. There is, however, what I will refer to as 'annotation' with regard to the link whereby other participants may derive a sense of what the link contains and how it should be read or viewed. This is the case here. MaxNoMom presents the link, and thereby the newspaper article, but this is, in a sort of reversed chronology, preceded by her receipt token T12 'Oh no....'. Thus other forum participants are offered a sense of how the link should be read, i.e. as bad news, at least from MaxNoMom's perspective. Annotations can take many forms and need not be so straightforwardly interpretative as in this example. Presenting part of the actual text, in the case of print media, is also used as a sort of implicit annotation in that a selection has been made from the text of what is relevant to the discussion at hand. Links which are not annotated at all I will refer to as 'baldly' stated links. Like good students, participants in the forum always cite their sources. Contributions containing links or fuller quotes from the mass media are then available for response, or some other next action by participants. How the links or quotes are presented and what happens next ground, then, an analysis of trust in the media.

Annotated links can be seen as bringing into the discussion communicative interactions which have taken place externally. Thus MaxNoMom's receipt token-link combination can be seen as a record of MaxNoMom reading a text and responding to it, and as an account of MaxNoMom's activities outside the forum. It is the bringing of this record into the forum which sets up our understanding of it as 'bad news' concerning the case of Kate. That is to say, we do not expect the 'Oh no...' to be

referring to some other state of affairs depicted in the text, nor the text itself. This is part of the trust discussed earlier concerning MaxNoMom as a forum participant, but it also concerns trust in the media as such. Our, and forum participant's, understanding of MaxNoMom's receipt token in no way challenges the veracity of the media text with regard to its relevance to this case. We understand the receipt token as a way of understanding some state of affairs depicted in the text, not the text itself as a media product. That T13 is, in a sense, an echo of T12, and that in the following turns participants proceed with the work of the forum as a place for discussing missing persons strengthens the grounds for this inference. In this instance, trust in the media is complete and unwavering.

The newspaper article addressed by the link contains, for all practical persons, a trusted representation of some state of affairs regarding the case of Kate. It is important note, however, that this trust in the media is for this one time only and it is partial. The receipt token refers to some state of affairs depicted in the text, not necessarily all, and its veracity lies in its relevance to the particular activity it is being used for, ie. discussion in a missing persons forum. This perspective on trust is quite different from research in which citizens are encouraged to offer, either explicitly or implicitly, general and generic statements of trust or mistrust in that the determination of trust is tied to very local, practical action.

Analysis

Let us begin with some of the basic characteristics of the data as a spate of communicative interaction. The data portrays a 'complete' interaction in that there appears, simply, to be a beginning, middle and end. In the table I have noted three distinct sequences of the interaction; Starting the case, Disbelief/affective stances, and Crime account respectively. The first turn in the thread begins with bare details of the case T1: "'Kate", 21 missing 8/25/06 Richmond, Va.' stating the name, age, date from which reported missing, and place, followed the report that only one article, i.e. newspaper article, could be found. What follows is what appears to be the entire, brief, article a local newspaper. The transition to the next sequence occurs between T3 and T4 where epistemic stances of doubt towards the facts of the case, eg. T3: 'I'm wondering if this is any way...', and hypotheses ostensibly to resolve those doubts, T3 '...if this is any way connected to an attempted abduction that was reported...' are brought into play. Turn 4, with its quotation and similar expressions of epistemic doubt and hypothesis,

T4 ‘...Richmond has had its share of tragedy but it seems this could be another...’, clearly responds to T3. Additionally in T4, there is an affective stance, T4 ‘This doesn’t feel good for me...’ of the sort we find throughout the sequence. The transition to the third sequence, Crime account, occurs between T7 and T8. After what we may term a ‘bald’ link, as opposed to annotated links where the contributor comments upon what the link holds, the contributions seem more focused on details of the case and offer more hypothesizing as to the ‘missing pieces’. Epistemic doubt is also prevalent throughout, however, this doubt is more directed to details of just this case as opposed to personal experience. Furthermore, hypothesizing relates more to the proclivities of what a ‘normal’ person might do or think, T9 ‘What is strange to me is that she would get into a car with someone and leave the area when she had to be to work in about 15 mins. ... If it looked like she was being forced wouldn’t the person who saw her have called 911?’, as opposed to connections between this case and other cases as in T3. Crime account ends, and thereby the entire spate of communication in T22 with a lament over the irresolution of the case. T22 ‘Darn. Now we will never know why in the world the guy did what he did...’.

The interaction thus has some semblance of being a complete spate of communication, linked undoubtedly to the chronology of the case of Kate. There is more, however, which indicates the interactivity of communication as well as its orderliness. I noted above how T4 could be heard as a response to T3, and thereby indicate interactivity. Such comment-response sequences can however be broken, by reports of ‘fresh’ news. The sequence between T8 and T11 where contributors are discussing details of the case revealed in a CTV recording is broken in T12 with a link to updated news of the case. T12 is immediately responded to in kind in T13 and T14, sometime later, initiates a new topic.

The orderliness of the interaction is also evidenced in the coupling of turns, as well as the absence of admonishment when sequences are legitimately broken for the report of incoming news. There are, however, instances of either chastisement or negligence in the interaction which would, conversely, point toward underpinning norms of the interaction through infraction of them. In T2, Crypto6 chastises Absolut for not including a picture in his initial reporting of the case. This seeming infraction is repaired in the next contribution, T3, where a picture is proffered. T6 is similarly interesting. Here we see a greeting to another contributor by name, biographic details of the contributor, as well as an account of the relative safety of the areas in which he or she lives, which is incidentally the area in which the supposed crime has taken place. T6

receives no response, in spite of being specifically addressed to another contributor. This is the only occurrence of a contribution by Perry. I can at this point only speculate as to the grounds for others neglecting this contribution, but the contribution differs from all others in the following ways. It is addressed to a specific contributor and it reveals biographical information about its contributor both of which can be heard as at disjunction to anonymity. Furthermore, in the account of relative safety for the area in which Perry lives and in which the incident has occurred may be heard as coming from a contributor with a vested interest. The area referred to is an upper middle-class area at some distance from the more crime infected parts of the city.

The last point above concerning disorderliness on the discussion provides a good illustration of trust between participants. The chastisement of Absolut in T2, and the lack of a response to Perry's T6 can be seen as demonstrating mistrust towards these two participants. Although one can perhaps most straightforwardly view these two infractions as a result of not knowing the 'rules' of the discussion forum, it is also a reasonable inference that these participants may in future be less trusted than other participants. Perry offers no more contributions after the absence of a response to his/her contribution at T6. Absolut does carry on in the discussion, but it is perhaps telling with regard to this that his/her two further contributions are a bald link (T7) and a more elaborate contribution at T11 in which he/she hedges on the veracity of the information he/she provides T7 'Haven't seen that in print anywhere so don't quote me on it...'. Thus it a possibility that both Perry and Absolut have understood responses to their contributions as indicating they are not as trusted as others with regard to the particular social activity in which they are engaged.

Turns T12 and T13 were used above to illustrate trust between participants in the activity. T13 was described as projecting 'leap of faith', or suspension, as well as an expectation with regard to trusting the contributor MaxNoMom at T12. The orderliness and alignment between the two turns were the mechanisms in which trust was revealed. Similar sequences of contributions are evident through out the discussion. In turns T14-T20, we witness, for example, six of the participants collaboratively re-constructing possible intentions and contingencies which might explain why Kate parked her car at a particular spot and why she would have gotten into a car with someone there. The sequence begins at T14 with Bobbisangel speculating as to why Kate, as related in a previous link, would have gotten into a car with someone in the parking lot of her place at work. This contribution in turn is a reformulation of a previous turn by Bobbisangels at T8. After an initial 'new news' report by Trixie B.

at T 15, Bobbisangel raises questions as to why Kate would have parked her car where she did, and how it could come to pass that someone was waiting there for her. Both these questions are given candidate answers in the following two turns, T16-17 and further elaborated upon in T 18-20. The orderliness of this sequence is to a great extent reliant on Bobbisangel's questions at T15, which in turn can be seen as arising from his/speculations at T 14. A quick overview of the topics dealt with here provides a sense of coherence between the contributions:

- T 14 – Bobbisangel hypothesizes as to who picked Kate up and why she might have gotten into the car with him
- T 15 – Body found, Kate gets into a car which, it is speculated, had been waiting for her to arrive
- T 16 – Bobbisangel poses questions as to why Kate parked where she did and hypothesizes that why the person supposedly waiting for her might be doing so
- T 17 – dannyolde suggests it could be an acquaintance
- T 18 – JGRAY offers a description of the parking lot which might explain her parking where she did
- T 19 – ashandkeals provides a link concerning the car supposedly waiting for Kate and hypothesizes that it should be easier to find its owner
- T 20 – Data05 provides more information concerning the type of car supposedly waiting for Kate, again suggesting that it should be easy to find the owner.

There are other, more technical, phenomena which aid in our understanding this sequence as an orderly, conversation-like bit of discourse. In T16 dannyoldie begins his/her contribution with an anaphoric 'this', T16 'this sounds like possibly someone she was acquaintance to,...' with the antecedent of 'this' being the hypotheses provided by Bobbisangel in the immediately previous turn concerning the sort of person who would be waiting for Kate in the parking lot, T 15 'That had to have been someone that she knew if he knew that she would be there at a certain time I would think or else it is someone who knew her schedule and had been watching her.' In T18 JGRAY, quotes a few lines of Bobbisangel's T 16 concerning specifically if T16 'the place that she pulled into by the place where she worked?'. JGRAY then recycles the terms 'place' and 'park' in his contribution, T18 'The place where she parked was just outside of Nordstrom...'. Finally in T20 states it is also the case that he believes, as do Bobbisangel T16 and dannyoldie T17, that the person Kate met in the parking lot was someone she knew. In T 20 he posits his belief that 'this is someone Kate knew, ...' preceding that re-formulation

of the relevant material in T16 and T17 with 'I also believe' with the inference that the belief he states has been previously mentioned.

By posing questions, the following turns can 'easily' slot into a sequence of relevancies provided they somehow are candidate answers to those question, or provided relevant background to those answers. This, in essence, is the 'language game' of the discussion forum. Participants either speculate or pose questions with regard to the intentions and actions of the key people in a case, or the contingencies of those intentions and actions in order to reconstruct a plausible scenario. And participants are trusted to the extent that they can provide these in contributions in an orderly, aligned fashion. More generally, we can also now begin to address the much larger question of how these citizens are managing an urban crisis.

So far, we can say that one way citizens manage the 'urban crisis' is by joining an online discussion forum and cooperating with others in building scenarios for normal and abnormal actions, or more specifically for this case, for victim and criminal actions respectively. This can be viewed as a sense-making technique aimed at making tragic events comprehensible. Bobbisangel contribution at T22 is informative with regard to this. His/her lament about the case ending, as it were, with the suicide of the suspected killer, concerns not so much whether the 'right' person committed suicide, but that because of this we might T22 'never know why in the world the guy did what he did.'. Although the reconstructing of intentions continues even here, T22 'It must have gotten to him afterwards for him to take his own life. It just makes me wonder what all of that was for anyway.' The point is that managing the crisis is not so much about solving, nor preventing crimes as it is making them 'sensible'. This can be seen as one way citizens may, as noted by Grindstedt and Jensen (this volume), 'cope by normal procedures'. There is, however, another issue to be accounted for here, and that is how the media, in this case the local newspapers and TV news channels, are involved in managing crises.

In my analytic exemplification involving T12-T13 earlier, I suggested that the receipt tokens there in no way challenged the veracity of the newspaper article linked into the turns and that the contributors responding to these turns were in agreement about this. The media then was trusted with regard to its depiction of a state of affairs of relevance to orderly discussion in the forum. Viewing the discussion as a whole, I find this to be generally true of the discussion – the media is not challenged as to its veracity in spite of the frequent use of it in the discussion. There is only one occasion where this result might be questioned, and that is in T 11 where Absolut contributes with:

11: absolut 08-28-2006, 11:04 AM

On Fox & friends this morning they reported the car in the video was found but no sign of her. Haven't seen that in print anywhere so don't quote me on it.

Here is today's article from the Richmond Times Dispatch.

<http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet...=1149190244792>

I wonder if Jim Nolan will be writing on this case as well. He was the primary reporter in the Taylor Behl case.

MissingAbducted Blog, exposing missing cases one post at a time. New Blog Today's Atrocities, because bad stuff happens everyday.

Here Absolut casts some doubt as to the veracity of something he/she has heard on the morning news program, suggesting that this sort of media text is less worthy of trust until the same information has been provided via the print media. Furthermore his question concerning the primary reporter on the case T11 'I wonder if Jim Nolan will be writing on this case as well.' allows the inference that not all reporters can be trusted as to the accuracy or relevance of the texts they write. I have discussed Absolut earlier, however, as someone who may not be as trusted a participant as others in the forum, the case in point concerned his initial turn in the Kate discussion and the chastisement he received due to it. I also noted that unlike Perry from T 6, Absolut does continue participating in the forum, though his contributions were, to some extent hedged. Further evidence of Absolut's marginal status as a participant can be found here in T11. The turn is what I've termed an 'annotated link', with the addition of some other comments, for example the comment concerning Jim Nolan, the reporter. With an annotated link, a response is not necessarily expected – recall that sequences can be legitimately broken for the report of incoming news. In his additional comments, his hedge concerning the morning news and his comment on the reporter, Absolut is doing somewhat more than an annotated link. This added material can be seen as more demanding of a response than a lone annotated link, however no response to these matters are forthcoming in the discussion. Thus, it could be said that the orderliness of this contribution is questionable and that any mistrust toward the media which can be inferred from it is not aligned to by any other participant.

I also mentioned earlier with regard to T12-T13 that trust in the media here must be understood in terms of trust in the depictions of states of affairs relevant to the social activity under way. Expanding on this, we may gain further understanding as to how the media, trusted as it is, is used to manage just this crisis. What is clearly different here from the

case Grindsted and Jensen (this volume) have analyzed is that it does not seem to be the case that the media are 'crisis producers' and that the general public, represented by bloggers in their data and forum participants here', are in conflict with the media. Rather in this case, I suggest participants are using what they can find of relevance to THEIR project in the media. The media provides material, in the form of depictions of states of affairs concerning the case of Kate, which participants selectively use as a basis for their own filling in of 'the missing pieces'. These pieces are then used to make sense of Kate's plight. The media, in the unchallenged trust attributed it, also provide credibility for the local logic of participant's project. Participants have no other source of knowledge regarding the case. They were not there. They might not even be in the same city or state. The media therefore supports the baseline upon which the project of discussing Kate's case rests. To mistrust the media then, would be to mistrust their own project. Again, it is important to remember that trust in the media here should not be taken in a general sense, as 'trusting everything one sees, hears, or reads in the media'. Rather participants use from the media only what they need. This use is more akin to something like 'trusting what what one sees, hears, or reads in the media as a function of the local management of a crisis' and we can understand that trust only through understanding the social activity of the discussion forum for that is local management of the crisis.

Conclusion

This paper has argued for the efficacy of the close analysis of interactive public communication for understanding issues of trust in times of social crisis. The particular crisis chosen was not a sudden act of nature or humans, but the slow decay of urban areas in the United States known as the 'urban crisis'. That the results of this analysis differ somewhat from Grindsted and Jensens' analysis of the 'Mohammed Crisis' (this volume) is undoubtedly connected to the differences between the two crises. The Ethnomethodological/Conversation Analytic moorings of the analysis offered here also differs from the vast majority of analyses of 'media discourse', though see Hutchby (2006) for an exception, in its attempts of find 'local order' as an emergent and intrinsic property of interaction, as opposed to a function of external or underlying forces. There is some payoff here in the closeness this allows to the life-world of citizens. We are encouraged to see what we might gloss as 'crisis management', as cooperative, situated social activity which, for its participants, is a seemingly everyday affair.

With regard to 'everydayness', I am convinced this sort of analysis can be beneficial for those seeking to do precisely what participants can be seen to be doing, namely managing crises. That they do this by means of communication should alert us to the social nature of crisis management. Certainly crises are psychologically trying, but the management of large scale social crises such as we are dealing with here, are indeed social affairs as well, and perhaps predominately so. While communication as an ingredient of crisis management is foremost considered an issue involved with the logistics of getting aid to the needy, and rightly so, more long term concerns of crisis management can benefit by understanding how those affected are dealing with crisis on their own terms. And to the extent this is being done socially, it will presuppose communicative interaction of the sort investigated here.

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Appendix 1

Source: <http://websleuths.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4259>

Sequence	Contributions
Starting the case	<p>1: Absolut <i>08-27-2006, 05:31 PM</i> "Kate", 21 missing 8/25/06 Richmond, Va.</p> <p>This is the only article I have found on this case. Quote: "Woman missing since Friday</p> <p>BY BILL WASSON TIMES-DISPATCH STAFF WRITER Aug 27, 2006</p> <p>"Kate", 21, was last seen in a Short Pump parking lot. Henrico County police are searching for a Goochland County woman missing since Friday morning, when she was last seen getting into a car at Short Pump Town Center, where she works.</p> <p>"We are concerned about her," Henrico police Lt. Doug Perry said last night.</p> <p>"Kate", 21, who lives with her parents in Goochland's Sandy Hook area, has not been heard from since Friday, Perry said http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet...=1149190232298"</p>
	<p>2: Crypto6 <i>08-27-2006, 06:26 PM</i> Quote: Originally Posted by absolut "This is the only article I have found on this case. http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet...=1149190232298"</p> <p>Another article about a missing person with no picture. Some of you guys/gals are quite good sleuths, but how're we going to be able to help if we don't know what she looks like?? (rhetorical question between episodes of banging head)</p>
	<p>3: Trixie B. <i>08-27-2006, 08:14 PM</i> Here's a picture of "Kate" that was shown last night on the local Richmond news & is also circulating on MySpace.</p> <p>PICTURE</p> <p>I'm wondering if this is any way connected to an attempted abduction that was reported in Richmond's Shockoe Bottom on Wednesday morning at 2:00 am. There was an arrest made in that case but with Kate's ties to that area it makes me wonder.</p>

Sequence	Contributions
Disbelief/ affective stances	<p>4: concernedperson 08-27-2006, 08:28 PM Quote: Originally Posted by Trixie B. "Here is a picture of "Kate" that was shown last night on the local Richmond news & is also circulating on MySpace. PICTURE I'm wondering if this is any way connected to an attempted abduction that was reported in Richmond's Shockoe Bottom on Wednesday morning at 2:00 am. There was an arrest made in that case but with Kate's ties to that area it makes me wonder." This doesn't feel good for me. I don't know why and I hope I am wrong. Something about her eyes and the unexpected actions. Richmond has had its share of tragedy but it seems this could be another. Lord, I hope I am overreacting.</p>
	<p>5: Trixie B. 08-27-2006, 08:36 PM Quote: Originally Posted by concernedperson "This doesn't feel good for me. I don't know why and I hope I am wrong. Something about her eyes and the unexpected actions. Richmond has had its share of tragedy but it seems this could be another. Lord, I hope I am overreacting." I share your concern & I, too, hope it's just an overreaction. Bad feeling though... I will post more info should any become available. I will also cross-post at the Missing/Abducted Blog.</p>
	<p>6: Perry 08-27-2006, 09:06 PM Hey Trixie B! I am a fellow Richmonder. I live about 2 miles from Short Pump Town Centre and all anyone is talking about is "Kate". I haven't heard anymore than has been publically released but, I am keeping an ear out. I will let y'all know if I hear anything more. This is such a safe area. I wouldn't give a second thought walking out of SPTC at night. Rarely does anything like this happen in this part of town. I am praying for Kate and her loved ones.</p>
	<p>7: absolut 08-27-2006, 09:24 PM http://www.wtvr.com/Global/story.asp?S=5331815 <hr/>MissingAbducted Blog, exposing missing cases one post at a time. New Blog Today's Atrocities, because bad stuff happens everyday.</p>

Sequence	Contributions
Crime account	<p>8: Bobbisangel 08-27-2006, 11:34 PM</p> <p>What is strange to me is that she would get into a car with someone and leave the area when she had to be to work in about 15 mins. Why would she leave her own car there and leave with someone? I wonder if the person who saw her said that she got into the car willingly or if it looked like she didn't have a choice? I wonder if the owner of the car got out of the car or talked to her through an open window? If it looked like she was being forced wouldn't the person who saw her have called 911?</p> <p>Was there anyone that she had been dating? I wish we had a little more info about this gal. I hope that she is safe and returns home soon. I'm sure that her parents are worried sick about her.</p>
	<p>9: Trixie B. 08-28-2006, 01:27 AM</p> <p>Quote: Originally Posted by Bobbisangel</p> <p>"What is strange to me is that she would get into a car with someone and leave the area when she had to be to work in about 15 mins. Why would she leave her own car there and leave with someone? I wonder if the person who saw her said that she got into the car willingly or if it looked like she didn't have a choice? I wonder if the owner of the car got out of the car or talked to her through an open window? If it looked like she was being forced wouldn't the person who saw her have called 911?</p> <p>Was there anyone that she had been dating? I wish we had a little more info about this gal. I hope that she is safe and returns home soon. I'm sure that her parents are worried sick about her."</p> <p>I don't think they have any actual witnesses. Instead, they're relying on information from a surveillance video of the parking lot. On the video it appears that she was followed by the dark car. First, Kate pulls into the lot & parks her car. Within moments the dark car pulls in right next to her & someone gets out and goes to the driver's side of Kate's car. Next, this person walks Kate to the passenger side of the dark car & she gets in. The stranger then gets into the driver's side & SPEEDS out of the parking lot. The video was of very poor quality so it is unknown if this person is male or female or if they may have had a weapon. IMO I don't think she left willingly.</p> <p>Some links to Richmond news: http://www.wtvr.com/ http://www.nbc12.com/ http://www.wric.com/ http://www.timesdispatch.com/</p> <p>WRIC-8 has a video story up right now under breaking news but I'm unable to view it. (Not Mac compatible) It appears to have a different picture than the one I posted above.</p>

Sequence	Contributions
	<p>10: misterallgood <i>08-28-2006, 04:55 AM</i> I did manage to find some of her online stuff. http://crimeblog.us/?p=64 http://crimeblog.us/wp-content/uploa...lthekitten.JPG She looks like an actress... Liv Tyler, maybe? This story isn't sounding good for her, yet, if you read some of the things I found, Kate didn't seem all that happy. Could have been an art-student pose, I don't know. The immediate circumstances surrounding her disappearance around 8:50 a.m. last Friday are very suspicious, though. It does not look, by the way, like the surveillance cameras gave a good view of the person driving the vehicle that took Kate away from the mall. Steve</p> <hr/> <p>The True Crime Weblog www.myspace.com/truecrimeweblog "Discourtesy is unspeakably ugly to me." ~ Hannibal Lecter</p>
	<p>11: absolut <i>08-28-2006, 11:04 AM</i> On Fox & friends this morning they reported the car in the video was found but no sign of her. Haven't seen that in print anywhere so don't quote me on it. Here is today's article from the Richmond Times Dispatch. http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet...=1149190244792 I wonder if Jim Nolan will be writing on this case as well. He was the primary reporter in the Taylor Behl case.</p> <hr/> <p>MissingAbducted Blog, exposing missing cases one post at a time. New Blog Today's Atrocities, because bad stuff happens everyday.</p>
	<p>12: MaxMoMom <i>08-28-2006, 03:14 PM</i> Oh no... http://www.richmondtimesdispatch.com...=1149190256318</p>
	<p>13: englishleigh <i>08-28-2006, 03:20 PM</i> Quote: Originally Posted by MaxMoMom "http://www.richmondtimesdispatch.com...=1149190256318" Oh... man!!</p>

Sequence	Contributions
	<p>14: Bobbisangel 08-28-2006, 11:50 PM It sounds like the person who followed her into the lot there knew her. It sounds like they must have known each other for her to pull in there and the car following her to pull in right behind her and then get out of his car and walk over to her window. She must have pulled in there to talk to whoever that was??? She must have been threatened for her to get out and go with him. He walked her over to his car? Her mom talks about how responsible she is and she was on her way to work. She had to know the person.</p> <p>I hope they check out ex-boyfriends...one that she has had trouble with or a current boyfriend that might be jealous. I hope they find out who did this and quick. My heart goes out to Kate's parents.</p>
	<p>15: Trixie B. 08-29-2006, 09:41 PM Positive ID</p> <p>They have positively identified the body found in Goochland County as "Kate".</p> <p>They have also released photos of the car she was seen getting into. It is believed to be a dark colored Pontiac Firebird. It was seen circling the parking lot waiting for her to arrive.</p> <p>Links to the latest: Times Dispatch ~ http://tinyurl.com/z6s9e NBC12 ~ http://tinyurl.com/h6h3w</p>
	<p>16: Bobbisangel 08-30-2006, 05:47 AM Was the place that she pulled into by the place where she worked? Would she have been parking her car there and then walking over to the store where she worked?</p> <p>That had to have been someone that she knew if he knew that she would be there at a certain time I would think or else it is someone who knew her schedule and had been watching her.</p> <p>Were there no cameras out where she parked?</p>
	<p>17: dannyodie 08-30-2006, 08:23 AM this sounds like possibly someone she was aquantance to, "sorry poor spelling" maybe this person also works at the same mall or a nearby location, someone that probably comes in frequently.</p>
	<p>18: JGRAY 08-30-2006, 10:53 AM Quote: Originally Posted by Bobbisangel "Was the place that she pulled into by the place where she worked? Would she have been parking her car there and then walking over to the store where she worked?"</p>

Sequence	Contributions
	<p>The place where she parked was just outside of Nordstrom. It is at the very front of the mall. There are several different entrances to the store but where she was is the easiest to get to and has the most parking available.</p>
	<p>19: ashandkeals 08-30-2006, 12:21 PM Here is a link to the most recent article... http://www.richmondtimesdispatch.com...=1149190290347 They have a clearer image of he car. The police have to have a clue by now whom the car belongs too. I am anxious to find out the whole story. Goochland is a small community in which I live in and there has to be someone who knows something.</p>
	<p>20 Data05 08-30-2006, 12:53 PM I did some research into the Trans Am and the burgandy color is actually called Red Maple Metallic and was only used on the Trans Am from 2000 to 2002. It is considered a rare color and hard to find. I also believe this is someone Kate knew, but not well and perhaps from the mall. I also wonder if VLE has taken a look at security tapes from the department that she worked. I'm sure this person loitered around her department. I find it very interesting that this person knew where she would park and possibly knew she would be working that morning. This is such a sad, sad story. I am so sorry for Ms Robertson and the pain her family must be going through..-(<hr/> "Knowledge is a process of piling up facts; wisdom lies in their simplification". Martin Fischer.</p>
	<p>21: cricket 08-30-2006, 06:41 PM Breaking News – Suspect Committed Suicide "Breaking News – Suspect Committed Suicide Police think the man who abducted and killed 21-year-old "Kate" was a former nightclub security guard who apparently later shot himself to death. The suspect, identified as John M. Snyder, 37, of the 1200 block of Careybrook Drive in western HenricoCounty, was found dead in his apartment by his wife about 2 p.m. on Monday, police said this afternoon." More at link: http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RTD/MGArticle/RTD_BasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=1149190308539</p>

Sequence	Contributions
	<p>22: Bobbisangel 09-01-2006, 02:56 AM</p> <p>Darn. Now we will never know why in the world the guy did what he did. It must have gotten to him afterwards for him to take his own life. It just makes me wonder what all of that was for anyway. He kills Kate and then he takes his own life....why....what purpose did that serve anyway? Why take her life?</p> <p>I wonder if Kate went to the club where he worked or if he knew her from somewhere else. Or if he even knew her? He must have threatened her to get her to go with him. I wonder if his wife suspected anything?</p>

Immigration Challenges in Metropolitan Bilbao: A Case Study

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The Bilbao metropolitan area underwent an important internal migration during the second half of the 20th century, but it was not until the final years of that century and especially with the beginning of the 21st century that significant numbers of people from other countries began to arrive and settle. Thus, during the last decade, year on year, the numbers of resident foreigners in the Bilbao metropolitan area continued to rise, and at an increasing rate, following the pattern in the Spanish State as a whole.

Faced with this new reality, there have been numerous responses from different national, regional, provincial and local governments, with the aim of understanding this new scenario and developing the necessary policies to respond to the new needs. In this context we could mention the different modifications of the Spanish Law of Immigration and its subsidiary regulations or the successive regularisation processes carried out at national level; the creation, at regional level, of an Immigration Directorate within the Basque Government; the inclusion of foreign groups in underprivileged situations within the scope of their activity by provincial social services, and the development of municipal departments for immigration in various City councils. Even civil society, through its voluntary associations, has reacted to adapt to a multi-ethnic and multicultural society, developing specialised organisations and *ad hoc* programmes aimed at confronting the specific challenges raised by this new migratory flow.

The increasing arrivals of foreign populations have redirected academic attention away from internal and towards international immigration and led to the posing of new questions when faced with the need to know and respond to a diverse and increasingly multicultural society. For that reason it comes as no surprise that during recent years the

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number of studies and researchers dedicated to this phenomenon has increased, both at state level and in our own context. But there is still much to know, given the great dynamism presented by the current migratory phenomenon and given the shortage of data available to analyse it, although the sources of information are also becoming more abundant. For this reason, there are still many questions about what to do when faced with certain manifestations of this migratory phenomenon and how to do so in the best possible way. It is within this context that we base this article, focused on the topic of immigration in the Bilbao metropolitan area. Until now there have been no studies which have taken the metropolitan area as a reference point to study immigration, although specific studies have been carried out in some of its municipalities, like Bilbao, Barakaldo and Getxo.

This article constitutes a first approach to understanding the reality of foreign immigration in metropolitan Bilbao. To this end, first of all, we are going to focus the article on the recent development of immigration in the Bilbao metropolis, framing the phenomenon in the context of its administrative-political structure, its sociological reality and its socio-territorial panorama. In the second part we will focus specifically on immigration, seeking an overview through the variables of age, sex, nationality and other variables that characterise the foreign inhabitants of Metropolitan Bilbao. Finally, and in view of the reality observed, we will finish with a reflective exercise in which we will consider some questions regarding research and action in the area of immigration.

The Bilbao Metropolis and Immigration

The Bilbao metropolitan area is defined from the territorial point of view by a settled urban concentration on the banks of the Lower Nervión. This is an area that includes 31 municipalities in a river estuary which has historically constituted the dividing axis of two socially differentiated worlds: the right bank, primarily residential in character, and the left bank, industrial in character, which has historically contained the main factories and working-class housing. As in many other places, we are here talking about two separate worlds that live side by side without mixing. The Bilbao metropolitan area has an approximate area of 3.716 Hectares, and a population that reaches almost 900.000 inhabitants, distributed as shown in Table 1. It consists of a central municipality, Bilbao, which has nearly 400.000 inhabitants; three municipalities of over 50.000 inhabitants each: Barakaldo, Getxo and Portugalete; and five municipalities having between 25.000 and 50.000 inhabitants:

Table 1

Demographic development of the Bilbao Metropolitan Area. Annual growth index

Municipality	District	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001	A.G.I. 1991-2001
Bilbao	Bilbao	393.759	381.506	369.839	361.128	349.972	-0.55
Arrigorriaga	Ibaizabal	9.011	9.469	9.913	10.348	11.140	1.17
Basauri	Ibaizabal	52.554	51.931	50.224	46.760	45.085	-1.08
Etxebarrri	Ibaizabal	6.548	6.431	6.458	6.248	7.043	0.87
Galdakao	Ibaizabal	26.785	27.232	28.569	29.600	29.544	0.34
Zaratamo	Ibaizabal	1.768	1.609	1.634	1.594	1.651	0.10
Barakaldo	Left bank	118.615	114.094	105.088	99.679	94.478	-1.06
Portugalete	Left bank	58.071	57.794	55.823	53.561	51.066	-0.89
Santurtzi	Left bank	53.919	52.502	50.466	49.224	47.173	-0.67
Sestao	Left bank	40.374	38.148	35.948	33.470	31.773	-1.23
Barrika	Plentzia-Mungia	774	767	877	1.143	1.230	3.35
Gorliz	Plentzia-Mungia	2.986	2.665	2.917	3.847	4.486	4.24
Plentzia	Plentzia-Mungia	2.844	2.770	2.542	3.071	3.643	3.56
Sopelana	Plentzia-Mungia	6.271	7.051	8.135	9.538	10.709	2.73
Urduliz	Plentzia-Mungia	2.643	2.507	2.580	2.764	3.142	1.96
Derio	Txorierrri	5.133	5.062	4.871	4.673	4.846	-0.05
Erandio	Txorierrri	25.184	25.134	25.055	23.230	22.422	-1.11
Larrabetzu	Txorierrri	1.629	1.547	1.472	1.486	1.551	0.52
Lezama	Txorierrri	1.827	1.901	2.020	2.046	2.113	0.45
Loiu	Txorierrri	1.797	1.685	1.694	1.680	2.199	2.59
Sondika	Txorierrri	3.901	3.606	3.345	3.512	3.978	1.73
Zamudio	Txorierrri	3.341	3.228	3.179	3.157	3.012	-0.54
Berango	Uribe-Coast	4.136	3.931	4.102	4.596	5.040	2.05
Getxo	Uribe-Coast	67.793	77.856	79.954	81.446	82.285	0.29
Leioa	Uribe-Coast	22.382	24.107	24.815	27.089	28.381	1.34
Abanto/Zierbena	Mining zone	9.461	9.346	9.472	8.527	9.036	-0.47
Alonsotegui	Mining zone			3.075	2.863	2.662	-1.44
Muskiz	Mining zone	6.054	6.224	6.358	6.343	6.558	0.31
Ortuella	Mining zone	9.100	9.200	8.976	8.594	8.684	-0.33
Trapagaran	Mining zone	13.677	13.406	13.239	12.921	12.621	-0.48
Zierbena	Mining zone				1.185	1.215	
Bilbao Metropolitan area		952.337	942.709	922.640	905.323	888.738	-0.37

A.G.I. = Annual growth index

Source: Prepared by the authors from EUSTAT data.

Basauri, Santurtzi, Sestao, Galdakao and Leioa. The remaining 23 municipalities, have fewer than 25.000 inhabitants each.

For many years, the Bilbao area has been an area of immigration. During the 20th century and until the 1980s, it was constantly receiving populations coming from other Spanish provinces. These people moved from the agricultural areas to work, especially in the industries of the Basque Country and those located in the Bilbao metropolitan area. The economic crisis of the end of the 1970s and the consequent industrial reconversion of the 1980s stopped this massive transfer of people. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Bilbao metropolis changed in appearance, becoming a services zone, after experiencing the closure of numerous industrial companies.

Foreign immigration, on the other hand, has not occurred until very recently, but its growth has accelerated greatly. In 1996 the number of foreigners reached 5.128 (Table 2), which represented only 0,6% of the total population in the metropolitan area, and the majority of them came from European Union countries. Four years later, in 2000, the number of foreigners had increased little, reaching 7.471 people, 0,8% of the total population. It was from that moment on that year upon year the number of immigrants started to grow quickly (Table 1),


Table 2

Development of the foreign population resident in the Bilbao Metropolitan Area, according to municipality of residence. 1996 and 2000-2007

Municipality	1996	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Abanto and Zierbena	14	37	45	60	67	83	98	118	129
Alonsotegi	1	0	5	18	26	36	51	62	67
Arrigorriaga	29	58	79	124	190	247	285	310	396
Barakaldo	919	482	631	810	1.078	1.414	1.901	2.535	3.216
Barrika	11	13	19	26	26	30	32	39	49
Basauri	148	216	286	313	435	545	722	887	1.051
Berango	34	64	75	122	165	173	219	211	273
Bilbao	2.217	3.953	6.125	8.820	11.096	13.049	16.215	19.611	21.890
Derio	17	8	17	47	83	83	124	135	169
Erandio	67	114	188	273	436	546	742	1.030	1.285
Etxebarri	30	38	49	55	67	90	142	133	164
Galdakao	70	105	137	214	330	429	507	544	596
Getxo	873	1.327	1.718	2.315	2.778	3.020	3.605	4.003	4.254
Gorliz	37	35	64	81	112	123	145	182	231
Larrabetzu	3	4	4	4	7	9	12	14	23

Municipality	1996	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Leioa	120	241	335	522	692	806	980	1.146	1.349
Lezama	6	5	7	16	19	39	58	78	100
Loiu	4	11	34	267	147	209	150	164	159
Muskiz	6	13	14	29	50	85	91	112	124
Ortuella	16	26	29	38	46	53	66	77	85
Plentzia	21	39	52	79	97	120	153	162	106
Portugalete	118	154	168	270	336	460	631	743	882
Santurtzi	138	174	255	302	379	557	770	999	1.148
Sestao	108	171	239	309	332	383	543	741	943
Sondika	6	6	17	33	46	69	97	130	149
Sopelana	75	107	122	198	268	325	370	395	441
Trapagaran	19	28	29	56	74	106	121	145	169
Urduliz	10	25	40	46	53	68	109	79	84
Zamudio	2	5	8	38	77	86	109	132	159
Zaratamo	4	9	10	11	12	14	20	29	31
Zierbana	5	3	4	9	15	17	14	15	21
Metropolitan Bilbao total	5.128	7.471	10.805	15.505	19.539	23.273	29.082	34.961	39.743
% Metropolitan Bilbao	0,6	0,8	1,2	1,7	2,2	2,6	3,2	3,9	4,4
Bizkaia total	6.533	9.419	13.120	18.661	23.908	28.876	36.217	43.395	50.092

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI.



Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI

Graph 1

Development of the foreign population in Metropolitan Bilbao.
1996, 2000 to 2007

representing in 2007 4,4% of the population, with a total of 39.743 resident foreigners. The arrival of foreigners has limited the population reduction that took place until 2001 and this is reflected in Table 1.

This increasing presence of foreign population is centred on the Bilbao metropolitan area, a zone with specific socio-demographic and economic characteristics which constitute the framework for development and living conditions to which these new inhabitants needed to be incorporated. For this reason, we are going to dedicate the next section to presenting some of its main characteristics.

Sociodemographic and economic characterization of the metropolitan area

The uninterrupted urban growth of the Bilbao metropolitan area was strongly shaken in the 1980s by a deep crisis in the productive fabric which set off all the alarms for the public authorities. Massive closures of companies, industrial desertification, the appearance of pockets of poverty, € were some of the symptoms that forced a change in course for the metropolitan economy, which culminated in a profound restructuring and the need to find new incentives for foreign investment.

The commitment to a diversified economy based, on the one hand, on industry which urgently needed modernisation of its productive apparatus; and, on the other, on decisive action with regard to installations and infrastructures, gave rise to the strategic Plan of the Bilbao Metropolitan Area, carried out at the beginning of the 1990s, which was the tool on which the metropolitan transformation pivoted. In particular, the commitment to give cultural installations, of which the Guggenheim Museum is a good example, a strategic place as instruments of economic and social recovery was one of the keys to this process.

The transformation of the Bilbao Metropolitan Area cannot be understood except with reference to the socio-political model on which it is based. Although the concept of this Metropolitan Area and its structuring go back to the 1950s, specifically to the creation of the Administrative Corporation of Greater Bilbao, at present the executive competences regarding metropolitan planning fall on the Bizkaia Provincial Delegation, which has the economic competences and resources for the development of planning. From the administrative point of view the composition of the Bilbao metropolitan area is as it appears in Table 3.

Table 3
Political-Administrative division of the Bilbao Metropolitan Area

Organization	Nature
Metropolitan Area	Territorial organization that forms a socioeconomic unit and which is composed of 31 municipalities. Its size is of 1 million inhabitants. Its area is of 38 km ² . The competence in the matter of metropolitan planning at executive level falls on the Bizkaia Provincial Delegation.
Sub-Area	Territorial divisions of the region based on the geographic location of the municipalities. Organizations which have joint services in the matters of social services, cleaning, employment,...
Municipality	The City council is the highest municipal institution and is responsible for municipal planning. Its municipalities are of medium size
District	Administrative unit relating to census matters. Bilbao Capital is distributed in 8 districts of some 50.000 inhabitants each.
Neighbourhood	Residential areas of historical nature that have a certain social homogeneity and collective identity
Census Section	Lower-level administrative division. Thus for example, Bilbao capital is made up of 8 Districts, 39 Neighbourhoods and 290 Census Sections. Disaggregated information on the resident population is available at this level.

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Demography

A progressive ageing of the population is taking place. If in 1991 the average age of the population was 37,9 years, 10 years later it is 41,9 years. The abrupt drop in the birth rate has implied a loss in size of the younger cohorts as a proportion of the total population. Those under 19 years old have gone from 23,7% in 1991 to 16,2% in 2001 (Table 4). This is a significant shift. The general aging of the population has affected the active population. The Replacement Index, which expresses the relationship between workers who leave the job market through retirement and those who join, shows that in recent years many more

leave than join. Women of fertile age (15-44 years) have diminished. In parallel, the population over 65 years has increased in number, going from 13,3% to 18,9%, that is to say, an increase of 5 percentage points in barely ten years.

Table 4
Demographic indicators, Bilbao Metropolitan Area

Relation of Indices	1991			2001		
	General	Male	Female	General	Male	Female
Average Age	37.9	36.5	39.3	41.9	40.3	43.5
Index of Youth (0-19 years)	23.7	25.0	22.5	16.2	17.3	15.2
Index of Age (> 64 years)	13.3	10.9	15.6	18.9	16.0	21.5
Replacement Index (Outgoing workers (60-64 years) per 100 incoming workers (15-19 years)	71.1	67.9	74.4	96.9	89.5	104.8
Women of Fertile Age (15-44 total years as a % of all women)	47.0	N/A	N/A	43.3	N/A	N/A
Young Workers (15-39 years as a % of total population)	40.5	N/A	N/A	37.2	N/A	N/A
Older Workers (40-64 years as a % of total population)	30.9	N/A	N/A	32.9	N/A	N/A
Index of Maternal Load (children < 5 years as a % of women of fertile age)	13.6	N/A	N/A	16.3	N/A	N/A

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Table 5 is highly illustrative of the territorial dynamics of the metropolitan area. The larger municipalities, traditional recipients of manpower and industrial in nature, have lost weight to the benefit of smaller periurban municipalities of semi-rural/semi-urban character, which are attracting the economically more powerful social classes. That is to say, a process of increasing residential differentiation has taken place by which the largest municipalities lose population to the benefit of the smallest, which are growing thanks to the fact that they provide areas of low residential density.

Table 5

Development of population by size of municipality. Bilbao Metropolitan Area

Size Municipalities	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001	A.G.I. 1981-1991	A.G.I. 1991-2001
< 10.000	63.942	62.479	65.572	67.329	72.089	0.25	0.95
10.000-25.000	54.143	55.060	56.342	56.037	56.892	0.40	0.10
25.000-50.000	196.014	193.920	190.022	186.143	181.956	-0.31	-0.43
50.000-100.000	244.479	249.744	240.865	234.686	227.829	-0.15	-0.56
More 100.000	393.759	381.506	369.839	361.128	349.972	-0.63	-0.55
B.M.A.	952.337	942.709	922.640	905.323	888.738	-0.32	-0.37

Source: Prepared by the authors.

A.G.I. Annual growth index.


Housing

The housing stock of the Bilbao metropolitan area is of approximately 400.000 dwellings, of which 85% are permanently occupied and the remaining 15% are made up of empty or seasonal housing. Owner-occupied dwellings represent approximately 90% of the housing stock whereas the supply of rental dwellings barely reaches 10%.

One of the structural characteristics of the metropolitan area is its lack of vacant land available for future growth. This is a consolidated urban area which has hardly any land available to promote new residential developments. This is due to the relatively rugged topography of the area, which has determined the urban development at the heart of the valley following the course of the river, but which at present is practically saturated. The lack of land partly explains one of the chronic problems of the area which powerfully affects the most disadvantaged classes, we are referring to the high price of housing. The estimates made by the Basque Government in relation to the problem of housing show that there is a deep imbalance between the demand-need for housing and the available supply., There is an unsatisfied demand for housing that extends to approximately 12% of the population which, for diverse reasons, cannot gain access to the housing market. All the people of foreign origin who are registered will be able to apply to become recipients of interventions designed to guarantee the right of foreigners to decent housing as a basic social right.

The average size of a house is 75 square metres and from the point of view of the facilities available we can say that practically 100% of houses have covered the basic needs of the residents as regards home

facilities such as hot water and heating. On the other hand, as shown in Table 6, a remarkable increase can be seen in recent years in the use of new technological appliances as domestic facilities.



Source: Prepared by the authors from EUSTAT data

Graph 2

Development of the price per m² of housing in the Bilbao Metropolitan Area

Table 6

Level of facilities of homes in the Bilbao Metropolitan Area


Level of facilities	1989	1994	1999
Hot water	98.1	99.2	99.4
Telephone	89.8	93.84	95.4
Fridge-Freezer	83.3	62.1	84.9
Washing Machine	97.0	98.1	99.2
Dishwasher	15.0	17.4	23.9
Vacuum Cleaner	67.2	75.6	81.3
Stereo	25.9	46.7	67.9
Camera	61.7	69.5	74.3
Video Camera	4.8	10.2	17.2
Colour TV	91.4	98.5	99.4
Video	32.5	58.8	70.5
Personal Computer	11.3	26.1	30.9

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of EUSTAT data

Education

19% of the Bilbao adult population have completed their university studies (higher + intermediate-higher) (Table 3). At the other end of the scale, the population which has not completed primary education represents almost 6% of the total. The most numerous group, however, consists of those who have completed primary education (43%), followed by those people who have completed their secondary and/or professional studies (30%).

Since education is understood in our society as a basic right, as well as an obligation for the population aged between 6 and 16 years, access to education is guaranteed for all the foreign population registered in any of the municipalities of Metropolitan Bilbao (regardless of their legal/administrative status). The scope of education includes both obligatory education as well as other types of educational actions offered or ensured in the Basque educational system from the public sector, in particular, adult education.



Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of EUSTAT data

Graph 3

Level of education of the population of the Bilbao Metropolitan Area, 2001. (%)

Health

Life expectancy at birth is 76,4 years for men and 83,7 years for women in the Basque Country, one of the highest of Europe. The im-

provement of the health system and habits of life has meant that in the last 20 years an average of 5 years has been gained in terms of life expectancy, going, in the case of the men, from 71 years approximately in 1980 to 76,4 years in 2003. Identically, women have improved their life expectancy in the same proportion, from 78,5 years in 1980 to 83,7 years in 2003.

With regards to Health Expenditure it is observed that its proportion of GDP is still far below that of countries like Switzerland, Germany, France or Norway (Table 7). The health cost per inhabitant is 1.342 €,

Table 7

Health Care Expenditure and Economic Level. Countries of the OECD. 1999

Countries	Total health care cost, % of GDP	Public health cost % of GDP	Public health cost % of total health cost	Cost of health per Inhabitant (\$)	GDP per inhabitant (\$)
Austria	8,2	5,9	72,1	2.014	24.643
Basque Country	6,1	4,6	76,0	1.342	22.073
Belgium	8,8	6,3	71,3	2.181	24.837
Canada	9,3	6,6	70,6	2.463	26.440
Denmark	8,4	6,9	82,2	2.275	27.069
Finland	6,8	5,2	75,7	1.547	22.702
France	9,4	7,3	78,1	2.125	22.691
Germany *	10,3	7,8	75,8	2.361	22.953
Greece *	8,4	4,7	56,3	1.198	14.327
Holland	8,7	6	68,5	2.259	25.887
Iceland	8,7	7,4	84,8	2.287	26.350
Ireland *	6,8	5,2	76,8	1.534	22.710
Italy **	8,2	5,5	67,3	1.905	23.262
Japan *	7,4	5,8	78,5	1.795	24.102
Luxembourg	6,1	5,7	92,9	2.543	41.656
Norway	9,3	7	75,8	2.612	28.140
Portugal *	7,7	5,1	66,9	1.203	15.696
Sweden *	7,9	6,6	83,8	1.732	21.855
Switzerland *	10,4	7,6	73,2	2.853	27.336
Spain*	7,0	5,4	76,4	1.194	17.027
United Kingdom	6,9	5,8	83,3	1.569	22.689
United States of America	12,9	5,7	44,5	4.358	33.874

* Data as of 1998.

** Data regarding Public Health Cost in 1998.

Source: EUSTAT, Accounts of the Health, 1999.

above the Spanish average, but very low with respect to that of the more developed countries. Nevertheless, 76% of the total cost is utilised for public health care, which in general gives an idea of the weight of this sector within the health system.

Considered as a basic social right, all registered foreigners in any of the municipalities of Metropolitan Bilbao (regardless of their legal/administrative status), will be able to apply for a health card, which will give them access to the Basque Health Service under the same conditions as the native population.

Labour Market

The recovery from the crisis of the 1980s has noticeably modified the indicators regarding the labour market. The fall in the rate of unemployment and therefore the positive development of the rate of employment have been spectacular. If in 1986 one in four people of working age was unemployed (25,8%), this number had fallen to 9,6% in 2001. The rate of unemployment in 2006 is 5,6%. On the contrary, the rate of employment, which represents the working population as a percentage of the potentially active population, has gone from 74,2% to 85,6%.

Table 8
Development of the Rates of Employment and Unemployment.
Bilbao Metropolitan Area

Region	Employment rate (%)				Unemployment Rate (%)			
	1986	1991	1996	2001	1986	1991	1996	2001
Bilbao	74,1	78,4	73,2	85,2	25,9	15,5	14,5	9,5
Ibaizabal	75,2	80,6	74,5	87,9	24,8	16,1	16,0	9,3
Left bank	71,7	76,0	68,9	84,0	28,3	18,6	21,1	11,6
Sopela-Plentzia	76,5	80,9	79,0	88,5	23,5	15,4	11,1	6,8
Txorierrri	74,0	79,2	72,8	86,9	26,0	15,6	13,8	7,1
Uribe-Kosta	81,3	83,4	78,2	87,2	18,7	12,3	11,8	8,0
Mining zone	69,8	75,8	70,9	85,5	30,2	18,1	18,7	9,3
Metropolitan Bilbao	74,2	78,6	72,9	85,6	25,8	16,1	16,1	9,6
Basque Country	62,9	65,2	61,8	70,9	22,9	19,2	23,3	11,6

Source: EUSTAT.

In parallel, the economy of the metropolitan area presents a fairly diversified structure in which commerce, and real estate and enterprise activities and services, predominate over the rest (Table 9).

Table 9

Distribution of the Working Population by Sectors of Activity. Bilbao Metropolitan Area

Activity Sector	2004
Extractive industries	0.01
Manufacturing industry	4.93
Production and distribution of electrical energy, gas and water	0.04
Construction	9.60
Commerce; motor vehicle repair	21.81
Hotel trade	6.94
Transport, storage and communications	6.97
Financial services	2.11
Real estate and rental activities; enterprise services	15.14
Public administration, defense and obligatory Social Security	0.30
Education	1.91
Sanitary and veterinary activities, social service	3.98
Other social and community service activities	5.00
Metropolitan Bilbao	78.74
Bizkaia	100.00

Source: EUSTAT, Labour Market.

Productivity and Standard of Living

The GDP per capita indicates the value of what is produced and is indicative of the degree of wealth of a country. Table 10 reflects the development undergone by the Basque Country as a whole in relation to the remainder of European countries. The data show that while in 1995 the Basque Country occupied position 12 among the countries of the EU-25, in 2004 it occupies 5th place, behind Holland. Following Ireland and Luxembourg in that order, it has been the area that has experienced most growth during the period 1995-2004. In addition, the Basque Country is 24.8 points above the Spanish average and 22.9 points above the European average.

Table 10
Development of the GDP per capita (Index)

Countries	1995	2000	2004
EU25	100	100	100
Luxemburg	177.6	216.9	222.0
Ireland	99.7	127.2	140.6
Netherlands	119.5	120.7	124.9
Denmark	125.3	127.3	122.7
Austria	128.4	126.9	122.0
United Kingdom	109.8	113.5	118.7
Belgium	119.5	116.0	118.3
Sweden	117.6	118.9	116.0
Finland	106.1	114.0	114.4
France	115.8	114.7	110.3
Germany	121.8	112.9	109.3
Italy	114.7	110.4	104.9
Spain	87.0	93.1	98.1
Greece	71.7	71.9	81.7
Cyprus	85.6	85.5	81.2
Slovenia	44.3	73.5	78.6
Portugal	75.4	81.2	76.5
Malta	-	76.8	70.6
Czech Republic	69.6	64.3	70.4
Hungary	49.3	53.1	61.1
Slovakia	44.3	47.5	52.1
Estonia	35.3	43.2	50.7
Lithuania	33.9	38.2	47.8
Poland	40.5	45.9	46.7
Latvia	29.7	35.2	43.1
Basque Country	104.5	113.9	122.9

Source: EUROSTAT.

Social Protection

In the Basque Country public policies against poverty began with the Integral Plan to Fight Against Poverty of 1989, whose main objective was to restrain the more severe consequences of the poverty which the economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s had imposed on Basque society. After

the end of the period of application of the Integral Plan to Fight Against Poverty in 1992, it was verified that there was no point in trying to end poverty, which had in fact become endemic, through extraordinary measures, specifically through temporary economic aid. In this way, the actions adopted as regards the fight against poverty became structural and were integrated within the ordinary budgets of the Public Administrations.

The basic income


The model of guaranteed minimum incomes of the Basque Government contains two types of economic benefits and an insertion agreement. The most important benefit, called the Basic Income since the legislative modification of 2000 and prior to that IMI (Minimum Income of Insertion), is at present 81% of the multi-industry minimum wage (SMI), 435.17 Euros a month in 2004 (for households with a single recipient). Its objective is to cover the basic expenses needed for survival and beneficiaries must satisfy the following main requirements: to be older than 23 years, not to have an income above 81% of the SMI (for a single recipient), except when there is income from work, in which case this percentage rises, and to count as an independent economic unit (independent household) for at least a year (demonstrable through registration with a municipality and a corresponding contract of rental or sublet). The basic income is legally considered as a subjective right, which means that it cannot be eliminated, suspended or cut back in cases of insufficient budget.

Emergency Social Aid (AES)

The other economic benefit is Emergency Social Aid (AES), designed to cover specific expenses, whether ordinary or extraordinary, necessary to prevent, palliate or avoid situations of social marginalisation. The maximum annual amounts by type of expense and recipient are variable.² The conditions for receiving the AES are: one must be over 18

² For the year 2004 they were: 3.245,47 Euros for expenses of rent or derived from interest and amortization of credit; 1.081,82 Euros for other expenses necessary for the benefit and maintenance of the home; 1.803,04 Euros for expenses of furniture and home appliances; 1,803.04 Euros for expenses of adaptation, repair and/or facilities in the home; 1,803.04 Euros for expenses regarding primary needs and 3.245,47 Euros for expenses from prior indebtedness.

years old, not have an income over 1.5 times the Basic Rent (this amount is increased in cases of having a working income) and residence in the Basque Country for at least 6 months. The AES is not a subjective right, which implies that it is cut back when the budget is insufficient, which has been the norm throughout the life of the AES and which, in recent years, is becoming a very serious problem since, given the scarcity of housing, three quarters of this aid go to cover rent, not meeting even half of real demand and leaving the other types of expenses anticipated in the Law very lacking in funds.



Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of EUSTAT

Graph 4

Cost per inhabitant of social protection

Territorial Problematic of the Sub-areas of the Metropolitan Area

Territorially, within the Bilbao metropolitan area we find different zones whose internal peculiarities are presented next:

Bilbao Capital

This is the central nucleus, financial centre and main population entity. It is made up of 8 districts and 39 neighbourhoods. Bilbao is a consolidated urban area without capacity for real territorial growth within the limits of the municipality, due to its relatively rugged topography. Urban

growth has consequently shifted to the bordering municipalities. The urban crisis of the 1980s gave rise to a Strategic Plan for the renovation of the city on the basis of the recovery of vacant land derived from the closure of various companies and the crisis of the 1980s. This Strategic Plan was pivotal to the beginning of projects like the Guggenheim museum, Metro, Euskalduna Conference and Music Centre, Tram and others.

Right bank

This area includes the municipalities of Leioa, Getxo and Berango. These are mainly upper-middle-class, residential municipalities, population centres with relatively high income and which have served as areas for expansion for those social classes which, seeking to flee from the city centre, looked for pleasant surroundings and high quality of life. Getxo is outstanding for its history, size and importance and constitutes a symbolic referent for certain sectors of society for which this municipality is a central area.

Left bank

A traditional working class enclave in process of deep reconstruction, this area includes the municipalities of Barakaldo, Sestao, Portugalete and Santurtzi. This is an area occupied by major industries which has undergone a progressive process of industrial dismantling and which has been forced to carry out a policy of economic and social regeneration. At present, specific activities are being implemented concerning recovery of polluted land, the development of local use policies and activities aimed at eradicating the problems derived from the concentration of ethnic minorities; like, for example, gypsies in districts that present clear symptoms of degradation. This is the case of the Special Plan for Chavarri in Sestao.

Txorierrri

This is an expanding area next to Bilbao, including the following municipalities: Erandio, Loiu, Sondika, Derio, Lezama, Zamudio and Larabetzu. All of them have a semirural-semiurban nature, abundant land and a concentration of some of the most important infrastructures: Airport, technology parks. They have become places of reference for the upper class in recent years, due to the supply of low density housing. The concentration of high-tech companies and some of the more important research centers gives this area a strategic nature. Some municipalities

like Derio or Erandio, still have an industrial nature as a result of past developments, although they are undergoing a profound transformation.

Mining zone

As its name indicates, these are municipalities that historically correspond to working-class areas dedicated to the extraction of iron and which at present are particularly industrial in character. This area includes the municipalities of Abanto and Zierbena, Muskiz, Trapagarán, Ortuella, and Alonsotegi. The progressive abandonment of the mines has created a need to replace the old mining uses by others and to reconvert the productive fabric of these municipalities, which until very recently were clearly working class in nature. This is an area of prolongation of the Left bank to the foot of the Triano mountains, which is undergoing full reconversion. The population is mainly working class and has been highly affected by the active political need to implement social welfare programmes to palliate the problems of unemployment and poverty. At present it is immersed in profound changes, derived from innovative projects in the areas of energy and new technologies.

Ibaizabal

Located in the upper part of the river basin, this zone is composed of the following municipalities: Basauri, Galdakao, Etxebarri, Arrigorriaga and Zaratamo. These are densely populated municipalities with an old industrial tradition, which present a profile in accordance with their character of nuclei and which have long played host to incoming workers since a stage (1960s-70s) when the need to find housing prevailed over any other criterion related to quality of life. Basauri constitutes the most populated nucleus and the one with the greatest industrial tradition. Its landscape, shattered by countless industrial activities and neighbourhoods constructed in a chaotic way, with hardly any planning criteria, is a clear indicator of the problems currently presented by these municipalities in urgent need of active policies of regeneration and improvement in the quality of life. Etxebarri and Galdakao, although to a lesser extent, also present symptoms derived from uncontrolled growth that it has been necessary to reverse after many years. Zaratamo and Arrigorriaga have a somewhat distinct character, due to being essentially nuclei of residential expansion.

In fact, the Bilbao metropolitan area is an old industrial area that has experienced a shock during the 1980s-90s due to an economic crisis which has forced a serious reformulation of its role and meaning. The

political and financial capacity of the Basque institutions has led to a profound transformation of the area in question. The demographic crisis which has affected the area as a whole, derived from an abrupt fall in the birth rate, has been compensated by the arrival of the immigrant population in a slow, but continuous, process which has gained visibility in recent years, attracted by the capacity of the economy to use this population both in the industrial and service sectors.

Overview of Immigraion in Metropolitan Bilbao

The more recent data available, from 1 January 2007, show that at the beginning of the past year 39.743 foreign people lived in the Bilbao metropolitan area, constituting 4,4% of the resident population. This number represents 40% of the foreigners registered in the Basque Country and 79% of the foreign population registered in the province of Bizkaia. Table 11 presents the comparative elements of population in relation to the whole of the Basque Country and the three Basque provinces, and here we can state that the Bilbao metropolitan area represents the greatest urban concentration of the region, since it contains 42% of the region's total population and 79% of that of the province of Bizkaia, of which Bilbao is capital. Given this concentration, the analysis of immigration in this metropolitan zone seems to be a good idea, since it contains four out of every ten foreign people registered in the Basque country.

Table 11

Total population and foreign population in the Basque Country by territories.
1.1.2007

	Population	Foreigners	% foreigners
Alava	305.459	19.392	6,3
Gipuzkoa	694.944	29.040	4,2
Bizkaia	1.141.457	50.092	4,4
Total Basque Country	2.141.860	98.524	4,6
Metropolitan Bilbao	897.511	39.743	4,4
% Metropolitan Bilbao with respect to the Basque Country	42%	40,3%	
% Metropolitan Bilbao with respect to Bizkaia	78,6%	79,3%	

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI. Municipal register.

The available sources of data allow us a vision of the situation of the Bilbao metropolitan area in relation to the foreign population with regard to several aspects, including their territorial distribution by municipalities and districts, and their breakdown by sex, age and regions of the world from which the immigrants come.

Territorial Distribution of the Foreign Population

The municipalities around the Bilbao capital, comprising in total of 31 population nuclei, are diverse in both size and the number of foreigners resident in them. Altogether there are almost 900.000 inhabitants, of whom 4,4% are foreigners, that is to say 39.743 people. Table 12 shows their territorial distribution. The municipalities of Bilbao (6,2%) and Getxo (5,2%) present the highest population concentrations,³ considerably above the average of 4,4% of foreigners in the metropolitan area as a whole.

The distribution by districts, taking solely the municipalities of Bilbao and Getxo, also show the unequal territorial distribution of the foreign immigrant population (Table 13). In Bilbao the major concentrations of immigrants are in two districts of the city. One of them, the district of Ibaiondo, is the zone with the highest percentage of immigrants and includes the neighbourhoods of San Francisco (27,8%), Bilbao la Vieja (12,6%) and Old Quarter (10,5%), all located in the old part of the city.

The other zone is located in the District of Rekalde, where 7,5% foreign population reside. In this area are located the neighbourhoods of Ametzola (9%) and Uretamendi (8,2%). The third district that concentrates a high percentage of foreigners is Deusto, where 5,8% of the population is foreign and particularly the neighbourhood of Arangoiti (10,8%). These geographic spaces present the highest immigrant concentrations throughout the metropolitan area. It is possible to indicate that the city of Bilbao, within the metropolitan area, is the zone of highest concentration of the immigrant population, with a percentage of 6,2% in relation to the total population, as shown in Table 13. In Getxo, the districts of Algorta and Neguri group the highest percentage of immigrants, although in all the districts, except in Andra Mari, there are some census sections where 7-10% of the population is composed of foreign residents.

³ The municipality of Loiu has 7,3% foreign population in its territory, 159 people. But this is where one of the main accommodation centres of Bizkaia is located where unaccompanied minor immigrants live, when the public institutions are acting as their guardians.

Table 12

Native and foreign population resident in the Bilbao metropolitan area, according to municipality of residence. 1.1.2007

Municipality	Total Population	Native	Foreigner	% Foreigners
Abanto & Zierbena	9.609	9.480	129	1,3
Alonsotegi	2.804	2.737	67	1,3
Arrigorriaga	12.341	11.945	396	3,2
Baracaldo	96.412	93.196	3.216	3,3
Barrika	1.405	1.356	49	3,5
Basauri	43.250	42.199	1.051	2,4
Berango	6.280	6.007	273	4,4
Bilbao	353.168	331.278	21.890	6,2
Derio	5.191	5.022	169	3,3
Erandio	23.960	22.675	1.285	5,4
Etxebarri	8.152	7.988	164	2,0
Galdakao	29.183	28.587	596	2,0
Getxo	81.746	77.492	4.254	5,2
Gorliz	5.176	4.945	231	4,5
Larrabetzu	1.742	1.719	23	1,3
Leioa	29.217	27.868	1.349	4,6
Lezama	2.411	2.311	100	4,2
Loiu	2.180	2.021	159	7,3
Muskiz	6.943	6.819	124	1,8
Ortuella	8.577	8.492	85	1,0
Plentzia	4.081	3.975	106	2,6
Portugalete	48.386	47.504	882	1,8
Santurtzi	47.094	45.946	1.148	2,4
Sestao	29.718	28.775	943	3,2
Sondika	4.432	4.283	149	3,4
Sopelana	12.123	11.682	441	3,6
Trapagaran	12.451	12.282	169	1,4
Urduliz	3.267	3.183	84	2,6
Zamudio	3.226	3.067	159	4,9
Zaratamo	1.687	1.656	31	1,8
Zierbana	1.299	1.278	21	1,6
Total	897.511	857.768	39.743	4,4

Source: NSI.

Table 13

Native and foreign population resident in Bilbao and Getxo, by districts and neighbourhoods. 1.1.2007

	Total population	Native	Foreigners	% Foreigners
District of Deusto	51.894	48.870	3.024	5,8
San Ignacio	14.015	13.249	766	5,5
Ibarrekolanda	11.154	10.674	480	4,3
San Pedro de Deusto	18.746	17.706	1.040	5,5
Arangoiti	3.208	2.862	346	10,8
La Ribera	1.829	1.750	79	4,3
Scattered Deusto	2.942	2.629	313	10,6
District of Uríbarri	38.783	36.640	2.143	5,5
Ciudad Jardín	741	709	32	4,3
Uríbarri	13.591	12.619	972	7,2
Zurbarán	9.641	9.227	414	4,3
Arabella	1.681	1.604	77	4,6
Matiko	4.975	4.639	336	6,8
Castaños	6.700	6.433	267	4,0
Scattered Uríbarri	1.454	1.409	45	3,1
District of Otxarkoaga-Txurdinaga	28.808	28.129	679	2,4
Otxarkoaga	11.428	11.075	353	3,1
Txurdinaga	16.158	15.870	288	1,8
Scattered Otxarkoaga-Txurdinaga	1.222	1.184	38	3,1
District of Begoña	43.322	41.309	2.013	4,6
Begoña	5.440	5.252	188	3,5
Santutxu	31.726	30.252	1.474	4,6
Bolueta	6.156	5.805	351	5,7
District of Ibaiondo	57.916	52.016	5.900	10,2
Casco Viejo	6.568	5.879	689	10,5
Iturribide	4.551	4.210	341	7,5
Solokoetxe	7.696	7.111	585	7,6
Atxuri	4.938	4.581	357	7,2
San Francisco	7.690	5.554	2.136	27,8
Bilbao la Vieja	2.305	2.015	290	12,6
Zabala	6.218	5.622	596	9,6
San Adrián	10.119	9.734	385	3,8
La Peña	5.601	5.219	382	6,8
Scattered Ibaiondo	2.230	2.091	139	6,2

	Total population	Native	Foreigners	% Foreigners
District of Abando	51.458	48.743	2.715	5,3
Indautxu	28.111	26.760	1.351	4,8
Abando	23.347	21.983	1.364	5,8
District of Rekalde	47.394	43.837	3.557	7,5
Ametzola	12.656	11.521	1.135	9,0
Iralabari	11.748	10.832	916	7,8
Errekaldeberri	15.449	14.411	1.038	6,7
Larrasquitu	2.684	2.541	143	5,3
Iturrigorri-Peñascal	1.375	1.335	40	2,9
Uretamendi	2.694	2.473	221	8,2
Scattered Errekalde	788	724	64	8,1
District of Basurto-Zorroza	33.593	31.734	1.859	5,5
Zorroza	11.956	11.358	598	5,0
Altamira	1.287	1.217	70	5,4
Olabeaga	1.084	1.005	79	7,3
Masustegui	4.201	3.948	253	6,0
Basurto	14.304	13.486	818	5,7
Scattered Basurto-Zorroza	761	720	41	5,4
Bilbao total	353.168	331.278	21.890	6,2
Total Getxo Districts	81.746	77.492	4.254	5,2
Algorta	36.389	34.293	2.096	5,8
Andra Mari	10.825	10.437	388	3,6
Las Arenas	27.868	26.475	1.393	5,0
Neguri	6.664	6.287	377	5,7

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI.

The distribution of the foreign population by sexes in the metropolis as a whole corresponds to the distribution by sexes of the whole population, in which the percentage of women dominates slightly, who represent 52,4% of the total foreign population, as can be observed in table 14.

Many municipalities of the metropolitan area exist in which a high proportion of women immigrants are present. In eight of the municipalities, the percentage of women surpasses 58%, reaching a maximum of 69% in Ortuella. Although we do not have data on the legal situation of immigrants at the level of Metropolitan Bilbao, we can indicate that, as regards the province of Bizkaia, at the beginning of 2007 there were 32.183 foreigners residing in this territory with a valid residence card or authorization, of which 15.591 were women (48,5%) and 16.592 men (51,5%).

Table 14

Resident foreign population in the Bilbao Metropolitan Area by sex, according to municipality of residence. 1.1.2007

Municipality	Total Foreigners	Men	Women	% Women
Abanto & Zierbena	129	54	75	58,1
Alonsotegi	67	33	34	50,7
Arrigorriaga	396	198	198	50,0
Barakaldo	3.216	1.557	1.659	51,6
Barrika	49	26	23	46,9
Basauri	1.051	533	518	49,3
Berango	273	101	172	63,0
Bilbao	21.890	10.750	11.140	50,9
Derio	169	108	61	36,1
Erandio	1.285	615	670	52,1
Etxebarri	164	81	83	50,6
Galdakao	596	275	321	53,9
Getxo	4.254	1.686	2.568	60,4
Gorliz	231	99	132	57,1
Larrabetzu	23	10	13	56,5
Leioa	1.349	612	737	54,6
Lezama	100	46	54	54,0
Loiu	159	109	50	31,4
Muskiz	124	45	79	63,7
Ortuella	85	26	59	69,4
Plentzia	106	44	62	58,5
Portugalete	882	413	469	53,2
Santurtzi	1.148	561	587	51,1
Sestao	943	455	488	51,7
Sondika	149	70	79	53,0
Sopelana	441	201	240	54,4
Trapagaran	169	74	95	56,2
Urduliz	84	35	49	58,3
Zamudio	159	83	76	47,8
Zaratamo	31	16	15	48,4
Zierbana	21	8	13	61,9
Total	39.743	18.924	20.819	52,4

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI.

Therefore, we can deduce that, if the foreign population of Bizkaia is counted as of January 2007 as consisting of 50.092 people and that, if of this amount of foreign people, 32.183 were residing in this territory with a valid residence permit or authorization, the other 17.809 foreigners were residing in Bizkaia without the necessary residence permit, that is to say, irregularly. The irregularity situation affects women more, since, if the percentage ratio between the number of foreign women and men residing in Bizkaia whether regularly or irregularly is 51,3% versus 48,7% in favour of women, this percentage ratio changes in favour of the men when speaking about the percentage of foreigners with a mandatory residence permit in the territory of Bizkaia (being 48,5% for women versus 51,5% in the case of men). Table 15 illustrates the data given in this paragraph.

Table 15

Registered foreign population and foreign population with residence permission in Bizkaia by sex. 1.1.2007

	Registered foreign population		Foreign population with residence permission	
Women	25.687	51,3	15.591	48,5
Men	24.405	48,7	16.592	51,5
Total	50.092	100	32.183	100

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI and the Statistical Yearbook of Immigration

When contemplating the distribution by age of the immigrant population (Table 16) the concentration within the productive age range is evident. 83% of all migrants in the Bilbao metropolitan area are be-

Table 16

Foreign population resident in the Bilbao Metropolitan Area, by age groups. 1.1.2007

Age Groups	Total	Percentage
Under 16 years	6.206	15,6
From 16 to 64 years	32.848	82,7
65 years and over	689	1,7
Total	39.743	100

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI.

tween 16 and 64 years old. Immigrant minors constitute 15,6% of the total. The immigrant population over 65 years old, on the other hand, is very low and represents only 1,7% of the total. This distribution by age groups is very distant far from that presented by the local population, since while the foreign population is young, the native one shows an older distribution of the population.

Distribution of the Foreign Population, According to Place of Origin

As regards the origin of foreigners, almost six out of ten residents in Metropolitan Bilbao come from the Americas (Table 17) and specifically from the countries of South America. Europeans constitute 20% of all foreigners and, of these, 60% come from the countries of the European Union (Table 18). People from the geographic areas of the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia respectively form minority communities, each with a weighting of around 7% of the total foreign population.

Table 17

Resident foreign population in the Bilbao Metropolitan Area by place of origin, according to municipality of residence. 1.1.2007

Municipality	Total foreign	Europe	Maghreb	Rest of Africa	Americas	Asia
Abanto & Zierbena	129	50	8	4	66	1
Alonsotegi	67	24	1	12	29	1
Arrigorriaga	396	152	25	50	155	14
Baracaldo	3.216	682	291	204	1.802	237
Barrika	49	25	0	0	21	3
Basauri	1.051	375	77	72	452	75
Berango	273	117	2	3	146	5
Bilbao	21.890	3.666	1.285	2.395	13.304	1.240
Derio	169	56	23	9	73	8
Erandio	1.285	158	32	31	1.043	21
Etxebarri	164	27	46	8	83	0
Galdakao	596	228	34	24	287	23
Getxo	4.254	1.030	80	27	2.818	299
Gorliz	231	73	10	6	141	1

Municipality	Total foreign	Europe	Maghreb	Rest of Africa	Americas	Asia
Larrabetzu	23	10	1	0	12	0
Leioa	1.349	231	83	18	935	82
Lezama	100	25	1	11	60	3
Loiu	159	23	77	9	45	5
Muskiz	124	20	12	5	83	4
Ortuella	85	28	5	3	49	0
Plentzia	106	61	0	3	40	2
Portugalete	882	240	63	46	459	74
Santurtzi	1.148	371	85	82	526	84
Sestao	943	142	95	121	555	30
Sondika	149	43	15	13	75	3
Sopelana	441	134	9	13	263	22
Trapagaran	169	38	4	12	102	13
Urduliz	84	37	2	0	44	1
Zamudio	159	36	13	7	103	0
Zaratamo	31	12	0	2	17	0
Zierbana	21	15	0	0	6	0
Total	39.743	8.129	2.397	3.208	23.800	2.223
Horizontal Percentage	100,0	20,5	6,0	8,1	59,9	5,6

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI.

In the Bilbao metropolitan area the municipalities do not all host the same type of immigrants. Thus, for example, we see that almost the whole of the foreign population that resides in Erandio is from the Americas, whereas almost half of the foreign population originating in Europe lives in Bilbao (although they do not represent more of 17% of the foreign population resident in this municipality). As regards the Maghrebis, more than half are concentrated in Bilbao, although it is possible to say that their relative weight represents half that reached in Loiu, since unaccompanied minors, hosted in a centre in this municipality, are almost all from Morocco. Although 75% of sub-Saharan Africans live in Bilbao, the places in which they are present in relative terms are Sestao and Arrigorriaga. Asians, on the other hand, are relatively more present in Getxo, Leioa, Portugalete and Santurtzi.

Table 18

Resident foreign population in the Bilbao Metropolitan Area coming from Europe, according to area. 1.1.2007

Continent	Area	Number	Percentage
Europe	UE-27	7.482	18,8
	Rest of Europe	647	1,6

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of NSI.

A comparison of the origin of immigrants of Metropolitan Bilbao with the Basque country as a whole and with the province of Bizkaia (Table 19 and Table 20), reveals that in the metropolis reside almost half of all the Asian immigrants in the Basque Country, 49% of all the immigrants from the Americas, a third of the immigrants originating from Africa and 28,6% of all European residents in the Basque country. In relation to the province of Bizkaia as a whole, almost all the Asians and 86% of Americans live in the metropolitan area, as well as a little more than three quarters of the Africans. Two thirds of the immigrants from European countries who live in Bizkaia are located in Metropolitan Bilbao.

Table 19

Resident foreign population in the Basque Country according to area of birth, by provinces. 1.1.2007

	Álava	Gipuzkoa	Bizkaia	Total Basque Country
Europe	5.581	10.767	13.082	29.430
Africa	4.888	3.774	7.145	15.807
North America	145	488	656	1.289
Central America	667	2.122	1.401	4.190
South America	7.108	10.505	25.468	43.081
Asia	1.000	1.340	2.287	4.627
Australia	3	44	53	100
Total foreignt population	19.392	29.040	50.092	98.524

Source: NSI. Municipal register.

Table 20

Resident foreign population in Metropolitan Bilbao according to area of birth.
1.1.2007

	Metropolitan Bilbao	Percentage	% Basque Country	% Bizkaia
Europe	8.129	20,5	8,3	16,2
Africa	5.569	14,0	5,7	11,1
America	23.794	59,9	24,2	47,5
Asia	2.223	5,6	2,3	4,4
Australia	28	0,1	0,0	0,1
Total foreign population	39.743	100		

Source: NSI. Municipal register.

Educational and Schooling Levels of the Foreign Population

Information regarding the educational levels of the foreign population is collected solely by means of population censuses, carried out every ten years. For that reason in this section we will refer to the data concerning the educational levels of the resident foreign population in the Basque country, gathered in 2001. On that date, three out of ten foreign residents lacked any type of educational qualification (28% did not have qualifications and another 2% were illiterate). Another quarter had a primary education qualification. The most numerous group were those who had a secondary education qualification (33%), whereas only 3% had reached a professional qualification only. Finally, 10% had a university degree.

By continent of origin, in the region of Greater Bilbao, we can see that the European population had the highest educational level, followed by the American, Asian and African populations (Table 21). Whereas among Europeans and Americans more than half of the population had completed their secondary and/or university studies, among Asians three out of four had no specific qualifications or had only a primary education. More than half of immigrants from Africa had no qualifications.

On the other hand, in Bizkaia the foreign population of school age, at the beginning of 2007, represents a fifth of the total foreign population (21%); half of the people who compose this group being in an irregular situation. The majority of these people aged between 0 and 19 years come from Latin America (55%), another 31% are from Europe, 11% are from the African continent and another 3% from Asia.

Table 21

Resident foreign population in the Great Bilbao according to origin continent and level of studies (horizontal Percentage). Year 2001

Continent	Without any qualification	Primary	Secondary	College students
Europe	21	21	40	18
America	22	28	42	8
Asia	40	31	20	9
Africa	57	19	21	3

Source: EUSTAT.

The resident foreign population of school age in the province of Bizkaia and Metropolitan Bilbao in particular is ever more numerous, diverse and multicultural, a situation which the Basque educational system will doubtless have to deal with if it really wants to fulfill its task of "guaranteeing the effective exercise of the constitutionally recognized right to education, eliminating economic, social and any other type of obstacles that hinder it" (Art. 3.2a, Law of the Basque State schools).

According to data from the Department of Education, Universities and Research of the Basque Government, corresponding to March 2006, at present the educational centres of Bizkaia already have 7.635 students of foreign origin, as a result of continued growth during recent years. These pupils coming from other countries are distributed among the different educational levels as follows: 19,1% are in Infant Education, 42,9% in Primary Education, 25,7% in Compulsory Secondary Education, 5,2% in Baccalaureate and 2,6% in Intermediate and Higher Education.

According to ownership of the schools, we emphasize that just over seven out of ten students (71%) study in public schools, whereas the remaining 29% do so in the arranged private (part public funded) network. The main nationalities of foreign pupils in Bizkaia's schools are, in this order: Colombian (1.436 students), Bolivian (980), Ecuadorian (812), Rumanian (537), Moroccan (478), Brazilian (310), Argentinean (255) and Chinese (245 students).

Among schools in Bizkaia, 189 have a percentage of foreign pupils below 5% (106 public and 83 arranged private). On the other hand, there are 69 schools in Bizkaia with between 5 and 10% immigrant pupils (54 public and 15 arranged private). Schools where immigrant pupils represent between 10 and 20% of the total are 43 in number (33 public and 10 arranged private). Finally, there are 29 schools in which the percentage of foreign pupils exceeds 20% (24 public and 5 arranged private).

Conclusion

As reflected in the data that we have just analysed, the increasing migratory flow towards the Bilbao metropolitan area is not merely a reality of recent years, but everything suggests that it will continue into the future. This means that, from a spatial point of view, immigrants are in a process of settlement, still awaiting a definitive consolidation.

Urban research related to immigration has demonstrated that, historically, decayed and marginal enclaves have been the places of settlement, at least initially, of these immigrant populations. These places can be categorised into two types of habitat: traditional neighbourhoods and former working-class districts. Nevertheless, their regeneration has contributed to the process of diffusion of the immigrant population towards other areas. In the same way, in the Bilbao metropolitan area, although this recent immigration is initially giving rise to processes of spatial concentration in certain districts, over the years and with the greater arrival of foreigners, we also see an increasing process of diffusion or spatial dispersion throughout the municipalities and neighbourhoods of the metropolitan area.

A challenge that is raised by this situation is to identify the mobility strategies of the different groups within the metropolitan geography. We should also analyse to what extent a transformation of certain neighbourhoods is taking place, identifying the processes of integration-segregation that take place with the settlement of the population of foreign origin. Since this immigration is primarily economic in nature and its position in the labour market is going to particularly determine its legal-administrative characterisation, as well as its social location, the challenge to be faced will be to know and analyze in depth the employment reality of this group, a fundamental aspect when reflecting on its present situation and future perspectives. In this context it will be important to consider the relation between the employment niches open to the immigrant population and their prior educational levels.

An aspect linked to the economic variable is access to housing, which is difficult for the population as a whole, but fundamentally worse among immigrants. The challenge in this area will be to verify the influence on the geographical location of immigrants of variables like scarcity of housing, shortage of rental accommodation, discrimination against immigrants concerning their access to rental accommodation, location with respect to the workplace and so on.

Another challenge to consider is to identify processes of inclusion-segregation linked to the spaces in which daily life develops: leisure places, bars, discotheques, supermarkets, meeting places, sports facili-

ties and so on. These areas not only displayed different patterns of use depending on the specific kind of space in question, but also reflect how the process of group integration of immigrants is taking place in our society. A field that merits special attention is that of educational integration, given the concentration of immigrant pupils in some schools, and the need for all the schools in Metropolitan Bilbao to be true intercultural spaces, where young people who share a classroom have the opportunity to reach the expected educational levels. The challenge, therefore, will be to research how the incorporation of immigrant pupils is taking place, at least at the levels of obligatory education in the Bilbao metropolitan area, at the same time as analysing how these schools are approaching the challenges of intercultural education.

On the other hand, one of the consequences of recent incoming migration towards the Bilbao Metropolitan Area is the need to restructure current social policies to make them equally accessible to immigrants. A challenge in this field is to understand in depth the accessibility of the different social, educational, health, etc., resources, incorporating both observable elements (distance to the resources, transport system...) and intangible elements related to the perception of accessibility (public perception of the group, adaptation of resources, etc.).

In all the aspects considered, it is important to consider the great diversity manifested by the immigrant body, from the point of view of their national origins, conditions of departure and arrival, gender, social capital, culture, language, religion... These variables will affect the questions that we have just been raising, which means that we must take them into account in analysing situations and elaborating policies in order to promote social integration and cohesion.

Nevertheless, we should point out that, nowadays, the available sources of information present important deficits. If we wish to research the subject and establish immigration policies that fit with reality, we need to improve our information sources at metropolitan level. At present, though, the most complete data come from the census. Since they are collected only once every ten years and thanks to the changeable process of the migratory phenomenon, these data are not very useful for understanding contemporary reality. The Municipal Register is much more up-to-date, but the volume of variables that it contains is very limited. Other sources existing at state level do not pick up data released at municipal level, or lack information regarding variables like sex, level of education and so on.



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